72,063 research outputs found
Redundancy in Logic I: CNF Propositional Formulae
A knowledge base is redundant if it contains parts that can be inferred from
the rest of it. We study the problem of checking whether a CNF formula (a set
of clauses) is redundant, that is, it contains clauses that can be derived from
the other ones. Any CNF formula can be made irredundant by deleting some of its
clauses: what results is an irredundant equivalent subset (I.E.S.) We study the
complexity of some related problems: verification, checking existence of a
I.E.S. with a given size, checking necessary and possible presence of clauses
in I.E.S.'s, and uniqueness. We also consider the problem of redundancy with
different definitions of equivalence.Comment: Extended and revised version of a paper that has been presented at
ECAI 200
Non‐Classical Knowledge
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker-than-classical K3 logic.
I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to--whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non-classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities
Modals and Modal Epistemology
I distinguish (§1) two projects in modal epistemology—one about how we come to know modal truths, and one about why we have the ability so to come to know. The latter, I suggest, (§§2–3) is amenable to an evolutionary treatment in terms of general capacities developed to evaluate quotidian modal claims. I compare (§4) this approach to a recent suggestion in a similar spirit by Christopher Hill and Timothy Williamson, emphasizing counterfactual conditionals instead of quotidian modals; I argue that while there are some reasons to prefer the quotidian modals approach, there are none favoring the Hill/Williamson counterfactual approach. I conclude (§5) with a suggestion that the remaining questions both approaches leave unanswered ought not to be too troubling
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