CERA-CRANIUM: a test bed for machine consciousness research

Proceeding of: International Workshop on Machine Consciousness 2009. Hong Kong, China. 15-17. June, 2009.This paper describes a novel framework designed as a test bed for machine consciousness cognitive models (MCCM). This MCCM experimentation framework is based on a generalpurpose cognitive architecture that can be integrated in different environments and confronted with different problem domains. The definition of a generic cognitive control system for abstract agents is the root of the versatility of the presented framework. The proposed control system, which is inspired in the major cognitive theories of consciousness, provides mechanisms for both sensory data acquisition and motor action execution. Sensory and motor data is represented in the proposed architecture using different level workspaces where percepts and actions are generated thanks to the competition and collaboration of specialized processors. Additionally, this cognitive architecture provides the means to modulate perception and behavior; in other words, it offers an interface for a higher control layer to drive the way percepts and actions are generated and how they interact with each other. This mechanism permits the experimentation with virtually any high level cognitive model of consciousness. An illustrative application scenario, autonomous explorer robots, is also reviewed in this work.This research has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under CICYT grant TRA2007-67374-C02-02.No publicad

Montreal Cognitive Assessment for the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease and other dementias.

BACKGROUND: Dementia is a progressive syndrome of global cognitive impairment with significant health and social care costs. Global prevalence is projected to increase, particularly in resource-limited settings. Recent policy changes in Western countries to increase detection mandates a careful examination of the diagnostic accuracy of neuropsychological tests for dementia. OBJECTIVES: To determine the diagnostic accuracy of the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) at various thresholds for dementia and its subtypes. SEARCH METHODS: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, BIOSIS Previews, Science Citation Index, PsycINFO and LILACS databases to August 2012. In addition, we searched specialised sources containing diagnostic studies and reviews, including MEDION (Meta-analyses van Diagnostisch Onderzoek), DARE (Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects), HTA (Health Technology Assessment Database), ARIF (Aggressive Research Intelligence Facility) and C-EBLM (International Federation of Clinical Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine Committee for Evidence-based Laboratory Medicine) databases. We also searched ALOIS (Cochrane Dementia and Cognitive Improvement Group specialized register of diagnostic and intervention studies). We identified further relevant studies from the PubMed 'related articles' feature and by tracking key studies in Science Citation Index and Scopus. We also searched for relevant grey literature from the Web of Science Core Collection, including Science Citation Index and Conference Proceedings Citation Index (Thomson Reuters Web of Science), PhD theses and contacted researchers with potential relevant data. SELECTION CRITERIA: Cross-sectional designs where all participants were recruited from the same sample were sought; case-control studies were excluded due to high chance of bias. We searched for studies from memory clinics, hospital clinics, primary care and community populations. We excluded studies of early onset dementia, dementia from a secondary cause, or studies where participants were selected on the basis of a specific disease type such as Parkinson's disease or specific settings such as nursing homes. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We extracted dementia study prevalence and dichotomised test positive/test negative results with thresholds used to diagnose dementia. This allowed calculation of sensitivity and specificity if not already reported in the study. Study authors were contacted where there was insufficient information to complete the 2x2 tables. We performed quality assessment according to the QUADAS-2 criteria.Methodological variation in selected studies precluded quantitative meta-analysis, therefore results from individual studies were presented with a narrative synthesis. MAIN RESULTS: Seven studies were selected: three in memory clinics, two in hospital clinics, none in primary care and two in population-derived samples. There were 9422 participants in total, but most of studies recruited only small samples, with only one having more than 350 participants. The prevalence of dementia was 22% to 54% in the clinic-based studies, and 5% to 10% in population samples. In the four studies that used the recommended threshold score of 26 or over indicating normal cognition, the MoCA had high sensitivity of 0.94 or more but low specificity of 0.60 or less. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The overall quality and quantity of information is insufficient to make recommendations on the clinical utility of MoCA for detecting dementia in different settings. Further studies that do not recruit participants based on diagnoses already present (case-control design) but apply diagnostic tests and reference standards prospectively are required. Methodological clarity could be improved in subsequent DTA studies of MoCA by reporting findings using recommended guidelines (e.g. STARDdem). Thresholds lower than 26 are likely to be more useful for optimal diagnostic accuracy of MoCA in dementia, but this requires confirmation in further studies.This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from Wiley via http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD010775.pub

