You Don't Always Get What You Pay For

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may well reduce effort and hence the probability of success. I also identify conditions under which the income effect dominates the incentive effect, and single out the hazard-rate of effort as a crucial determinant of this trade-off.bonus, premium, incentives, income effect, moral hazard

If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one’s rational character, whether or not those activities are under one’s voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle

What You Don't Know Can't Help You: Pension Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making

This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. We find that well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average individual when knowledge is ignored. We further find that the ill-informed individuals do respond to their own misperception of the incentives, rather than being unresponsive to any incentives.

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income, and Effort

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. This paper provides conditions such that no success bonus induces the agent to exert more effort and the optimal contract is independent of success. Moreover, success bonuses may even reduce effort and thus the probability of success. The reason is that bonuses increase the perceived income of the agent and can hence reduce his willingness to exert effort. This perceived income effect has to be weighed against the incentive effect of the bonus. The trade-off is determined by the marginal effect of effort on the success probability in relation to this probability itself (success hazard-rate of effort). The paper also discusses practical implications of the finding.bonus, premium, incentives, income effect, moral hazard

The Unity of Reason

Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve even tha

E-learning: you don't always get what you hope for

Despite substantial growth in the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) throughout western societies, there is much evidence of technology-led innovations within Higher Education (HE) failing to achieve the anticipated transformations in learning and teaching. This paper reviews evidence from research and evaluation studies relating not only to e-learning, but also to wider HE practices. It argues that the use of ICT does not, in itself, result in improved educational outcomes and ways of working. It considers contextual factors that are of greater significance in determining how and why e-learning is used in HE. Students' engagement with e-learning relates to their expectations and conceptions of learning and to assessment demands. Academics need to re-assess their own beliefs and practices concerning teaching and assessment and their impact on the experience of learners. Both teachers and learners need to understand why e-learning activities are to be undertaken and the rewards expected to be derived

Dental care professionals and child protection: case scenarios and discussions

Any concerns about paediatric patients in general dental practice can be stressful for all involved. Barriers to the reporting of concerns by dental teams are known to exist. Anything that can help ease those situations can only be beneficial. In this article we look at three scenarios that could arise which I am often asked about during teaching and training sessions on safeguarding and child protection for dental teams. They can be discussed at team meetings and training, so that if they are ever to happen for real, everyone will know exactly what to do. This article cannot be completely prescriptive as there will be local variations, but it gives general guidance on issues raised by the scenarios. If you already have a child protection policy in your practice, make sure you know what it says; and if you don't this article will point the way to further resources for developing one

The real time rolling shutter

From an early age children are often told either, you are creative you should do art but stay away from science and maths. Or that you are mathematical you should do science but you're not that creative. Compounding this there also exist some traditional barriers of artistic rhetoric that say, "don't touch, don't think and don't be creative, we've already done that for you, you can just look...". The Real Time Rolling Shutter is part of a collaborative Art/Science partnership whose core tenets are in complete contrast to this. The Art/Science exhibitions we have created have invited the public to become part of the exhibition by utilising augmented digital mirrors, Kinects, feed-back camera and projector systems and augmented reality perception helmets. The fundamental underlying principles we are trying to adhere to are to foster curiosity, intrigue, wonderment and amazement and we endeavour to draw the audience into the interactive nature of our exhibits and exclaim to everyone that you can be what ever you chose to be, and that everyone can be creative, everyone can be an artist, everyone can be a scientist... all it takes is an inquisitive mind, so come and explore the real-time rolling shutter and be creative