The influence of social networking, video games and general computer usage on parent-child relations

The aim of this project was to find out how parents feel about controlling the media/technology use of their adolescent children and how it influences their parent/child relations. This is important because modern entertainment technologies are easily accessible and available to the population; thus they inevitably invade family space and influence family life. A gap in the literature is identified, indicating that existing research does not explore the reasons why parents control or do not control their adolescent children’s use of social media, video games and more. Additionally, there was no literature concerning how parents feel about such control and whether it was part of emotional labour; that being any activities that are performed with a child’s well-being in mind. The project was carried out as the part of an undergraduate degree course by the final year student in sociology. The data was collected through face-to-face and telephone semi-structured interviews with mothers and fathers of adolescents. It was observed that both mothers and fathers felt their control over children’s use of media and technologies influenced their relations. Also the findings show a variety of reasons why parents choose to exercise their control in a particular way, and how it links to parent-child relations

Peeling Back the Onion of Cyber Espionage after Tallinn 2.0

Tallinn 2.0 represents an important advancement in the understanding of international law’s application to cyber operations below the threshold of force. Its provisions on cyber espionage will be instrumental to states in grappling with complex legal problems in the area of digital spying. The law of cyber espionage as outlined by Tallinn 2.0, however, is substantially based on rules that have evolved outside of the digital context, and there exist serious ambiguities and limitations in its framework. This Article will explore gaps in the legal structure and consider future options available to states in light of this underlying mismatch

Usability and Trust in Information Systems

The need for people to protect themselves and their assets is as old as humankind. People's physical safety and their possessions have always been at risk from deliberate attack or accidental damage. The advance of information technology means that many individuals, as well as corporations, have an additional range of physical (equipment) and electronic (data) assets that are at risk. Furthermore, the increased number and types of interactions in cyberspace has enabled new forms of attack on people and their possessions. Consider grooming of minors in chat-rooms, or Nigerian email cons: minors were targeted by paedophiles before the creation of chat-rooms, and Nigerian criminals sent the same letters by physical mail or fax before there was email. But the technology has decreased the cost of many types of attacks, or the degree of risk for the attackers. At the same time, cyberspace is still new to many people, which means they do not understand risks, or recognise the signs of an attack, as readily as they might in the physical world. The IT industry has developed a plethora of security mechanisms, which could be used to mitigate risks or make attacks significantly more difficult. Currently, many people are either not aware of these mechanisms, or are unable or unwilling or to use them. Security experts have taken to portraying people as "the weakest link" in their efforts to deploy effective security [e.g. Schneier, 2000]. However, recent research has revealed at least some of the problem may be that security mechanisms are hard to use, or be ineffective. The review summarises current research on the usability of security mechanisms, and discusses options for increasing their usability and effectiveness

Proportionality and its Applicability in the Realm of Cyber Attacks

With an ever-increasing reliance on State cyber-attacks, the need for an international treaty governing the actions of Nation-States in the realm of cyberwarfare has never been greater. States now have the ability to cause unprecedented civilian loss with their cyber actions. States can destroy financial records, disrupt stock markets, manipulate cryptocurrency, shut off nuclear reactors, turn off power grids, open dams, and even shut down air traffic control systems with the click of a mouse. This article argues that any cyber-attack launched with a reasonable expectation to inflict “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects,” must be subject to the existing laws of proportionality. This article further examines the broader concept of proportionality, and the difficulties associated with applying a proportionality analysis to an offensive cyber-strike. This paper asserts that the ambiguities and complexities associated with applying the law of proportionality—in its current state and within a cyber context—will leave civilian populations vulnerable to the aggressive cyber actions of the world’s cyber powers. Consequently, this article stresses the necessity of developing a proportionality standard within a unified international cyberwarfare convention and asserts that such a standard is required in order to prevent the creation of a pathway towards lethal cyber aggressions unrestrained by the laws of war