Montreal Cognitive Assessment for the detection of dementia

Background: Dementia is a progressive syndrome of global cognitive impairment with significant health and social care costs. Global prevalence is projected to increase, particularly in resource‐limited settings. Recent policy changes in Western countries to increase detection mandates a careful examination of the diagnostic accuracy of neuropsychological tests for dementia. Objectives: To determine the accuracy of the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) for the detection of dementia. Search methods: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, BIOSIS Previews, Science Citation Index, PsycINFO and LILACS databases to August 2012. In addition, we searched specialised sources containing diagnostic studies and reviews, including MEDION (Meta‐analyses van Diagnostisch Onderzoek), DARE (Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects), HTA (Health Technology Assessment Database), ARIF (Aggressive Research Intelligence Facility) and C‐EBLM (International Federation of Clinical Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine Committee for Evidence‐based Laboratory Medicine) databases. We also searched ALOIS (Cochrane Dementia and Cognitive Improvement Group specialized register of diagnostic and intervention studies). We identified further relevant studies from the PubMed ‘related articles’ feature and by tracking key studies in Science Citation Index and Scopus. We also searched for relevant grey literature from the Web of Science Core Collection, including Science Citation Index and Conference Proceedings Citation Index (Thomson Reuters Web of Science), PhD theses and contacted researchers with potential relevant data. // Selection criteria: Cross‐sectional designs where all participants were recruited from the same sample were sought; case‐control studies were excluded due to high chance of bias. We searched for studies from memory clinics, hospital clinics, primary care and community populations. We excluded studies of early onset dementia, dementia from a secondary cause, or studies where participants were selected on the basis of a specific disease type such as Parkinson’s disease or specific settings such as nursing homes. // Data collection and analysis: We extracted dementia study prevalence and dichotomised test positive/test negative results with thresholds used to diagnose dementia. This allowed calculation of sensitivity and specificity if not already reported in the study. Study authors were contacted where there was insufficient information to complete the 2x2 tables. We performed quality assessment according to the QUADAS‐2 criteria. Methodological variation in selected studies precluded quantitative meta‐analysis, therefore results from individual studies were presented with a narrative synthesis. // Main results: Seven studies were selected: three in memory clinics, two in hospital clinics, none in primary care and two in population‐derived samples. There were 9422 participants in total, but most of studies recruited only small samples, with only one having more than 350 participants. The prevalence of dementia was 22% to 54% in the clinic‐based studies, and 5% to 10% in population samples. In the four studies that used the recommended threshold score of 26 or over indicating normal cognition, the MoCA had high sensitivity of 0.94 or more but low specificity of 0.60 or less. // Authors' conclusions: The overall quality and quantity of information is insufficient to make recommendations on the clinical utility of MoCA for detecting dementia in different settings. Further studies that do not recruit participants based on diagnoses already present (case‐control design) but apply diagnostic tests and reference standards prospectively are required. Methodological clarity could be improved in subsequent DTA studies of MoCA by reporting findings using recommended guidelines (e.g. STARDdem). Thresholds lower than 26 are likely to be more useful for optimal diagnostic accuracy of MoCA in dementia, but this requires confirmation in further studies

Primary Physical Science for Student Teachers at Kindergarten and Primary School Levels: Part II—Implementation and Evaluation of a Course

AbstractThis is the second of two papers on a novel physical science course for student teachers that develops and uses an imaginative approach to Primary Physical Science Education. General philosophical, cognitive, developmental, and scientific issues have been presented in the first paper; here, we briefly recapitulate the most important aspects. In the main part of the current paper, we present in some detail concrete elements of the implementation of the course at three Italian universities where Primary Physical Science Education has been taught for more than 6 years. After a brief description of the course structure, we discuss which parts of macroscopic physics are taught, and how this is done in lectures and labs. Most importantly, we show how the science is entwined with methods related to pedagogy and didactics that (1) help our students approach the science and (2) can be transferred quite readily to teaching children in kindergarten and primary school. These methods include the design of direct physical experience of forces of nature, embodied simulations, writing and telling of stories of forces of nature, and design and performance of Forces-of-Nature Theater plays. The paper continues with a brief description of feedback from former students who have been teaching for some time, and an in-depth analysis of the research and teaching done by one of the students for her master thesis. We conclude the paper by summarizing aspects of both the philosophy and the design of the course that we believe to be of particular value

