Strategic Asset Allocation, Asset Price Dynamics, and the Business Cycle

The main contribution of this work is to provide a dynamic general equilibrium model of asset allocation, allowing to reconcile economic theory with several puzzling contradictions recently pointed out in the literature: (i) the asset allocation puzzle, (ii) the observed time-variation in aggregate portfolio holdings, and (iii) the occurrence of twin peaks in equity and house prices. In this approach, compared to the existing literature, the main difference stems from the fact that, in addition to consumption and dividends, both prices and portfolio decisions are allowed to be endogenously determined within a general equilibrium framework. Secondly, real estate is introduced into the analysis, labor supply is allowed to be endogenously determined and macroeconomic shocks are the main source of riskiness.strategic asset allocation, real estate, house prices, business cycle, general equilibrium

Hedge fund seeding via fees-for-seed swaps under idiosyncratic risk

We develop a dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding business by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse manager who launches a hedge fund through a seeding vehicle. This vehicle, i.e. fees-for-seed swap, specifies that a strategic partner (seeder) provides a critical amount of capital in exchange for participation in the funds revenue. Our results indicate that the new swap not only solves the serious problem of widespread financing constraints for new and early-stage funds (ESFs) managers, but can be highly beneficial to both the manager and the seeder if structured properly

First come, first served: an analysis of pioneer and follower firms' market and nonmarket actions in the European mobile telephone industry

This study examines the relationship between erosion of the first-mover's market share and the differences in competitive behaviour of pioneer firms and followers. Particularly, we pay particular attention to market actions related to innovation, pricing and promotion, and to non-market actions related to judicial issues. The empirical study has been carried out with companies that are present in a dynamic context, such as the European mobile telephone industry. Our results show that when followers take more non-market actions than pioneers the negative effect on the firstentrant's advantage is more significant. On the contrary, we have not found a significant impact of innovating and pricing actions

An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Aggregate Portfolio Allocations

This paper analyzes the important time variation in U.S. aggregate portfolio allocations. To do so, we first use flexible descriptions of preferences and investment opportunities to derive optimal decision rules that nest tactical, myopic, and strategic portofolio allocations. We then compare these rules to the data through formal statistical analysis. Our main results reveal that i) purely tactical and myopic investment behaviors are unambiguously rejected, ii) strategic portfolio allocations are strongly supported, and iii) the Fama-French factors best explain empirical portfolios shares.Dynamic Hedging, Risk Aversion, Inter-temporal Substitution, Time-Varying Investment Opportunity Set

"Strategic Default Jump as Impulse Control in Continuous Time"

This paper presents a new approach for modeling an optimal debt contract in continuous time. It examines a competing contract design in a continuous-time environment with Markov income shocks and costly veri able information. It shows that an optimal contract has the form of a long-term debt contract that permits a debtor's strategic default and debt restructuring. The default is characterized by a recurrent, optimal impulse control beyond default. Numerical examples show that the equilibrium probability of the default is decreasing in the monitoring technology level when the default causes a big wealth loss.

Deferred Annuities and Strategic Asset Allocation

We derive the optimal portfolio choice and consumption pattern over the lifecycle for households facing labor income, capital market, and mortality risk. In addition to stocks and bonds, households also have access to deferred annuities. Deferred annuities offer a hedge against mortality risk and provide similar benefits as Social Security. We show that a considerable fraction of wealth should be annuitized to skim the return enhancing mortality credit. The remaining liquid wealth (stocks and bonds) is used to hedge labor income risk during work life and to earn the equity premium. We find a marginal difference between a strategy involving deferred annuities and one where the investor can purchase immediate life annuities.

Corporate finance in an interest free economy: An alternate approach to practiced Islamic Corporate Finance

This paper suggests an alternate approach to corporate finance in an interest free economy by looking beyond practiced Islamic finance and suggesting alternatives for corporate finance in sourcing funds i.e. i) Ijara with embedded options, ii) limited liability partnership, iii) equity modes like Musharakah and Mudarabah iv) income bonds and v) convertible income bonds. It also suggests alternatives for corporate finance in using funds i.e. i) Islamic income funds, ii) Islamic REITs, iii) Treasury Bonds, iv) income bonds v) convertible income bonds, vi) foreign currency reserves, vii) making strategic expansion, and viii) equity investments in other companies. It also suggests methods of valuation by suggesting an alternate means of pricing capital in interest free economy and use of appropriate discount rate i.e. Nominal GDP growth rate in public finance and corporate finance in CAPM, dividend discount model, project valuation, calculating NPV, valuing income bonds and stocks. It also discusses how the problems of scarcity of capital will be solved and alternatives for insurance in an interest free economy.Islamic corporate finance, pricing of capital, Islamic public finance, scarcity of capital, Interest free economy, Interest free finance, Zakat, Usury, Time value of money, CAPM, Project evaluation, NPV, FCF

Insufficient Incentives for Investment in Electricity Generation

In theory, competitive electricity markets can provide incentives for efficient investment in generating capacity. We show that if consumers and investors are risk averse, investment is efficient only if investors in generating capacity can sign long-term contracts with consumers. Otherwise the uncovered price risk increases financing costs, reduces equilibrium investment levels, distorts technology choice towards less capital-intensive generation and reduces consumer utility. We observe insufficient levels of long-term contracts in existing markets, possibly because retail companies are not credible counter-parties if their final customer can switch easily. With consumer franchise, retailers can sign long-term contracts, but this solution comes at the expense of the idea of retail competition. Alternative capacity mechanisms to stimulate investment are discussed