Jamesian Free Will, The Two-stage Model Of William James

Research into two-stage models of “free will” – first “free” random generation of alternative possibilities, followed by “willed” adequately determined decisions consistent with character, values, and desires – suggests that William James was in 1884 the first of a dozen philosophers and scientists to propose such a two-stage model for free will. We review the later work to establish James’s priority. By limiting chance to the generation of alternative possibilities, James was the first to overcome the standard two-part argument against free will, i.e., that the will is either determined or random. James gave it elements of both, to establish freedom but preserve responsibility. We show that James was influenced by Darwin’s model of natural selection, as were most recent thinkers with a two-stage model. In view of James’s famous decision to make his first act of freedom a choice to believe that his will is free, it is most fitting to celebrate James’s priority in the free will debates by naming the two-stage model – first chance, then choice -“Jamesian” free will

Stoics against stoics in Cudworth's "A Treatise of Freewill"

In his 'A Treatise of Freewill', Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ‘up to us’ and that these things are the product of our choice. These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim to be drawing on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias

Automata with Nested Pebbles Capture First-Order Logic with Transitive Closure

String languages recognizable in (deterministic) log-space are characterized either by two-way (deterministic) multi-head automata, or following Immerman, by first-order logic with (deterministic) transitive closure. Here we elaborate this result, and match the number of heads to the arity of the transitive closure. More precisely, first-order logic with k-ary deterministic transitive closure has the same power as deterministic automata walking on their input with k heads, additionally using a finite set of nested pebbles. This result is valid for strings, ordered trees, and in general for families of graphs having a fixed automaton that can be used to traverse the nodes of each of the graphs in the family. Other examples of such families are grids, toruses, and rectangular mazes. For nondeterministic automata, the logic is restricted to positive occurrences of transitive closure. The special case of k=1 for trees, shows that single-head deterministic tree-walking automata with nested pebbles are characterized by first-order logic with unary deterministic transitive closure. This refines our earlier result that placed these automata between first-order and monadic second-order logic on trees.Comment: Paper for Logical Methods in Computer Science, 27 pages, 1 figur

Two-Way Visibly Pushdown Automata and Transducers

Automata-logic connections are pillars of the theory of regular languages. Such connections are harder to obtain for transducers, but important results have been obtained recently for word-to-word transformations, showing that the three following models are equivalent: deterministic two-way transducers, monadic second-order (MSO) transducers, and deterministic one-way automata equipped with a finite number of registers. Nested words are words with a nesting structure, allowing to model unranked trees as their depth-first-search linearisations. In this paper, we consider transformations from nested words to words, allowing in particular to produce unranked trees if output words have a nesting structure. The model of visibly pushdown transducers allows to describe such transformations, and we propose a simple deterministic extension of this model with two-way moves that has the following properties: i) it is a simple computational model, that naturally has a good evaluation complexity; ii) it is expressive: it subsumes nested word-to-word MSO transducers, and the exact expressiveness of MSO transducers is recovered using a simple syntactic restriction; iii) it has good algorithmic/closure properties: the model is closed under composition with a unambiguous one-way letter-to-letter transducer which gives closure under regular look-around, and has a decidable equivalence problem

Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy

First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of “experimental philosophy,” in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons’ intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy—independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage with the material and paves the way for more fruitful and impassioned classroom discussion. We offer some suggestions for how to use surveys in the classroom and provide an appendix that contains some examples of scenarios teachers could use in their courses

And the Robot Asked "What do you say I am?" Can Artificial Intelligence Help Theologians and Scientists Understand Free Moral Agency?

Concepts of human beings as free and morally responsible agents are shared culturally by scientists and Christian theologians. Accomiplishments of the "artificial intelligence" (AI) branch of computer science now suggest the possibility of an advanced robot mimicking behaviors associated with free and morally responsible agency. The author analyzes some specific features theology has expected of such agency, inquiring whether appropriate AI resources are available for incorporating the features in robots. Waiving questions of whether such extraordinary robots will be constructed, the analysis indicates that they could be, furnishing useful new scientific resources for understanding moral agency

Linear Bounded Composition of Tree-Walking Tree Transducers: Linear Size Increase and Complexity

Compositions of tree-walking tree transducers form a hierarchy with respect to the number of transducers in the composition. As main technical result it is proved that any such composition can be realized as a linear bounded composition, which means that the sizes of the intermediate results can be chosen to be at most linear in the size of the output tree. This has consequences for the expressiveness and complexity of the translations in the hierarchy. First, if the computed translation is a function of linear size increase, i.e., the size of the output tree is at most linear in the size of the input tree, then it can be realized by just one, deterministic, tree-walking tree transducer. For compositions of deterministic transducers it is decidable whether or not the translation is of linear size increase. Second, every composition of deterministic transducers can be computed in deterministic linear time on a RAM and in deterministic linear space on a Turing machine, measured in the sum of the sizes of the input and output tree. Similarly, every composition of nondeterministic transducers can be computed in simultaneous polynomial time and linear space on a nondeterministic Turing machine. Their output tree languages are deterministic context-sensitive, i.e., can be recognized in deterministic linear space on a Turing machine. The membership problem for compositions of nondeterministic translations is nondeterministic polynomial time and deterministic linear space. The membership problem for the composition of a nondeterministic and a deterministic tree-walking tree translation (for a nondeterministic IO macro tree translation) is log-space reducible to a context-free language, whereas the membership problem for the composition of a deterministic and a nondeterministic tree-walking tree translation (for a nondeterministic OI macro tree translation) is possibly NP-complete

Life Is Strange and ‘‘Games Are Made’’: A Philosophical Interpretation of a Multiple-Choice Existential Simulator With Copilot Sartre

The multiple-choice video game Life is Strange was described by its French developers as a metaphor for the inner conflicts experienced by a teenager in trying to become an adult. In psychological work with adolescents, there is a stark similarity between what they experience and some concepts of existentialist philosophy. Sartre’s script for the movie Les Jeux Sont Faits (literally ‘‘games are made’’) uses the same narrative strategy as Life is Strange—the capacity for the main characters to travel back in time to change their own existence—in order to stimulate philosophical, ethical, and political thinking and also to effectively simulate existential ‘‘limit situations.’’ This article is a dialogue between Sartre’s views and Life is Strange in order to examine to what extent questions such as what is freedom? what is choice? what is autonomy and responsibility? can be interpreted anew in hybrid digital–human—‘‘anthrobotic’’—environments

Lucretius' arguments on the swerve and free-action

In his version of atomism, Lucretius made explicit reference to the concept of an intrinsic declination of the atom, the atomic swerve (clinamen in Latin), stressing that the time and space of the infinitesimal atomic vibration is uncertain. The topic of this article is the Epicurean and Lucretian arguments in favour of the swerve. Our exposition of the Lucretian model of the atomic clinamen will present and elucidate the respective considerations on the alleged role of the swerve in the generation of free-action