69,762 research outputs found
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Some shortcomings of long-term working memory
Within the framework of their long-term working memory theory, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) propose that experts rapidly store information in long-term memory through two mechanisms: elaboration of long-term memory patterns and schemas and use of retrieval structures. They use chess playersâ memory as one of their most compelling sources of empirical evidence. In this paper, I show that evidence from chess memory, far from supporting their theory, limits its generality. Evidence from other domains reviewed by Ericsson and Kintsch, such as medical expertise, is not as strong as claimed, and sometimes contradicts the theory outright. I argue that Ericsson and Kintschâs concept of retrieval structure conflates three different types of memory structures that possess quite different properties. One of these types of structuresâgeneric, general-purpose retrieval structuresâhas a narrower use than proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch: it applies only in domains where there is a conscious, deliberate intent by individuals to improve their memory. Other mechanisms, including specific retrieval structures, exist that permit a rapid encoding into long-term memory under other circumstances
The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment
I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions arenât integral to moral judgment. Thereâs ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an actionâs outcomes and the agentâs role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing oneâs attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. I conclude that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these shouldnât be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment
The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium
John Rawlsâ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics.This paper argues that this influence is undeserved, for two reasons. First, reflective equilibrium fails to accomplish two tasks that give us reason to care about methodology. On the one hand, it fails to explain how (or whether) moral knowledge is possible.This is because the method is explicitly oriented towards the distinct (and less interesting) task of characterizing our moral sensibilities. On the other hand, the method fails to provide an informative way of adjudicating central methodological debates in ethics. Second, where Rawlsâ method âand the background methodology he uses to motivate it âdo have substance, that substance is implausible. The role of dispositions in the method entails that it endorses obviously irrational inferences. Further, the method makes substantively implausible distinctions between the dispositions that are allowed to play a methodological role. Rawls' background methodology appeals to the idea of a psychology in âwide reflective equilibriumâ. However, both formal and empirical path-dependence considerations strongly suggest that there is nothing even minimally determinate that is someoneâs psychology in âwide reflective equilibriumâ. I close by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit of reflective equilibrium by abandoning elements of Rawlsâ approach. I argue that none of these attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method of reflective equilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological questions in ethics. In a slogan, reflective equilibrium is methodologically irrelevant
Does religious belief impact philosophical analysis?
One popular conception of natural theology holds that certain purely rational arguments are insulated from empirical inquiry and independently establish conclusions that provide evidence, justification, or proof of Godâs existence. Yet, some raise suspicions that philosophers and theologiansâ personal religious beliefs inappropriately affect these kinds of arguments. I present an experimental test of whether philosophers and theologiansâ argument analysis is influenced by religious commitments. The empirical findings suggest religious belief affects philosophical analysis and offer a challenge to theists and atheists, alike: reevaluate the scope of natural theologyâs conclusions or acknowledge and begin to address the influence of religious belief
Political Activism and Research Ethics
Those who care about and engage in politics frequently fall victim to cognitive bias. Concerns that such bias impacts scholarship recently have prompted debatesânotably, in philosophy and psychologyâon the proper relationship between research and politics. One proposal emerging from these debates is that researchers studying politics have a professional duty to avoid political activism because it risks biasing their work. While sympathetic to the motivations behind this proposal, I suggest several reasons to reject a blanket duty to avoid activism: (1) even if it reduced bias, this duty would make unreasonable demands on researchers; (2) this duty could hinder research by limiting viewpoint diversity; (3) this duty wrongly implies that academia offers a relative haven from bias compared to politics; and (4) not all forms of political activism pose an equal risk of bias. None of these points suggest that researchers should ignore the risk of bias. Rather, researchers should focus on stronger evidence-based strategies for reducing bias than a blanket recommendation to avoid politics
Librarian and Faculty Collaborative Instruction: A Phenomenological Self-Study
