59,652 research outputs found
What is a book?
The aim of this paper is to reach a level of conceptual clarity about what we call a book. The motivation for this exercise lies in the desire to chart the trajectory of the book as a cultural phenomenon in light of the gradual move to shorter textual expression that is taking place alongside the delivery of stories in other forms besides text. For this purpose the article takes a historical perspective without, however, attempting to chart all the phases in the development of the book. Concurrently with the move to shorter textual expression, in the digital reading environment the basic elements of the 1964 UNESCO definition of the book (printed, a minimum number of pages) have had to be left behind. Alongside the arrival of new publishing business models, the entire notion of the book is in jeopardy. This set of developments calls for a fundamental reconsideration of how we define a book in relation to other book-like objects and text forms. The approach taken is iterative, moving closer towards a definition of the book whilst acknowledging the arrival of offspring such as the ebook and audiobook
Eligibility and inscrutability
The philosophy of intentionality asks questions such as: in virtue of what
does a sentence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a certain
way? The subquestion I focus upon here concerns the semantic properties
of language: in virtue of what does a name such as âLondonâ refer
to something or a predicate such as âis largeâ apply to some object?
This essay examines one kind of answer to this âmetasemanticâ1
question: interpretationism, instances of which have been proposed by
Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and others. I characterize the âtwostepâ
form common to such approaches and briefl y say how two versions
described by David Lewis fi t this pattern. Then I describe a fundamental
challenge to this approach: a âpermutation argumentâ that contends,
by interpretationist lights, there can be no fact of the matter about lexical
content (e.g., what individual words refer to). Such a thesis cannot be sustained,
so the argument threatens a reductio of interpretationism.
In the second part of the article, I will give what I take to be the
best interpretationist response to the inscrutability paradox: David Lewisâs
appeal to the differential âeligibilityâ of semantic theories. I contend that,
given an independently plausible formulation of interpretationism, the
eligibility response is an immediate consequence of Lewisâs general analysis
of the theoretical virtue of simplicity.
In the fi nal sections of the article, I examine the limitations of Lewisâs
response. By focusing on an alternative argument for the inscrutability
of reference, I am able to describe conditions under which the eligibility
result will deliver the wrong results. In particular, if the world is complex
enough and our language suffi ciently simple, then reference may
be determinately secured to the wrong things
What is Computational Intelligence and where is it going?
What is Computational Intelligence (CI) and what are its relations with Artificial Intelligence (AI)? A brief survey of the scope of CI journals and books with ``computational intelligence'' in their title shows that at present it is an umbrella for three core technologies (neural, fuzzy and evolutionary), their applications, and selected fashionable pattern recognition methods. At present CI has no comprehensive foundations and is more a bag of tricks than a solid branch of science. The change of focus from methods to challenging problems is advocated, with CI defined as a part of computer and engineering sciences devoted to solution of non-algoritmizable problems. In this view AI is a part of CI focused on problems related to higher cognitive functions, while the rest of the CI community works on problems related to perception and control, or lower cognitive functions. Grand challenges on both sides of this spectrum are addressed
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