Cybersecurity: mapping the ethical terrain

This edited collection examines the ethical trade-offs involved in cybersecurity: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and between the types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. Foreword Governments and society are increasingly reliant on cyber systems. Yet the more reliant we are upon cyber systems, the more vulnerable we are to serious harm should these systems be attacked or used in an attack. This problem of reliance and vulnerability is driving a concern with securing cyberspace. For example, a ‘cybersecurity’ team now forms part of the US Secret Service. Its job is to respond to cyber-attacks in specific environments such as elevators in a building that hosts politically vulnerable individuals, for example, state representatives. Cybersecurity aims to protect cyberinfrastructure from cyber-attacks; the concerning aspect of the threat from cyber-attack is the potential for serious harm that damage to cyber-infrastructure presents to resources and people. These types of threats to cybersecurity might simply target information and communication systems: a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on a government website does not harm a website in any direct way, but prevents its normal use by stifling the ability of users to connect to the site. Alternatively, cyber-attacks might disrupt physical devices or resources, such as the Stuxnet virus, which caused the malfunction and destruction of Iranian nuclear centrifuges. Cyber-attacks might also enhance activities that are enabled through cyberspace, such as the use of online media by extremists to recruit members and promote radicalisation. Cyber-attacks are diverse: as a result, cybersecurity requires a comparable diversity of approaches. Cyber-attacks can have powerful impacts on people’s lives, and so—in liberal democratic societies at least—governments have a duty to ensure cybersecurity in order to protect the inhabitants within their own jurisdiction and, arguably, the people of other nations. But, as recent events following the revelations of Edward Snowden have demonstrated, there is a risk that the governmental pursuit of cybersecurity might overstep the mark and subvert fundamental privacy rights. Popular comment on these episodes advocates transparency of government processes, yet given that cybersecurity risks represent major challenges to national security, it is unlikely that simple transparency will suffice. Managing the risks of cybersecurity involves trade-offs: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. These trade-offs are often ethical trade-offs, involving questions of how we act, what values we should aim to promote, and what means of anticipating and responding to the risks are reasonably—and publicly—justifiable. This Occasional Paper (prepared for the National Security College) provides a brief conceptual analysis of cybersecurity, demonstrates the relevance of ethics to cybersecurity and outlines various ways in which to approach ethical decision-making when responding to cyber-attacks

Global Cyber Intermediary Liability: A Legal & Cultural Strategy

This Article fills the gap in the debate on fighting cybercrime. It considers the role of intermediaries and the legal and cultural strategies that countries may adopt. Part II.A of this Article examines the critical role of intermediaries in cybercrime. It shows that the intermediaries’ active participation by facilitating the transmission of cybercrime traffic removes a significant barrier for individual perpetrators. Part II.B offers a brief overview of legal efforts to combat cybercrime, and examines the legal liability of intermediaries in both the civil and criminal context and in varying legal regimes with an emphasis on ISPs. Aside from some level of injunctive relief, intermediaries operate in a largely unregulated environment. Part III looks at what we can learn from other countries. The cleanest intermediary country, Finland, and the worst country, Lithuania, were selected in order to explore the causes for the differences between country performances. The section examines the remarkable distinctions between national cultures to explain differences in national cybercrime rates. Part III.A of this Article argues that the criminal code laws do not account for the difference in host and ISP performances between Finland and Lithuania. There are few differences in the codified laws pertaining to cybercrime between these countries. Instead, it is Finland’s cultural and business environments that appear to drive its cybercrime ranking. Part IV suggests reforms to shift a country’s culture to make it less prone to corruption. However, changing a culture takes time so Part IV also proposes a private law scheme in which intermediaries are unable to wave the “flag of immunity,” as they do now. The guiding philosophy for this proposal is that harmed parties should be permitted to recover damages directly from “bad” intermediaries

How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice

Since its appearance on the educational landscape, school choice has engendered considerable controversy. Those controversies are captured in two forms of "law" -- legislation and litigation. Government legislation at all levels codifies the results of political struggles around school choice and defines choices available to parents. Those unhappy with the results have brought litigation to determine whether the policies are consistent with constitutional provisions and other existing laws. This policy brief examines the relationships between various forms of school choice and the legal authority that both binds and bounds them. As the discussion will show, both the development of and legal challenges to school choice in its various forms can be traced to a tension between the legal principle that parents should be able to direct the upbringing of their children and the legal principle of parens patriae (the government is the ultimate guardian), which forms the foundation for compulsory education in the United States. As such, school choice legislation and litigation go to the very heart of public education and the societal values it reflect

