Building a truster environment for e-business : a Malaysian perspective

Internet identify ‘security’ as a major concern for businesses. In general, the level of security in any network environment is closely linked to the level of trust assigned to a particular individual or organization within that environment. It is the trust element that is crucial in ensuring a secure environment. Besides physical security, security technology needs to be utilised to provide a trusted environment for e-business. Network security components for perimeter defense, i.e., Virtual Private Networks, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems, need to be complemented by security components at the applications and user level, e.g., authentication of user. ID or password security solution may be an option but now with the availability of legally binding digital certificates, security in e-business transactions can be further improved. Time and date stamping of e-business transactions are also of concern to prove at a later date that the transactions took place at the stipulated date and time. Digital certificates are part of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme, which is an enabling technology for building a trusted epvironment. PIU comprise policies and procedures for establishing a secure method for exchanging information over a network environment. The Digital Signature Act 1997 (DSA 1997) facilitates the PKI implementation in Malaysia. Following the DSA 1997, Certification Authorities (CAs) were set up in Malaysia. This paper describes a trusted platform for spurring ebusiness and provides a Malaysian perspective of it

Applying Lessons from Cyber Attacks on Ukrainian Infrastructures to Secure Gateways onto the Industrial Internet of Things

Previous generations of safety-related industrial control systems were ‘air gapped’. In other words, process control components including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and smart sensor/actuators were disconnected and isolated from local or wide area networks. This provided a degree of protection; attackers needed physical access to compromise control systems components. Over time this ‘air gap’ has gradually been eroded. Switches and gateways have subsequently interfaced industrial protocols, including Profibus and Modbus, so that data can be drawn from safety-related Operational Technology into enterprise information systems using TCP/IP. Senior management uses these links to monitor production processes and inform strategic planning. The Industrial Internet of Things represents another step in this evolution – enabling the coordination of physically distributed resources from a centralized location. The growing range and sophistication of these interconnections create additional security concerns for the operation and management of safety-critical systems. This paper uses lessons learned from recent attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructures to guide a forensic analysis of an IIoT switch. The intention is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities that would enable similar attacks to be replicated across Europe and North America

A New Role for Human Resource Managers: Social Engineering Defense

[Excerpt] The general risk of social engineering attacks to organizations has increased with the rise of digital computing and communications, while for an attacker the risk has decreased. In order to counter the increased risk, organizations should recognize that human resources (HR) professionals have just as much responsibility and capability in preventing this risk as information technology (IT) professionals. Part I of this paper begins by defining social engineering in context and with a brief history pre-digital age attacks. It concludes by showing the intersection of HR and IT through examples of operational attack vectors. In part II, the discussion moves to a series of measures that can be taken to help prevent social engineering attacks

SMEs, electronically-mediated working and data security: cause for concern?

Security of data is critical to the operations of firms. Without the ability to store, process and transmit data securely, operations may be compromised, with the potential for serious consequences to trading integrity. Thus the role that electronically-mediated working plays in business today and its dependency on data security is of critical interest, especially in light of the fact that much of this communication is based on the use of open networks (i.e. the Internet). This paper discusses findings from a 'WestFocus' survey on electronically-mediated working and telework amongst a sample of SMEs located in West London and adjacent counties in South-Eastern England in order to highlight the problems that such practice raises in terms of data security. Data collection involved a telephone survey undertaken in early 2006 of 378 firms classified into four industrial sectors ('Media', 'Logistics', 'Internet Services' and 'Food Processing'). After establishing how ICTs and the Internet are being exploited as business applications for small firms, data security practice is explored on the basis of sector and size with a focus on telework. The paper goes on to highlight areas of concern in terms of data security policy and training practice. Findings show some sector and size influences.WestFocus* under the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF 2

Assessing Resilience in Power Grids as a Particular Case of Supply Chain Management

Electrical power grids represent a critical infrastructure for a nation as well as strategically important. Literature review identified that power grids share basic characteristics with Supply Chain Management. This thesis presents a linear programming model to assess power grid resilience as a particular case of Supply Chain Management. Since resilient behavior is not an individual or specific system\u27s attribute but a holistic phenomenon based on the synergic interaction within complex systems, resilience drivers in power grids were identified. Resilience is a function of Reliability, Recovery Capability, Vulnerability and Pipeline Capacity. In order to embed heterogeneous variables into the model, parameterization of resilience drivers were developed. A principle of improving resilience through redundancy was applied in the model by using a virtual redundancy in each link which allows reliability improvement throughout the entire network. Vulnerability was addressed through the standard MIL-STD 882D, and mitigated through security allocation. A unique index (R) integrates the resilience complexity to facilitate alternate scenarios analysis toward strategic decision making. Decision makers are enabled to improve overall power grid performance through reliability development as well as security allocation at the more strategic links identified by the optimal solutions. Moreover, this tool lets decision makers fix grid variables such as reliability, reduced pipeline capacity, or vulnerabilities within the model in order to find optimal solutions that withstand disruptions. The model constitutes an effective tool not only for efficient reliability improvement but also for rational security allocation in the most critical links within the network. Finally, this work contributes to the federal government mandates accomplishment, intended to address electrical power-related risks and vulnerabilities

Threats and countermeasures for network security

In the late 1980's, the traditional threat of anonymous break-ins to networked computers was joined by viruses and worms, multiplicative surrogates that carry out the bidding of their authors. Technologies for authentication and secrecy, supplemented by good management practices, are the principal countermeasures. Four articles on these subjects are presented