Several models of librarian and faculty collaboration are found in the professional librarian literature. The literature on collaborative self-study research in higher education settings indicates collaborative self-study research can improve interdisciplinary and collaborative approaches to teaching and research and facilitate the transfer of knowledge. A research librarian and assistant professor of special education conducted a phenomenological self-study to examine their multiple roles as researchers, collaborators, and educators who collaborated to develop, implement, and evaluate distance-delivered instructional services for public school teachers who live and work in remote, rural, and Native communities throughout the state of Alaska. Several themes emerged from this study, including: (a) the authorsâ interdisciplinary and collaborative efforts resulted in increased opportunities to team teach and conduct future collaborative research; (b) the authors struggled to communicate effectively with students via audio-conference; and (c) the beliefs and practices of both authors were transformed by their participation in this self-study. The study suggests implications for further and improved interdisciplinary collaboration between librarians and faculty. The authors believe this collaborative approach to self-study research facilitates reflective and authentic teaching and research for academic librarians working in collaboration with teaching faculty.Ye
American History X, Cinematic Manipulation, and Moral Conversion
American History X (hereafter AHX) has been accused by numerous critics of a morally dangerous cinematic seduction: using stylish cinematography, editing, and sound, the film manipulates the viewer through glamorizing an immoral and hate-filled neo-nazi protagonist. In addition, thereâs the disturbing fact that the film seems to accomplish this manipulation through methods commonly grouped under the category of âfascist aesthetics.â More specifically, AHX promotes its neo-nazi hero through the use of several filmic techniques made famous by Nazi propagandist Leni Riefenstahl. Now most critics admit that, in the end, the film claims to denounce racism and attempts to show us the conversion of the protagonist to the path of righteousness, but they complain that nonetheless the film (perhaps unintentionally) ends up implicitly promoting the immoral worldview it rather superficially professes to reject in its final act.
This charge of hypocrisy is connected to another worry: the moral conversion in the film is said to fall flat because the intellectual resources on display to support the characterâs racism are not counterbalanced by equally explicit (but superior) arguments for the anti-racist position ultimately embraced by the character. In other words, just as the devil is said to get all the good lines in Miltonâs Paradise Lost, in AHX the racists get all the arguments. This has been taken to be a morally problematic flaw of the film. Critics lament that Derekâs conversion seems to result not from relevant logical inferences and valid rational argumentation but from overly simplistic and arguably egoistic insights (e.g., âhas anything you've done made your life better?â) combined, perhaps, with a hackneyed clichĂ© (in prison, one of his best friends is a black person!)
In this paper Iâll attempt to rebut these charges and defend the film as a powerful, and powerfully moral, work of art. Iâll be suggesting that the seductive techniques employed allow for many viewers a degree of sympathy towards the protagonist that is crucial, both for making that characterâs more horrific actions especially unsettling, and also for making his eventual conversion plausible and ultimately compelling. Iâll also argue that the manner in which his conversion is presented is in fact subtler than many critics have allowed: Derekâs transformation is not artificial or implausible but is depicted as resulting from a cumulative series of emotionally powerful life events and personal engagements. It is certainly true that it is not represented in the way some would seemingly have preferred, i.e. as straightforwardly resulting from a process of gradual intellectual improvement in Derekâs reasoning on questions of race and politics. However, Iâll argue that the decidedly emotional basis of his moral evolution is both refreshingly realistic and no hindrance to accepting his conversion as rational. Finally, properly understanding the legitimacy of the emotional foundations of much moral thought will also allow us to appreciate the ways in which our initial worries about this filmâs (not insignificant) ability to persuade viewers through the engagement of emotions need not, in itself, be seen as a barrier to endorsing the film as a morally praiseworthy work
Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation
This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs
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A Critical and Comprehensive Sociological Theory of Race and Racism
This article contests the contention that sociology lacks a sound theoretical approach to the study of race and racism, instead arguing that a comprehensive and critical sociological theory of race and racism exists. This article outlines this theory of race and racism, drawing from the work of key scholars in and around the field. This consideration of the state of race theory in sociology leads to four contentions regarding what a critical and comprehensive theory of race and racism should do: (1) bring race and racism together into the same analytical framework; (2) articulate the connections between racist ideologies and racist structures; (3) lead us towards the elimination of racial oppression; and (4) include an intersectional analysis
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