The nature of international law cyber norms

The special expanded issue of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence's Tallinn Papers examines the nature, formation and evolution of international legal norms governing cyber activities. The inquiry’s foundational premise is that the rules of international law governing cyber activities are identical to those applicable to other types of conduct. Any differences in their explication and application are the product of the unique nature of cyber activities, not a variation in the legal strictures that shape their content and usage. It conducts the examination by genre of legal norm: treaty, customary law and general principles

An empirical investigation into the sources of supply chain disruptions

Master's thesis Industrial Economics and Technology Management IND590 - University of Agder 2019Firms are facing a vast array of risks which can cause disruptions to the normal operation of their supply chains. Managers striving to prepare for and overcome these disruptions have a broad selection of literature and risk reports at their disposal when assessing risks to their supply chain. These risk reports and academic works provide differentiated and compelling answers to what are the most pressing risks to supply chains, but are they accurate? This study aims at providing managers with an empiricalfoundation on what the main sources of supply chain disruptions have been the last decade by addressing the following research question:What have been the main sources of supply chain disruptions over the last decade, and do observed patterns correspond with expectations put forward in the scholarly literature and the risk management communities?Based on a content analysis of 11 504 articles from the Financial Times archive from 2009-2018, 445 articles describing sources of supply chain disruptions were retrieved. The samples were later analysed using statistical methods. The results of this investigation revealed that disruptions originating from within the supply chain were in sum the most prevalent. The majority of these disruptions were associated with risks that have traditionally been the concerns of supply chain managers. These risks include operational struggles at suppliers that are unable to deliver the desired quantity and quality, as well as challenges with forecasting demand and navigating the legal and bureaucratic process that emerge from operating a complex global supply chain across multiple regions. The study also revealed that supply chain disruptions stemming from risk sources external to the supply chain such as asset price collapse, natural hazards, terrorism and political turmoil have accounted for a relatively constant number of supply chain disruptions over the last decade. This observation is contrary to the seemingly increasing focus on these risks by the global community. However, even though there has not been an increase in disruptions caused by external events, catastrophic events still stood out as one of the biggest threats facing supply chains. Catastrophic incidents encompass high impact-low probability events including natural hazards such as earthquakes and hurricanes together with man-made acts both deliberate e.g. war and terrorism, and unintentional such as fires. Somewhat contrary to the attention given o acts of terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, disruptions associated with acts of terrorism constituted a surprisingly small number of the supply chain disruptions, with the vast majority of disruptions related to catastrophic events attributed to natural hazards. Lastly, the findings showed that disruptions originating from risks associated with information and communication technology, in particular, cyber-crime and unplanned IT outage, have been an increasingly common source of supply chain disruptions during the decade in conjunction with the advancing digitalisation of supply chains.Comparing the findings against the focus of academia and the risk management communities it is apparent that the strong focus on risks external to the supply chain is somewhat warranted given the frequent occurrences of catastrophic events that disrupt supply chains. However, the study revealed that too much attention has been given to these high-profile events, and in the process the more mundane risks facing supply chains have received less attention. As a consequence,these risks continue to pose a significant threat to the performance of supply chains. The findings highlight the importance of using several sources of information when assessing risks to supply chains. No single source of information, may it be scholarly literature, risk reports or internal reporting are able to grasp all the current, and future, patterns of supply chain disruptions by themselves. Managers should keep this in mind when identifying and assessing the risks to their supply chain. Diligence in seeking out alternative sources of information on supply chain risks can aid in creating a more advantageous supply chain risk management process and foster greater resilience in supply chains

A web of harms: serious and organised crime and its impact on Australian interests

Overview This report analyses serious, transnational and organised crime and the harms it causes to Australia’s interest, with the aim of reinvigorating a discussion of this critical matter amongst Australians. This web impacts on our national interests to the sum of an estimated $15 billion per year. That very conservative estimate includes costs to government through denied revenue and increased law enforcement costs. But there are also social, health and economic harms to individuals, community and business. The report poses a series of questions to be considered by the community, business and government