32,864 research outputs found

    The incomplete Analytic Hierarchy Process and Bradley-Terry model: (in)consistency and information retrieval

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    Several methods of preference modeling, ranking, voting and multi-criteria decision making include pairwise comparisons. It is usually simpler to compare two objects at a time, furthermore, some relations (e.g., the outcome of sports matches) are naturally known for pairs. This paper investigates and compares pairwise comparison models and the stochastic Bradley-Terry model. It is proved that they provide the same priority vectors for consistent (complete or incomplete) comparisons. For incomplete comparisons, all filling in levels are considered. Recent results identified the optimal subsets and sequences of multiplicative/additive/reciprocal pairwise comparisons for small sizes of items (up to n = 6). Simulations of this paper show that the same subsets and sequences are optimal in case of the Bradley-Terry and the Thurstone models as well. This, somehow surprising, coincidence suggests the existence of a more general result. Further models of information and preference theory are subject to future investigation in order to identify optimal subsets of input data

    Solving Hard Control Problems in Voting Systems via Integer Programming

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    Voting problems are central in the area of social choice. In this article, we investigate various voting systems and types of control of elections. We present integer linear programming (ILP) formulations for a wide range of NP-hard control problems. Our ILP formulations are flexible in the sense that they can work with an arbitrary number of candidates and voters. Using the off-the-shelf solver Cplex, we show that our approaches can manipulate elections with a large number of voters and candidates efficiently

    Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting

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    In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-kk candidates receiving the most votes. An agent may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain situations, agents may use heuristics to strategize, instead of incurring the additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them. In this paper, we examine voting behavior in multi-winner approval voting scenarios with complete information. We show that people generally manipulate their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal manipulation. Instead, voters tend to prioritize the candidates with the highest utilities. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of these heuristics in situations where agents only have access to partial information

    Preference fusion and Condorcet's Paradox under uncertainty

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    Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their preferences over certain alternatives under uncertainty, to get a collective representative opinion of the whole community, a preference fusion process is required. The aim of this work is to propose a preference fusion method that copes with uncertainty and escape from the Condorcet paradox. To model preferences under uncertainty, we propose to develop a model of preferences based on belief function theory that accurately describes and captures the uncertainty associated with individual or collective preferences. This work improves and extends the previous results. This work improves and extends the contribution presented in a previous work. The benefits of our contribution are twofold. On the one hand, we propose a qualitative and expressive preference modeling strategy based on belief-function theory which scales better with the number of sources. On the other hand, we propose an incremental distance-based algorithm (using Jousselme distance) for the construction of the collective preference order to avoid the Condorcet Paradox.Comment: International Conference on Information Fusion, Jul 2017, Xi'an, Chin

    Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory

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    We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata

    Where Have All the Parties Gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote - Yet Again

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    The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to inter-ethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt,the author points out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, he explains how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. Prof. Horowitz also explains why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and shows that Fraenkel and Grofman\u27s interpretations of AV\u27s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence
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