A new framework for resolving conflicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods

A novel bankruptcy approach is proposed for resolving transboundary river conflicts in which the total water demand or claim of the riparian parties is more than the available water. Bankruptcy solution methods can allocate the available water to the conflicting parties with respect to their claims. Four commonly used bankruptcy methods in the economic literature are used here to develop new river bankruptcy solution methods for allocating water to the riparian parties of river systems. Given the non-uniform spatial and temporal distribution of water across river basins, the proposed solution methods are formulated as non-linear network flow optimization models to allocate water with respect to time sensitivity of water deliveries at different locations in a river network during the planning horizon. Once allocation optimization solutions are developed, their acceptability and stability must be evaluated. Thus, a new bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) is developed for evaluating the acceptability of river bankruptcy solutions. To show how the proposed river bankruptcy framework can be helpful in practice, the suggested methods are applied to a real-world transboundary river system with eight riparians under various hydrologic regimes. Stability analysis based on the proposed stability evaluation method suggests that the acceptability of allocation rules is sensitive to hydrologic conditions and demand values. This finding has an important policy implication suggesting that fixed allocation rules and treaties may not be reliable for securing cooperation over transboundary water resources as they are vulnerable to changing socioeconomic and climatic conditions as well as hydrologic non-stationarity

Non-priority and priority allocation policies in water resources management concerning water resources scarcity using the WEAP model in the catchment area of Fars province

Water shortage in dry regions include the region of this study urge the needs for management of water supply in different parts such as drinking and agriculture sectors, the effects and climate changes of the region should be evaluated in order to anticipate the necessary measures to deal with these effects. In the present study, based on the fifth IPCC reports, these changes were predicted using scenarios of RCP2.6,RCP4.5, RCP8.5.The results showed that by the end of this century, the annual temperature will increase by 4.7%, but in the case of precipitation, according to different scenarios,4.5RCPscenario considered as optimistic scenario and 2.6RCP as pessimistic and finally 8.5RCP considered as the median. Two general policies of allocation without prioritizing consumption and prioritizing urban consumption found to be ineffective regarding the allocation of water resources until the end of the present century. Many problems were observed in the drinking water sector in the policy without prioritization in the allocation of water resources in the months of June to October and in the allocation with prioritization of consumption in the months of August, September and October. Therefore, the rationing policy should beused to supply drinking water to the cities of Shiraz and Marvdasht. This policy showed the best efficiency by reducing the area under cultivation and changing the crop. Thus it is possible toavoid problems in both drinking water and agriculture by substituting rice product to wheat and reducing rice product to 50% as well as reducing the area under agricultural cultivation by58.4%

Water and benefit sharing in transboundary river basins

Le partage équitable des bénéfices dans les bassins fluviaux transfrontaliers est nécessaire pour résoudre les conflits entre les pays riverains et atteindre un consensus sur les activités de développement et de gestion du bassin versant. Le partage des bénéfices doit être discuté collectivement par tous les pays riverains pour être perçu non seulement comme efficace, mais aussi équitable. La littérature actuelle décrit principalement ce que l’on entend par le partage des bénéfices d’un point de vue conceptuel. Les arrangements institutionnels pratiques qui assurent le bien-être économique maximal, ainsi que les méthodes développées en collaboration pour encourager le partage équitable des bénéfices, ne sont toutefois pas présentés. L’objectif global de ce projet de thèse est de développer un arrangement institutionnel, qui comprend à la fois des politiques de répartition de l’eau et des mécanismes de partage des bénéfices, afin d’améliorer la gestion des ressources en eau transfrontalières et d’encourager la coopération entre les pays riverains. La méthodologie étend l’approche traditionnelle, basée sur des stratégies d’allocation très limitées en allouant efficacement les ressources en eau et le partage équitable des bénéfices découlant de l’utilisation de l’eau. Cette thèse détaille l’arrangement institutionnel développé et, à travers trois activités distinctes, les principales composantes de l’arrangement sont analysés. Dans l’arrangement institutionnel, une autorité de bassin fluvial (RBA) est l’opérateur d’un système axé sur le marché, dans lequel les politiques d’allocation économiquement efficaces sont identifiées et imposées aux usagers de l’eau, qui doit payer pour l’eau qui leur est alloué. Ces frais sont collectés et redistribués, via une règle de partage spécifique au bassin fluvial, afin d’assurer l’équité entre les usagers de l’eau. Le bassin du Nil oriental est utilisé comme étude de cas pour illustrer l’approche. Il y a des secteurs hydroélectriques et agricoles répartis dans trois pays (Egypte, Soudan et Ethiopie) et une longue histoire de non-coopération dans ce bassin. La répartition actuelle de l’eau repose sur des accords bilatéraux de l’époque coloniale, qui désignent l’Egypte et le Soudan comme les seuls bénéficiaires des eaux du Nil. La coopération future est impérative dans ce bassin pour profiter du potentiel hydroélectrique en Ethiopie, et du potentiel de l’agriculture au Soudan, ainsi que pour atténuer, autant que possible, les effets du changement climatique. Les résultats montrent que la gestion coopérative du bassin du Nil oriental, et de son infrastructure, augmenterait considérablement les bénéfices économiques à l’échelle du bassin et entraiînerait une répartition de l’eau plus efficace. L’arrangement institutionnel garantit que l’eau est retirée ouù elle a la plus grande valeur et que les investissements en amont dans des projets à faible productivité sont découragés. Le plus haut niveau de coopération est effectuée en vertu d’une institution supranationale et toutes les parties doivent se mettre d’accord sur la définition de l’équité dans le le partage des bénéfices. L’imposition d’axiomes spécifiques sur la base de cette vision collaborative de l’équité se traduit par une solution unique pour la répartition des bénéfices économiques. Une règle de partage élaborée avec la participation des parties prenantes peut être plus acceptable parce que la définition de la règle n’est pas contestée, comme ce serait le cas si les règles existantes avaientété appliquées avec leurs propres définitions de l’équité. Enfin, les résultats globaux montrent que la réalisation de compromis entre l’efficacité et l’équité peut se produire lorsque ces deux principes de répartition de l’eau sont couplés afin de maximiser les avantages de l’utilisation de l’eau, puis de réaffecter ces d’une manière équitable.The equitable sharing of benefits in transboundary river basins is necessary to solve disputes among riparian countries and to reach a consensus on basin-wide development and management activities. Benefit-sharing arrangements must be collaboratively developed to be perceived not only as efficient, but also as equitable, and to be considered acceptable to all riparian countries. The current literature mainly describes what is meant by the term benefit sharing, in the context of transboundary river basins, and discusses this from a conceptual point of view. Practical, institutional arrangements that ensure maximum economic welfare, as well as collaboratively developed methods for encouraging the equitable sharing of benefits, are, however, not provided. The overall objective of this PhD project was to develop an institutional arrangement, that includes both water allocation policies and benefit-sharing mechanisms, to improve the sustainability of managing transboundary water resources and to encourage cooperation between riparian states. The methodology extends the traditional approach, which is based on highly constrained allocation policies, that merely complement existing management institutions, by efficiently allocating water resources and then equitably sharing the benefits derived from water use. This thesis details the institutional arrangement developed and, through three separate activities, the main components of the arrangement are analyzed. A river basin authority (RBA) is the operator of a market-based system, in which economically efficient allocation policies are identified and imposed on water users, who are charged for the water allocated to them. These charges are collected and redistributed, via a sharing rule specific to the river basin, to ensure equity among the water users. The Eastern Nile River Basin is used as the case study to illustrate the approach. There are important hydropower and agricultural sectors spread across three countries (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia), and there is a long history of non-cooperation in this river basin. Current water allocation is based on colonial era bilateral agreements that designate Egypt and Sudan as the only beneficiaries of the Nile waters. Future cooperation is imperative, in this basin, to take advantage of hydropower potential in Ethiopia, and agriculture potential in Sudan, as well as to mitigate, as much as possible, the effects of climate change in the near future. Results reveal that the cooperative management of the Eastern Nile River Basin and its infrastructure would significantly increase the basin-wide economic benefits and lead to more efficient water allocation. The institutional arrangement ensures that water is withdrawn where it has the greatest value (efficient water allocation is established) and that upstream investments in low productivity projects are discouraged. The highest level of cooperation is effectuated through a supranational institution and all parties must agree on the definition of fairness in the sharing of benefits.The imposition of specific axioms, based on this agreedupon vision of fairness results in a unique solution for the distribution of economic benefits. A sharing rule developed with stakeholder input may be more acceptable because the definition of the rule is not in question, as would be the case if existing rules were applied with their inherent definitions of equity. Finally, overall results show that achieving trade-offs between efficiency and equity can occur when these two principles of water allocation are coupled to first maximize the benefits from water use and then reallocate these in an equitable manner

Socio-hydrology from Local to Large Scales: An Agent-based Modeling Approach

For decades, the interaction between water and people has attracted hydrologists’ attention. However, the coevolution of social and natural processes, which occurs across a range of time scales, has not yet been adequately characterized. This research gap has motivated more research in recent years under the umbrella of “socio-hydrology”. The purpose of socio-hydrology is to posit the endogeneity of humans in a hydrological system and then to investigate feedback mechanisms between hydrological and human systems that might lead to emergent phenomena. The current state-of-the-art in socio-hydrology faces several challenges that include (1) a tenuous connection of socio-hydrology to broader research on social, economic, and policy aspects of water resources, (2) the (in)capability of socio-hydrological models to capture human behavior by generic feedback mechanisms that can be extrapolated to other places, and (3) unsatisfying calibration or validation processes in modeling. To address the first gap, a socio-hydrology study needs to connect proper social theories on water-related human decision making with a water resource model based on a given context and scale. Addressing the second gap calls for socio-hydrology research with case studies in different and contrasting regions and at different scales. In fact, such study can shed light on the similarities and differences in socio-hydrological systems in different contexts and scales as initial steps for future research. The third research gap calls for a socio-hydrology study that improves calibration and validation processes. Thus, to address all these gaps in one thesis, two case studies with completely different environments are chosen to investigate various phenomena at different scales. The research presented here contributes to socio-hydrological understanding at two spatial scales. To account for the heterogeneity of human decision making and its interactions with the hydrologic system, an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach is used in this research. The first objective is to explore human adaptation to drought as well as the subsequent expected or unexpected effects on the agricultural sector and to develop a socio-hydrological model to predict agricultural water demand. To do so, an agent-based agricultural water demand model (ABAD) is developed. This model is applied to the Bow River Basin in Alberta, Canada, as a study region, which has recently experienced drought periods. The second objective is to explore conflict-and-cooperation processes in transboundary rivers as socio-hydrological phenomena at a large scale. The Eastern Nile Basin Socio-hydrological (ENSH) model is developed and applied to the Eastern Nile Basin (ENB) in Africa in which conflict-and-cooperation dynamics can be seen among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The ENSH model aims to quantify and simulate these countries’ willingness to cooperate in the ENB. ABAD demonstrates (1) how farmers’ attitudes toward profits, risk aversion, environmental protection, social interaction, and irrigation expansion explain the dynamics of the water demand and (2) how the conservation program may paradoxically lead to the rebound phenomenon whereby the water demand may increase after decreasing through modernized irrigation systems. Through the ABAD model analysis, economic factors are found to dominantly control possible rebounds. Based on the insights gained via the model analysis, it is discussed that several strategies, including community participation and water restrictions, can be adopted to avoid the rebound phenomenon in irrigation systems. Fostering farmers’ awareness about the average water use in their community could be a means to avoid the rebound phenomenon through community participation. Also, another strategy to avoid the rebound phenomenon could be to reassign water allocations to reduce farmers’ water rights. The ENSH model showed that (1) socio-political factors (i.e., relative political stability and foreign direct investment) can explain two historical trends (i.e., (a) fluctuations in Ethiopia’s willingness to cooperate between 1983 and 2009 and (b) a decreasing Ethiopia’s willingness to cooperate between 2009 and 2016); (2) the 2008 food crisis (i.e., Sudan’s food gap) may account for Sudan recovering its willingness to cooperate; and (3) Egypt’s political (in)stability plays a role in its willingness to cooperate. The outcomes of this research can provide valuable insights to support policymakers for the long-term sustainability of water planning. This research investigates two main socio-hydrological phenomena at different spatial scales: the agricultural rebound phenomenon at a small geographical scale and the conflict and cooperation phenomena at a large geographical scale. The emergence of these phenomena can be a complex resultant of interaction and feedback mechanisms between the social system at the individual, institutional, and society levels and the hydrological system. Through developing quantitative socio-hydrological models, this research investigates the feedback mechanisms that may lead to the rebound phenomenon at a small scale and the conflict and cooperation phenomenon at a large scale. Finally, the research shows how these socio-hydrological models can be used for sustainable water management to avoid negative long-term consequences

Water Allocation Under Climate Change In The Qezelozan-Sefidrood Watershed

The Qezelozan-Sefidrood Watershed is a transboundary watershed in Iran, shared by eight provinces. Recent development plans in the upstream provinces include several dams that are either under construction or at the study stage. Implementation of these plans will negatively impact the downstream provinces, which historically have had access to the river. The situation can be exacerbated by the expected climate change impacts on the basin. This study evaluates the possible impacts of upstream development plans and climate change on the natural flow of the Qezelozan-Sefidrood River and designs a reasonable mechanism for fair allocation of streamflow to the riparian parties. First, a watershed model is developed using the Water Evaluation And Planning System (WEAP) software. This model is run for current water allocation and various development and climate change scenarios. The results indicate that the downstream provinces have a high vulnerability to the expected climate and development changes in the basin. To reduce the potential tension, the study treats the problem as a bankruptcy problem and applies the Adjusted Proportional rule to fairly allocate the available resource (water) to the creditors (conflict parties). © 2012 IEEE

Water allocation under climate change in the Qezelozan-Sefidrood Watershed

The Qezelozan-Sefidrood Watershed is a transboundary watershed in Iran, shared by eight provinces. Recent development plans in the upstream provinces include several dams that are either under construction or at the study stage. Implementation of these plans will negatively impact the downstream provinces, which historically have had access to the river. The situation can be exacerbated by the expected climate change impacts on the basin. This study evaluates the possible impacts of upstream development plans and climate change on the natural flow of the Qezelozan-Sefidrood River and designs a reasonable mechanism for fair allocation of streamflow to the riparian parties. First, a watershed model is developed using the Water Evaluation And Planning System (WEAP) software. This model is run for current water allocation and various development and climate change scenarios. The results indicate that the downstream provinces have a high vulnerability to the expected climate and development changes in the basin. To reduce the potential tension, the study treats the problem as a bankruptcy problem and applies the Adjusted Proportional rule to fairly allocate the available resource (water) to the creditors (conflict parties). © 2012 IEEE