Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism

Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1Introduction2Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems3Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1High-grade necessity4.2Unity in diversity5Conclusio

The Teleological Theory of Representation

Book chapter (revised

How Prices are Determined

PDF pages: 2

Finding and Resolving Security Misusability with Misusability Cases

Although widely used for both security and usability concerns, scenarios used in security design may not necessarily inform the design of usability, and vice- versa. One way of using scenarios to bridge security and usability involves explicitly describing how design deci- sions can lead to users inadvertently exploiting vulnera- bilities to carry out their production tasks. This paper describes how misusability cases, scenarios that describe how design decisions may lead to usability problems sub- sequently leading to system misuse, address this problem. We describe the related work upon which misusability cases are based before presenting the approach, and illus- trating its application using a case study example. Finally, we describe some findings from this approach that further inform the design of usable and secure systems

Quantum causal models, faithfulness and retrocausality

Wood and Spekkens (2015) argue that any causal model explaining the EPRB correlations and satisfying no-signalling must also violate the assumption that the model faithfully reproduces the statistical dependences and independences---a so-called "fine-tuning" of the causal parameters; this includes, in particular, retrocausal explanations of the EPRB correlations. I consider this analysis with a view to enumerating the possible responses an advocate of retrocausal explanations might propose. I focus on the response of N\"{a}ger (2015), who argues that the central ideas of causal explanations can be saved if one accepts the possibility of a stable fine-tuning of the causal parameters. I argue that, in light of this view, a violation of faithfulness does not necessarily rule out retrocausal explanations of the EPRB correlations, although it certainly constrains such explanations. I conclude by considering some possible consequences of this type of response for retrocausal explanations