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Computational Argumentation-based Chatbots: a Survey
The article archived on this institutional repository is a preprint. It has not been certified by peer review.Chatbots are conversational software applications designed to interact dialectically with users for a plethora of different purposes. Surprisingly, these colloquial agents have only recently been coupled with computational models of arguments (i.e. computational argumentation), whose aim is to formalise, in a machine-readable format, the ordinary exchange of information that characterises human communications. Chatbots may employ argumentation with different degrees and in a variety of manners. The present survey sifts through the literature to review papers concerning this kind of argumentation-based bot, drawing conclusions about the benefits and drawbacks that this approach entails in comparison with standard chatbots, while also envisaging possible future development and integration with the Transformer-based architecture and state-of-the-art Large Language models
Utilitarianism and the Social Nature of Persons
This thesis defends utilitarianism: the view that as far as morality goes, one ought to choose the option which will result in the most overall well-being. Utilitarianism is widely rejected by philosophers today, largely because of a number of influential objections. In this thesis I deal with three of them. Each is found in Bernard Williams’s ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’ (1973). The first is the Integrity Objection, an intervention that has been influential whilst being subject to a wide variety of interpretations. In Chapter Two I give my interpretation of Williams’s Integrity objection; in Chapter Three I discuss one common response to it, and in Chapters Four and Five I give my own defence of utilitarianism against it. In Chapter Six I discuss a second objection: the problem of pre-emption. This problem is also found in Williams, but has received greater attention through the work of other authors in recent years. It suggests that utilitarianism is unable to deal with some of the modern world’s most pressing moral problems, and raises an internal tension between the twin utilitarian aims of making a difference and achieving the best outcomes. In Chapter Seven I discuss a third objection: that utilitarianism is insufficiently egalitarian. I find this claim to be unwarranted, in light of recent social science and philosophy. My responses to Williams’s objections draw upon resources from the socialist tradition – in particular, that tradition’s emphasis on the importance of social connections between individuals. Socialists have often been hostile to utilitarianism, in part for socialist-inflected versions of Williams’s objections. Thus, in responding to these objections I aim to demonstrate that socialist thought contains the means to defuse not only mainstream philosophy’s rejection of utilitarianism but also its own, and thus to re-open the possibilities for a productive engagement between the two traditions
_Transcendence:_ Measuring Intelligence
Among the many common criticisms of the Turing test, a valid criticism concerns its scope. Intelligence is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon that will require testing using as many different formats as possible. The Turing test continues to be valuable as a source of evidence to support the inductive inference that a machine possesses a certain kind of intelligence and when interpreted as providing a behavioural test for a certain kind of intelligence. This paper raises the novel criticism that the Turing test represents an example of Goodhart’s Law operating in the field of artificial intelligence. As one measure towards the goal of creating genuinely intelligent machines, the Turing test must not be confused with the goal itself. Moreover, the Turing test ought to be augmented such that through its use additional evidence could be secured to support the strong inference that a machine, were it to pass the Turing Test, could think like a human
Corpus Analysis in Philosophical Semantics
The topic of this dissertation is corpus analysis: the use of computational techniques to search through large collections of real-world texts (called corpora) to discover facts about language use which hold throughout the collection. I examine how corpus analysis can be used as an empirical methodology within philosophy of language to confirm semantic analyses of philosophically important expressions. I begin by discussing the philosophical importance of analyzing the ordinary meaning of people's language use, as through that we can come to understand how they categorize the world around them. Specifically, I am concerned with philosophical semantics: the study of the meaning of expressions for which different theories of their meaning will have different philosophical upshots. After discussing the kind of meaning relevant to this subject area (namely operative concepts: the concepts that actually determine how we apply expressions to cases), I rationally reconstruct and analyze existing methods of confirmation in philosophical semantics, including intuitive methods and questionnaire methods from experimental philosophy. I then critique these methods in terms of the strength of evidence they can offer.Next, I introduce corpus analysis, and explain how it can be used as a method of confirmation in philosophical semantics. I pay special attention to the question of how corpus analysis can be used to discover the 'deep', semantic, representational features of text relevant for confirming semantic analyses, and offer several techniques to perform this task.I argue that corpus analysis has many benefits over existing methods of confirmation in philosophical semantics, given that it studies (i) actual, rather than imagined, instances of language use, and (ii) the language use of the actual communities whose meanings we are interested in, rather than just that of philosophers.The dissertation concludes with a case study of the use of corpus analysis to confirm a theory of the reference conditions of definite descriptions over a rival theory with different philosophical upshots. This is the first corpus study in philosophical semantics to make use of an annotated corpus, which is a technique with lot of promise within this field.Doctor of Philosoph
A Behavioural Decision-Making Framework For Agent-Based Models
In the last decades, computer simulation has become one of the mainstream modelling techniques in many scientific fields. Social simulation with Agent-based Modelling (ABM) allows users to capture higher-level system properties that emerge from the interactions of lower-level subsystems. ABM is itself an area of application of Distributed Artificial Intelligence and Multiagent Systems (MAS). Despite that, researchers using ABM for social science studies do not fully benefit from the development in the field of MAS. It is mainly because the MAS architectures and frameworks are built upon cognitive and computer science foundations and principles, creating a gap in concepts and methodology between the two fields. Building agent frameworks based on behaviour theory is a promising direction to minimise this gap. It can provide a standard practice in interdisciplinary teams and facilitate better usage of MAS technological advancement in social research. From our survey, Triandis' Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB) was chosen due to its broad set of determinants and inclusion of an additive value function to calculate utility values of different outcomes. As TIB's determinants can be organised in a tree-like structure, we utilise layered architectures to formalise the agent's components. The additive function of TIB is then used to combine the utilities of different level determinants. The framework is then applied to create models for different case studies from various domains to test its ability to explain the importance of multiple behavioural aspects and environmental properties. The first case study simulates the mobility demand for Swiss households. We propose an experimental method to test and investigate the impact of core determinants in the TIB on the usage of different transportation modes. The second case study presents a novel solution to simulate trust and reputation by applying subjective logic as a metric to measure an agent's belief about the consequence(s) of action, which can be updated through feedback. The third case study investigates the possibility of simulating bounded rationality effects in an agent's decision-making scheme by limiting its capability of perceiving information. In the final study, a model is created to simulate migrants' choice of activities in centres by applying our framework in conjunction with Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The experiment can then be used to test the impact of different combinations of core determinants on the migrants' activities. Overall, the design of different components in our framework enables adaptations for various contexts, including transportation modal choice, buying a vehicle or daily activities. Most of the work can be done by changing the first-level determinants in the TIB's model based on the phenomena simulated and the available data. Several environmental properties can also be considered by extending the core components or employing other theoretical assumptions and concepts from the social study. The framework can then serve the purpose of theoretical exposition and allow the users to assess the causal link between the TIB's determinants and behaviour output. This thesis also highlights the importance of data collection and experimental design to capture better and understand different aspects of human decision-making
The Self The Soul and The World: Affect Reason and Complexity
This book looks at the affective-cognitive roots of how the human mind inquires into the workings of nature and, more generally, how the mind confronts reality. Reality is an infinitely complex system, in virtue of which the mind can comprehend it only in bits and pieces, by making up interpretations of the myriads of signals received from the world by way of integrating those with information stored from the past. This constitutes a piecemeal interpretation by which we assemble our phenomenal reality. In perceiving the complex world and responding to it, the mind invokes the logic of affect and the logic of reason, the former mostly innate and implicit, and the latter generated consciously in explicit terms with reference to mind-independent relations between entities in nature. It is a strange combination of affect and reason that enables us to make decisions and inferences, --- the latter mostly of the inductive type --- thereby making possible the development of theories. Theories are our tool-kits for explaining and predicting phenomena, guiding us along in our journey in life. Theories, however, are defeasible, and need to be constantly updated, at times even radically. In this, the self and the soul are of enormous relevance. The former is the affect-based psychological engine driving all our mental processes, while the latter is the capacity of the conscious mind to examine and reconstruct the self by modulating repressed conflicts. If the soul remains inoperative, all our theories become misdirected and a rot spreads inexorably all around us
Logics of Responsibility
The study of responsibility is a complicated matter. The term is used in different ways in different fields, and it is easy to engage in everyday discussions as to why someone should be considered responsible for something. Typically, the backdrop of these discussions involves social, legal, moral, or philosophical problems. A clear pattern in all these spheres is the intent of issuing standards for when---and to what extent---an agent should be held responsible for a state of affairs. This is where Logic lends a hand. The development of expressive logics---to reason about agents' decisions in situations with moral consequences---involves devising unequivocal representations of components of behavior that are highly relevant to systematic responsibility attribution and to systematic blame-or-praise assignment. To put it plainly, expressive syntactic-and-semantic frameworks help us analyze responsibility-related problems in a methodical way. This thesis builds a formal theory of responsibility. The main tool used toward this aim is modal logic and, more specifically, a class of modal logics of action known as stit theory. The underlying motivation is to provide theoretical foundations for using symbolic techniques in the construction of ethical AI. Thus, this work means a contribution to formal philosophy and symbolic AI. The thesis's methodology consists in the development of stit-theoretic models and languages to explore the interplay between the following components of responsibility: agency, knowledge, beliefs, intentions, and obligations. Said models are integrated into a framework that is rich enough to provide logic-based characterizations for three categories of responsibility: causal, informational, and motivational responsibility. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses at length stit theory, a logic that formalizes the notion of agency in the world over an indeterministic conception of time known as branching time. The idea is that agents act by constraining possible futures to definite subsets. On the road to formalizing informational responsibility, Chapter 3 extends stit theory with traditional epistemic notions (knowledge and belief). Thus, the chapter formalizes important aspects of agents' reasoning in the choice and performance of actions. In a context of responsibility attribution and excusability, Chapter 4 extends epistemic stit theory with measures of optimality of actions that underlie obligations. In essence, this chapter formalizes the interplay between agents' knowledge and what they ought to do. On the road to formalizing motivational responsibility, Chapter 5 adds intentions and intentional actions to epistemic stit theory and reasons about the interplay between knowledge and intentionality. Finally, Chapter 6 merges the previous chapters' formalisms into a rich logic that is able to express and model different modes of the aforementioned categories of responsibility. Technically, the most important contributions of this thesis lie in the axiomatizations of all the introduced logics. In particular, the proofs of soundness & completeness results involve long, step-by-step procedures that make use of novel techniques
New Directions in Private Law Theory
New Directions in Private Law Theory brings together some of the best new work on private law theory, reflecting the breadth of this increasingly important field. The contributions interrogate a wide range of topics including aspects of private law doctrine, its development, ordering and application.
The authors adopt a variety of different approaches and contribute to ongoing and important debates about the moral foundations of private law, the individuation of areas of private law and the connections between private law and everyday moral experience. Questions addressed include: Does the diversity identified amongst claims in unjust enrichment mean that the category is incoherent? Are claims in tort law always about compensating for wrongs? How should we understand parties’ agreement in contract? The contributions shed new light on these and other topics, and the ways in which they intersect and open up new lines of scholarly enquiry.
The book will be of interest to researchers working in private law and legal theory, but it will also appeal to those outside of law, most notably researchers with an interest in moral and political philosophy, economics and history
Intentional dialogues in multi-agent systems based on ontologies and argumentation
Some areas of application, for example, healthcare, are known to resist the replacement of human operators by fully autonomous systems. It is typically not transparent to users how artificial intelligence systems make decisions or obtain information, making it difficult for users to trust them. To address this issue, we investigate how argumentation theory and ontology techniques can be used together with reasoning about intentions to build complex natural language dialogues to support human decision-making. Based on such an investigation, we propose MAIDS, a framework for developing multi-agent intentional dialogue systems, which can be used in different domains. Our framework is modular so that it can be used in its entirety or just the modules that fulfil the requirements of each system to be developed. Our work also includes the formalisation of a novel dialogue-subdialogue structure with which we can address ontological or theory-of-mind issues and later return to the main subject. As a case study, we have developed a multi-agent system using the MAIDS framework to support healthcare professionals in making decisions on hospital bed allocations. Furthermore, we evaluated this multi-agent system with domain experts using real data from a hospital. The specialists who evaluated our system strongly agree or agree that the dialogues in which they participated fulfil Cohen’s desiderata for task-oriented dialogue systems. Our agents have the ability to explain to the user how they arrived at certain conclusions. Moreover, they have semantic representations as well as representations of the mental state of the dialogue participants, allowing the formulation of coherent justifications expressed in natural language, therefore, easy for human participants to understand. This indicates the potential of the framework introduced in this thesis for the practical development of explainable intelligent systems as well as systems supporting hybrid intelligence
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