Volume II Acquisition Research Creating Synergy for Informed Change, Thursday 19th Annual Acquisition Research Proceedings

ProceedingsApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

With the Tigers over China, 1941-1942

In the twelve months centered around the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a diverse group of American and British flyers fought one of the most remarkable air campaigns of WWII. Pilots including Claire Chennault, Pappy Boyington, and Art Donahue bought time for an Allied regrouping against Japan\u27s relentless assault in the China-Burma-India theater. In the face of the 1941 bombings, Chiang Kai-shek turned to air power to survive, which he did thanks to Chennault\u27s rebuilding of the Chinese Air Force and the leadership of the American Volunteer Group, or AVG. Formed by Chennault, the AVG, also known as the Flying Tigers, were contract employees working for the Chinese government. As a result, they received virtually no official American recognition for their efforts. The group was known for their romantic, reckless spirit. They performed remarkably with outdated planes and equipment in ill-repair, were almost always heavily outnumbered in battle, and were seen by outsiders as hard-drinking rebels. Whatever their image, the Flying Tigers were highly effective. In the words of Air Force Major General Charlie Bond, During that first week of action the AVG destroyed fifty-five enemy bombers and fighters while losing only five Tomahawks. Unfortunately, two of our colleagues were killed, but at the same time two hundred enemy airmen were either killed or captured. We were shattering the myth that the Japanese Air Force was invincible. Jerome Klinkowitz, whose earlier books focused on flyers\u27 attitudes toward the air war in Britain and Europe, continues his work with an exceptionally interesting group of Pacific warriors. He brings together not only the commanders\u27 stories but the often more colorful--and sometimes more accurate--accounts of life and battle by the men who flew these planes and the women who participated on the ground. Jerome Klinkowitz, professor of English and University Distinguished Scholar at the University of Northern Iowa, is the author of Yanks Over Europe and Their Finest Hours. Contains the best general description and estimate of Gen. Claire Chennault I have ever read. —Bernard Norling Brings together not only the commanders’ stories but often more colorful—and sometimes more accurate—accounts of life and battle by the men who flew these planes and the women who participated on the ground. —McCormick (SC) Messenger Shows that the Tigers’ success was largely due to Chennault himself. —Rapport Forces us to re-evaluate the role of the military hero who has passed into the realm of myth and legend. —South Carolina Reviewhttps://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_military_history/1016/thumbnail.jp

The Effect of Values on System Development Project Outcomes

In order to understand why organizations make certain decisions and target certain outcomes, it is useful to understand their priorities and preferences, commonly referred to as “values.” This research explores the relationship between the technical values held by system development teams and the operational effectiveness of the systems those teams produce. Specifically, it examines the impact of a value set called FIST (Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, Tiny) on DoD and NASA system development projects, and investigates the correlation between the FIST values and operational outcomes. The findings show that the FIST value set enhances project stability, increases the project leader’s control and accountability, optimizes failure, fosters “luck,” and facilitates learning. These benefits of the FIST approach all support the goal of ensuring the organization delivers systems which are “available when needed and effective when used.” FIST is therefore recommended as an effective approach to system development, and several heuristics are provided to facilitate understanding and application of these values

The New Way of War: Is There A Duty to Use Drones?

Part I of this Article briefly describes the newest battlespace occupants. Robotic systems have been taking active part in combat. They now inhabit the air, the land, and the sea. They carry out missions ranging from surveillance and bomb disposal to “destroy and disable.” Part II examines the relevant principles of LOAC. It argues that drones are not, per se, unlawful under LOAC. Rather, the critical question is the same for drones as for other types of weapons, i.e., whether the specific use of the weapon complies with LOAC. In this context, the weapon must be deployed in accordance with LOAC’s fundamental principles of humanity, proportionality, distinction, taking precautions, and military necessity. Even if a specific type of weapon is not unlawful per se (or has not been specifically prohibited by particular treaties), it may not be used improperly, e.g., in a manner that would run afoul of these principles. Part III applies the principles of LOAC to drones. First, it analyzes the general trajectories of the development of new weapons throughout human history, which has involved trading off between three main considerations, namely distance, accuracy, and lethality. Second, it examines the rise of precision-guided munitions as an attempt to balance these three considerations, increasing military efficiency while minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects. Part IV discusses the ability of drones to combine both remote exercise of force and high accuracy to reduce lethality. Part IV also closely examines both the promised benefits that the use of drones may bring to battlespace and the challenges to their deployment. Part V returns to the question of whether states and their military commanders have an obligation to use drones in the context of an armed conflict. It argues that although there are no treaties that deal specifically with the use of drones in armed conflict and no customary norms obligating the use of drones, such a duty may be derived from the cardinal principles of the law of armed conflict. It suggests that such an interpretation is merited if we accept that drones offer the possibility of a more humane war by combining remote and accurate use of force to reduce lethality among both friendly forces and innocent civilians. Part V concludes by setting out further challenges that ought to receive careful attention in developing and elaborating on the obligation to use drones in the battlefield

Chat Communication in a Command and Control Environment: How Does It Help?

Military command and control (C2) teams are often faced with difficult, complex, and distributed operations amidst the fog and friction of war. To deal with this uncertainty, teams rely on clear and effective communication to coordinate their actions; two current conduits for communication in distributed military teams include voice and chat. Chat communication is regarded by many in the C2 world as the premier method of communicating with the power to lessen some of the traffic and disturbances of current voice communication, and its usage continues to exponentially increase. Despite this operational view, countless laboratory studies have demonstrated detrimental effects of chat communication relative to voice communication. The current study investigates the gap between laboratory research results and usage in complex environments, and empirically tests the effect that chat communication has on tactical C2 performance through an air battle management synthetic task environment. Results demonstrate that participants performed better on time-critical, emergent events with voice communication and better on preplanned missions when they had access to archival information. Voice communication is a valuable, high bandwidth channel that is essential for coordination in highly complex situations, while chat communication is a nonintrusive form of communication that allows the operator flexibility in prioritizing the information flow through the use of archival information. The challenge in operational settings with overcrowded radio channels, however, is to protect the voice channel to ensure it is available when the situation demands it. With careful implementation, voice and chat communication can be complementary technologies to facilitate complex work

U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) impacts on combat aviation tactics from Gulf War I through 2007 Iraq

Unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs) are an increasingly important element of many modern militaries. Their success on battlefields in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the globe has driven demand for a variety of types of unmanned vehicles. Their proven value consists in low risk and low cost, and their capabilities include persistent surveillance, tactical and combat reconnaissance, resilience, and dynamic re-tasking. This research evaluates past, current, and possible future operating environments for several UAV platforms to survey the changing dynamics of combat-aviation tactics and make recommendations regarding UAV employment scenarios to the Turkish military. While UAVs have already established their importance in military operations, ongoing evaluations of UAV operating environments, capabilities, technologies, concepts, and organizational issues inform the development of future systems. To what extent will UAV capabilities increasingly define tomorrow's missions, requirements, and results in surveillance and combat tactics? Integrating UAVs and concepts of operations (CONOPS) on future battlefields is an emergent science. Managing a transition from manned- to unmanned and remotely piloted aviation platforms involves new technological complexity and new aviation personnel roles, especially for combat pilots. Managing a UAV military transformation involves cultural change, which can be measured in decades.http://archive.org/details/usunmannedaerial109454211Turkish Air Force authors.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited