What is Probability?

Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only arises with decoherence, then they must be given by the Born rule. That further, on the Everett interpretation, we have a clear statement of what probabilities are, in terms of purely categorical physical properties; and finally, along lines laid out by Deutsch and Wallace, that there is a clear basis in the axioms of decision theory as to why subjective probabilities should track these objective ones. These results hinge critically on the absence of hidden-variables or any other mechanism (such as state-reduction) from the physical interpretation of the theory. The account of probability has traditionally been considered the principal weakness of the Everett interpretation; on the contrary it emerges as one of its principal strengths

What is "true" in internal realism?

This paper is a critical examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphysical to internal realism. First, I analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic view of truth. Though a powerful critique of the metaphysical realist conception of truth, this argument does not establish conclusively that the concept of truth has any epistemic content. Secondly, I discuss Putnam's idealization theory of truth, arguing that the identification of truth with "acceptability under ideal conditions" is at odds with the claim that truth is context-transcendent, since the notion of justification is intrinsically context-dependent and no amount of idealization can reedeem its contextual character. Finally, I suggest that the realist intuitions that Putnam's internal realism tries to capture call for no more than a deflationary view of truth. Acceptance of this view requires abandoning not only the idea that truth is an epistemic property, but also the idea that truth is a substantive property that all true statements share and, therefore, a proper object of philosophical theorizing.Aquest article és un examen critic de la teoria de la veritat de Putnam en la seva evolució des d'un realisme metafisic a un realisme intern. En primer lloc, presento una anàlisi de l'argument de la teoria de models que va dur a Putnam a abandonar el concepte metafísic de veritat corn a correspondència i a adoptar un concepte epistèmic de veritat. Aquest argument, encara que constitueix una potent crítica de la concepció de la veritat del realisme metafísic, no estableix conclusivament que la veritar tingui algun contingut epistèmic. En segon lloc, discuteixo la teoria idealitzada de la veritat de Putnam, tot argumentant que la identificació de la veritat amb "acceptabilitat en condicions ideals" no s'adiu amb la tesi que la veritat no és contextual sinó transcendent, per tal com la noció de justificació és intrínsecament contextual i no hi ha idealització que la pugui redimir d'aquest caracter. Finalment, suggereixo que les intuicions realistes que el realisme intern de Putnam intenta captar no requereixen més que una perspectiva deflacionista sobre la veritat. Adoptar aquesta perspectiva implica abandonar no sols la idea que la veritat és una propietat epistèmica, sinó també la idea que la veritat és una propietat substantiva que totes les afirmacions verdaderes comparteixen i que, per tant, és objecte d'una teoria filosòfica

Answering the question : ‘what is life?’

The present paper offers five approaches to the question of life as it is posed in the intersection between Percy Bysshe Shelley’s ‘The Triumph of Life’ and Jacques Derrida’s reading of it in ‘Living On/Border Lines’. After a brief overview of the circumstances of the poem’s composition, it explores (1) the relation between historical fact and figuration; (2) the afterlife of literary texts as theorised by Derrida and Walter Benjamin; (3) the responsibility of critical writing on life and figuration; (4) the difference between survival and immortality as well as Shelley’s conception of poetry’s eternity; and finally (5) the possibility that it is living on that destroys life.peer-reviewe

What is the method in applying formal methods to PLC applications?

The question we investigate is how to obtain PLC applications with confidence in their proper functioning. Especially, we are interested in the contribution that formal methods can provide for their development. Our maxim is that the place of a particular formal method in the total picture of system development should be made very clear. Developers and customers ought to understand very well what they can rely on or not, and we see our task in trying to make this explicit. Therefore, for us the answer to the question above leads to the following questions: Which parts of the system can be treated formally? What formal methods and tools can be applied? What does their successful application tell (or does not) about the proper functioning of the whole system

What is Immanent Critique?

This working paper examines the notion of "immanent critique", a central methodological commitment of critical theories of society. In the first part, I distinguish immanent critique - a critique which reconstructs norms immanent in a social practice which point beyond the normative self-understanding of its members - from both external and internal critique and examine three questions that a theory of immanent critique has to answer (a social ontological, an epistemological and a justificatory question). After surveying some of the classic accounts of immanent critique in part two, I then distinguish two varieties of immanent critique, a hermeneutic and a practice-theoretic approach. Drawing on theories in recent analytic philosophy, I finally argue for a practice-theoretic approach to immanent critique that locates the relevant norms in a practice constituted by mutual recognition

What is Québécois Literature?

The question ‘What is Québécois literature?’ may seem innocent and answerable, yet Rosemary Chapman's compelling study shows that to answer it is to chart the cultural history of French Canada, to put francophone writing in Canada in postcolonial context and to ask whether literary history, with its focus on the nation, is in fact obsolete. This remarkable book will be compulsory reading for scholars well-versed in francophone postcolonial studies and will also act as an ideal introduction for Anglophone scholars of Canadian literature

What is rational belief?

A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality