Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era--The Human-like Authors are Already Here- A New Model

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are creative, unpredictable, independent, autonomous, rational, evolving, capable of data collection, communicative, efficient, accurate, and have free choice among alternatives. Similar to humans, AI systems can autonomously create and generate creative works. The use of AI systems in the production of works, either for personal or manufacturing purposes, has become common in the 3A era of automated, autonomous, and advanced technology. Despite this progress, there is a deep and common concern in modern society that AI technology will become uncontrollable. There is therefore a call for social and legal tools for controlling AI systems’ functions and outcomes. This Article addresses the questions of the copyrightability of artworks generated by AI systems: ownership and accountability. The Article debates who should enjoy the benefits of copyright protection and who should be responsible for the infringement of rights and damages caused by AI systems that independently produce creative works. Subsequently, this Article presents the AI Multi- Player paradigm, arguing against the imposition of these rights and responsibilities on the AI systems themselves or on the different stakeholders, mainly the programmers who develop such systems. Most importantly, this Article proposes the adoption of a new model of accountability for works generated by AI systems: the AI Work Made for Hire (WMFH) model, which views the AI system as a creative employee or independent contractor of the user. Under this proposed model, ownership, control, and responsibility would be imposed on the humans or legal entities that use AI systems and enjoy its benefits. This model accurately reflects the human-like features of AI systems; it is justified by the theories behind copyright protection; and it serves as a practical solution to assuage the fears behind AI systems. In addition, this model unveils the powers behind the operation of AI systems; hence, it efficiently imposes accountability on clearly identifiable persons or legal entities. Since AI systems are copyrightable algorithms, this Article reflects on the accountability for AI systems in other legal regimes, such as tort or criminal law and in various industries using these systems

Can intelligence explode?

The technological singularity refers to a hypothetical scenario in which technological advances virtually explode. The most popular scenario is the creation of super-intelligent algorithms that recursively create ever higher intelligences. It took many decades for these ideas to spread from science fiction to popular science magazines and finally to attract the attention of serious philosophers. David Chalmers' (JCS, 2010) article is the first comprehensive philosophical analysis of the singularity in a respected philosophy journal. The motivation of my article is to augment Chalmers' and to discuss some issues not addressed by him, in particular what it could mean for intelligence to explode. In this course, I will (have to) provide a more careful treatment of what intelligence actually is, separate speed from intelligence explosion, compare what super-intelligent participants and classical human observers might experience and do, discuss immediate implications for the diversity and value of life, consider possible bounds on intelligence, and contemplate intelligences right at the singularity

Non-display uses of copyright works: Google Books and beyond

Copyright @ 2011 The AuthorsWith the advent of mass digitisation projects, such as the Google Book Search, a peculiar shift has occurred in the way that copyright works are dealt with. Contrary to what has so far been the case, works are turned into machine-readable data to be automatically processed for various purposes without the expression of works being displayed to the public. In the Google Book Settlement Agreement, this new kind of uses is referred to as “non-display uses” of digital works. The legitimacy of these uses has not yet been tested by Courts and does not comfortably fit in the current copyright doctrine, plainly because the works are not used as works but as something else, namely as data. Since non-display uses may prove to be a very lucrative market in the near future, with the potential to affect the way people use copyright works, we examine non-display uses under the prism of copyright principles to determine the boundaries of their legitimacy. Through this examination, we provide a categorisation of the activities carried out under the heading of “non-display uses”, we examine their lawfulness under the current copyright doctrine and approach the phenomenon from the spectrum of data protection law as could apply, by analogy, to the use of copyright works as processable data

Special Libraries, October 1944

Volume 35, Issue 8https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1944/1007/thumbnail.jp

Ideas are not replicators but minds are

An idea is not a replicator because it does not consist of coded self-assembly instructions. It may retain structure as it passes from one individual to another, but does not replicate it. The cultural replicator is not an idea but an associatively-structured network of them that together form an internal model of the world, or worldview. A worldview is a primitive, uncoded replicator, like the autocatalytic sets of polymers widely believed to be the earliest form of life. Primitive replicators generate self-similar structure, but because the process happens in a piecemeal manner, through bottom-up interactions rather than a top-down code, they replicate with low fidelity, and acquired characteristics are inherited. Just as polymers catalyze reactions that generate other polymers, the retrieval of an item from memory can in turn trigger other items, thus cross-linking memories, ideas, and concepts into an integrated conceptual structure. Worldviews evolve idea by idea, largely through social exchange. An idea participates in the evolution of culture by revealing certain aspects of the worldview that generated it, thereby affecting the worldviews of those exposed to it. If an idea influences seemingly unrelated fields this does not mean that separate cultural lineages are contaminating one another, because it is worldviews, not ideas, that are the basic unit of cultural evolution