32,864 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
Do democracies have different public policies than non-democracies?
Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960-90. Based on three tenets of voting theory - that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important - we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracy is correlated with policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes
The incomplete Analytic Hierarchy Process and Bradley-Terry model: (in)consistency and information retrieval
Several methods of preference modeling, ranking, voting and multi-criteria
decision making include pairwise comparisons. It is usually simpler to compare
two objects at a time, furthermore, some relations (e.g., the outcome of sports
matches) are naturally known for pairs. This paper investigates and compares
pairwise comparison models and the stochastic Bradley-Terry model. It is proved
that they provide the same priority vectors for consistent (complete or
incomplete) comparisons. For incomplete comparisons, all filling in levels are
considered. Recent results identified the optimal subsets and sequences of
multiplicative/additive/reciprocal pairwise comparisons for small sizes of
items (up to n = 6). Simulations of this paper show that the same subsets and
sequences are optimal in case of the Bradley-Terry and the Thurstone models as
well. This, somehow surprising, coincidence suggests the existence of a more
general result. Further models of information and preference theory are subject
to future investigation in order to identify optimal subsets of input data
Solving Hard Control Problems in Voting Systems via Integer Programming
Voting problems are central in the area of social choice. In this article, we
investigate various voting systems and types of control of elections. We
present integer linear programming (ILP) formulations for a wide range of
NP-hard control problems. Our ILP formulations are flexible in the sense that
they can work with an arbitrary number of candidates and voters. Using the
off-the-shelf solver Cplex, we show that our approaches can manipulate
elections with a large number of voters and candidates efficiently
Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting.
Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules
that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent
may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are chosen by tallying up
the votes and choosing the top- candidates receiving the most votes. An
agent may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way
that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain
situations, agents may use heuristics to strategize, instead of incurring the
additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them.
In this paper, we examine voting behavior in multi-winner approval voting
scenarios with complete information. We show that people generally manipulate
their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal
manipulation. Instead, voters tend to prioritize the candidates with the
highest utilities. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of these
heuristics in situations where agents only have access to partial information
Preference fusion and Condorcet's Paradox under uncertainty
Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit
his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express
uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their
preferences over certain alternatives under uncertainty, to get a collective
representative opinion of the whole community, a preference fusion process is
required. The aim of this work is to propose a preference fusion method that
copes with uncertainty and escape from the Condorcet paradox. To model
preferences under uncertainty, we propose to develop a model of preferences
based on belief function theory that accurately describes and captures the
uncertainty associated with individual or collective preferences. This work
improves and extends the previous results. This work improves and extends the
contribution presented in a previous work. The benefits of our contribution are
twofold. On the one hand, we propose a qualitative and expressive preference
modeling strategy based on belief-function theory which scales better with the
number of sources. On the other hand, we propose an incremental distance-based
algorithm (using Jousselme distance) for the construction of the collective
preference order to avoid the Condorcet Paradox.Comment: International Conference on Information Fusion, Jul 2017, Xi'an,
Chin
Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory
We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata
Where Have All the Parties Gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote - Yet Again
The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to inter-ethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt,the author points out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, he explains how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. Prof. Horowitz also explains why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and shows that Fraenkel and Grofman\u27s interpretations of AV\u27s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence
- …