What Cognitive Dissonance Tells Us About Tone in Persuasion

This Article takes the first step in thinking about where good advocacy should draw the line between zeal and coercion. Legal advocates differ about how to navigate that line.\u27 Is the best service to the client to be found in the most aggressive, strongest, hard-line approach? Or is a more tempered, reasonable approach most likely to produce the best results? This Article looks at cognitive science for guidance on this question. One cognitive process that seems to be integral to tone is cognitive dissonance, a concept I will explain in Part II. I then take a close look at two types of advocacy strategies that exemplify the conflict between the hardline and tempered approaches to advocacy. The first advocacy strategy, addressed in Part III, focuses on how to deal with arguments and information that undermine your position. Is it best to sound like you believe your case to be ideal and that contrary arguments are wholly without merit or even spurious? Or is it best to acknowledge that there are possible reasonable counterviews while still arguing that your position has greater merit? The second advocacy strategy, addressed in Part IV, is how to approach a controversial rule or premise for which you are advocating. Is the best approach to push early and hard in support of the rule, or to ease the reader into the controversial point by taking her through a step-by-step thought process that guides her to the controversial point? The bottom line is that in both rhetorical situations, cognitive dissonance supports an advocacy approach that, while still strong in pursuit of a favorable outcome, appears more gradual, objective, and reasonable. In other words, it is often advisable for lawyers to present arguments in a way that appears to be reasonable, measured, and objective

Precis of neuroconstructivism: how the brain constructs cognition

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment

Usage-based and emergentist approaches to language acquisition

It was long considered to be impossible to learn grammar based on linguistic experience alone. In the past decade, however, advances in usage-based linguistic theory, computational linguistics, and developmental psychology changed the view on this matter. So-called usage-based and emergentist approaches to language acquisition state that language can be learned from language use itself, by means of social skills like joint attention, and by means of powerful generalization mechanisms. This paper first summarizes the assumptions regarding the nature of linguistic representations and processing. Usage-based theories are nonmodular and nonreductionist, i.e., they emphasize the form-function relationships, and deal with all of language, not just selected levels of representations. Furthermore, storage and processing is considered to be analytic as well as holistic, such that there is a continuum between children's unanalyzed chunks and abstract units found in adult language. In the second part, the empirical evidence is reviewed. Children's linguistic competence is shown to be limited initially, and it is demonstrated how children can generalize knowledge based on direct and indirect positive evidence. It is argued that with these general learning mechanisms, the usage-based paradigm can be extended to multilingual language situations and to language acquisition under special circumstances

Enacting Productive Dialogue: Addressing the Challenge that Non-Human Cognition Poses to Collaborations Between Enactivism and Heideggerian Phenomenology

This chapter uses one particular proposal for interdisciplinary collaboration – in this case, between early Heideggerian phenomenology and enactivist cognitive science – as an example of how such partnerships may confront and negotiate tensions between the perspectives they bring together. The discussion begins by summarising some of the intersections that render Heideggerian and enactivist thought promising interlocutors for each other. It then moves on to explore how Heideggerian enactivism could respond to the challenge of reconciling the significant differences in the ways that each discourse seeks to apply the structures it claims to uncover

Knowledge Integration and Diffusion: Measures and Mapping of Diversity and Coherence

I present a framework based on the concepts of diversity and coherence for the analysis of knowledge integration and diffusion. Visualisations that help understand insights gained are also introduced. The key novelty offered by this framework compared to previous approaches is the inclusion of cognitive distance (or proximity) between the categories that characterise the body of knowledge under study. I briefly discuss the different methods to map the cognitive dimension