Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences

In many real-world collective decision problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables. The prohibitive size of such combinatorial domains makes it practically impossible to represent preference relations explicitly. Now, the AI community has been developing languages for representing preferences on such domains in a succinct way, exploiting structural properties such as conditional preferential independence. In this paper we reconsider voting and aggregation rules in the case where voters' preferences have a common preferential independence structure, and address the issue of decomposing a voting rule or an aggregation function following a linear order over variables

MODELING, LEARNING AND REASONING ABOUT PREFERENCE TREES OVER COMBINATORIAL DOMAINS

In my Ph.D. dissertation, I have studied problems arising in various aspects of preferences: preference modeling, preference learning, and preference reasoning, when preferences concern outcomes ranging over combinatorial domains. Preferences is a major research component in artificial intelligence (AI) and decision theory, and is closely related to the social choice theory considered by economists and political scientists. In my dissertation, I have exploited emerging connections between preferences in AI and social choice theory. Most of my research is on qualitative preference representations that extend and combine existing formalisms such as conditional preference nets, lexicographic preference trees, answer-set optimization programs, possibilistic logic, and conditional preference networks; on learning problems that aim at discovering qualitative preference models and predictive preference information from practical data; and on preference reasoning problems centered around qualitative preference optimization and aggregation methods. Applications of my research include recommender systems, decision support tools, multi-agent systems, and Internet trading and marketing platforms

On learning and visualizing lexicographic preference trees

Preferences are very important in research fields such as decision making, recommendersystemsandmarketing. The focus of this thesis is on preferences over combinatorial domains, which are domains of objects configured with categorical attributes. For example, the domain of cars includes car objects that are constructed withvaluesforattributes, such as ‘make’, ‘year’, ‘model’, ‘color’, ‘body type’ and ‘transmission’.Different values can instantiate an attribute. For instance, values for attribute ‘make’canbeHonda, Toyota, Tesla or BMW, and attribute ‘transmission’ can haveautomaticormanual. To this end,thisthesis studiesproblemsonpreference visualization and learning for lexicographic preference trees, graphical preference models that often are compact over complex domains of objects built of categorical attributes. Visualizing preferences is essential to provide users with insights into the process of decision making, while learning preferences from data is practically important, as it is ineffective to elicit preference models directly from users. The results obtained from this thesis are two parts: 1) for preference visualization, aweb- basedsystem is created that visualizes various types of lexicographic preference tree models learned by a greedy learning algorithm; 2) for preference learning, a genetic algorithm is designed and implemented, called GA, that learns a restricted type of lexicographic preference tree, called unconditional importance and unconditional preference tree, or UIUP trees for short. Experiments show that GA achieves higher accuracy compared to the greedy algorithm at the cost of more computational time. Moreover, a Dynamic Programming Algorithm (DPA) was devised and implemented that computes an optimal UIUP tree model in the sense that it satisfies as many examples as possible in the dataset. This novel exact algorithm (DPA), was used to evaluate the quality of models computed by GA, and it was found to reduce the factorial time complexity of the brute force algorithm to exponential. The major contribution to the field of machine learning and data mining in this thesis would be the novel learning algorithm (DPA) which is an exact algorithm. DPA learns and finds the best UIUP tree model in the huge search space which classifies accurately the most number of examples in the training dataset; such model is referred to as the optimal model in this thesis. Finally, using datasets produced from randomly generated UIUP trees, this thesis presents experimental results on the performances (e.g., accuracy and computational time) of GA compared to the existent greedy algorithm and DPA

A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences

International audienceCore-selection is a crucial property of rules in the literature of resource allocation. It is also desirable, from the perspective of mechanism design, to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates the exchange problem where (i) each agent is initially endowed with (possibly multiple) indivisible goods, (ii) agents' preferences are assumed to be conditionally lexicographic, and (iii) side payments are prohibited. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC), based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that ATTC is core-selecting and runs in polynomial time with respect to the number of goods. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under ATTC is NP-hard. We finally clarify relationship of misreporting with splitting and hiding, two different types of manipulations, under ATTC

