Scientific requirements for an engineered model of consciousness

The building of a non-natural conscious system requires more than the design of physical or virtual machines with intuitively conceived abilities, philosophically elucidated architecture or hardware homologous to an animal’s brain. Human society might one day treat a type of robot or computing system as an artificial person. Yet that would not answer scientific questions about the machine’s consciousness or otherwise. Indeed, empirical tests for consciousness are impossible because no such entity is denoted within the theoretical structure of the science of mind, i.e. psychology. However, contemporary experimental psychology can identify if a specific mental process is conscious in particular circumstances, by theory-based interpretation of the overt performance of human beings. Thus, if we are to build a conscious machine, the artificial systems must be used as a test-bed for theory developed from the existing science that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious causation in natural systems. Only such a rich and realistic account of hypothetical processes accounting for observed input/output relationships can establish whether or not an engineered system is a model of consciousness. It follows that any research project on machine consciousness needs a programme of psychological experiments on the demonstration systems and that the programme should be designed to deliver a fully detailed scientific theory of the type of artificial mind being developed – a Psychology of that Machine

Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science, and the Philosophy of Mind

Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world interactions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind

Where Are My Intelligent Assistant's Mistakes? A Systematic Testing Approach

Intelligent assistants are handling increasingly critical tasks, but until now, end users have had no way to systematically assess where their assistants make mistakes. For some intelligent assistants, this is a serious problem: if the assistant is doing work that is important, such as assisting with qualitative research or monitoring an elderly parent’s safety, the user may pay a high cost for unnoticed mistakes. This paper addresses the problem with WYSIWYT/ML (What You See Is What You Test for Machine Learning), a human/computer partnership that enables end users to systematically test intelligent assistants. Our empirical evaluation shows that WYSIWYT/ML helped end users find assistants’ mistakes significantly more effectively than ad hoc testing. Not only did it allow users to assess an assistant’s work on an average of 117 predictions in only 10 minutes, it also scaled to a much larger data set, assessing an assistant’s work on 623 out of 1,448 predictions using only the users’ original 10 minutes’ testing effort

The Pragmatic Turn in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature

Unmasking Clever Hans Predictors and Assessing What Machines Really Learn

Current learning machines have successfully solved hard application problems, reaching high accuracy and displaying seemingly "intelligent" behavior. Here we apply recent techniques for explaining decisions of state-of-the-art learning machines and analyze various tasks from computer vision and arcade games. This showcases a spectrum of problem-solving behaviors ranging from naive and short-sighted, to well-informed and strategic. We observe that standard performance evaluation metrics can be oblivious to distinguishing these diverse problem solving behaviors. Furthermore, we propose our semi-automated Spectral Relevance Analysis that provides a practically effective way of characterizing and validating the behavior of nonlinear learning machines. This helps to assess whether a learned model indeed delivers reliably for the problem that it was conceived for. Furthermore, our work intends to add a voice of caution to the ongoing excitement about machine intelligence and pledges to evaluate and judge some of these recent successes in a more nuanced manner.Comment: Accepted for publication in Nature Communication