REPRESENTING AND LEARNING PREFERENCES OVER COMBINATORIAL DOMAINS

Agents make decisions based on their preferences. Thus, to predict their decisions one has to learn the agent\u27s preferences. A key step in the learning process is selecting a model to represent those preferences. We studied this problem by borrowing techniques from the algorithm selection problem to analyze preference example sets and select the most appropriate preference representation for learning. We approached this problem in multiple steps. First, we determined which representations to consider. For this problem we developed the notion of preference representation language subsumption, which compares representations based on their expressive power. Subsumption creates a hierarchy of preference representations based solely on which preference orders they can express. By applying this analysis to preference representation languages over combinatorial domains we found that some languages are better for learning preference orders than others. Subsumption, however, does not tell the whole story. In the case of languages which approximate each other (another piece of useful information for learning) the subsumption relation cannot tell us which languages might serve as good approximations of others. How well one language approximates another often requires customized techniques. We developed such techniques for two important preference representation languages, conditional lexicographic preference models (CLPMs) and conditional preference networks (CP-nets). Second, we developed learning algorithms for highly expressive preference representations. To this end, we investigated using simulated annealing techniques to learn both ranking preference formulas (RPFs) and preference theories (PTs) preference programs. We demonstrated that simulated annealing is an effective approach to learn preferences under many different conditions. This suggested that more general learning strategies might lead to equally good or even better results. We studied this possibility by considering artificial neural networks (ANNs). Our research showed that ANNs can outperform classical models at deciding dominance, but have several significant drawbacks as preference reasoning models. Third, we developed a method for determining which representations match which example sets. For this classification task we considered two methods. In the first method we selected a series of features and used those features as input to a linear feed-forward ANN. The second method converts the example set into a graph and uses a graph convolutional neural network (GCNN). Between these two methods we found that the feature set approach works better. By completing these steps we have built the foundations of a portfolio based approach for learning preferences. We assembled a simple version of such a system as a proof of concept and tested its usefulness

Essays on institutions and implementation

This thesis studies three issues in the field of implementation theory. In the first chapter, I examine the implementation of social choice rules under strong Nash equilibrium, when agents do not only care about the final outcomes, but also have a small intrinsic preference for honesty. Specifically, an agent is partially honest if she breaks ties in favour of a truthful strategy, when she faces indifference between outcomes. I present sufficient conditions for implementation in such cases and provide applications in matching and bargaining environments. In the second chapter, I study the issue of decentralization from the implementation perspective. In most cases of institution design, a social planner is forced to operate in a decentralized manner, by designing distinct institutions that deal with different issues or sectors, over which agents may have complementarities in their preferences. By utilizing the notion of a rights structure, I consider a two-sector environment and examine the possibilities that arise in implementation when the social planner can condition the rights structure of one sector to the one of the other. We distinguish two cases, one when a sector constitutes an institutional constraint (constrained conditional implementation), and one where both sectors can be objects of design (conditional implementation). I characterize the social choice rules that are implementable in the first case, while in the second case I provide sufficient conditions for implementation. My results outline the difficulties of implementation in decentralized environments. As applications, I include some possibility results. First I prove the implementability of a weaker version of the stable rule in a constrained matching environment with partners and projects and second, I prove the implementability of the weak Pareto rule in a multi-issue environment with lexicographic preferences. In the third chapter, I extend the positive results obtained in Dutta and Sen (2012) to the framework of rights structures. I show that the well-known unanimity condition is suffcient for implementation in such an environment when there is at least one partially honest agent

PREFERENCES: OPTIMIZATION, IMPORTANCE LEARNING AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS

Preferences are fundamental to decision making and play an important role in artificial intelligence. Our research focuses on three group of problems based on the preference formalism Answer Set Optimization (ASO): preference aggregation problems such as computing optimal (near optimal) solutions, strategic behaviors in preference representation, and learning ranks (weights) for preferences. In the first group of problems, of interest are optimal outcomes, that is, outcomes that are optimal with respect to the preorder defined by the preference rules. In this work, we consider computational problems concerning optimal outcomes. We propose, implement and study methods to compute an optimal outcome; to compute another optimal outcome once the first one is found; to compute an optimal outcome that is similar to (or, dissimilar from) a given candidate outcome; and to compute a set of optimal answer sets each significantly different from the others. For the decision version of several of these problems we establish their computational complexity. For the second topic, the strategic behaviors such as manipulation and bribery have received much attention from the social choice community. We study these concepts for preference formalisms that identify a set of optimal outcomes rather than a single winning outcome, the case common to social choice. Such preference formalisms are of interest in the context of combinatorial domains, where preference representations are only approximations to true preferences, and seeking a single optimal outcome runs a risk of missing the one which is optimal with respect to the actual preferences. In this work, we assume that preferences may be ranked (differ in importance), and we use the Pareto principle adjusted to the case of ranked preferences as the preference aggregation rule. For two important classes of preferences, representing the extreme ends of the spectrum, we provide characterizations of situations when manipulation and bribery is possible, and establish the complexity of the problem to decide that. Finally, we study the problem of learning the importance of individual preferences in preference profiles aggregated by the ranked Pareto rule or positional scoring rules. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a ranking of preferences such that the ranked profile correctly decided all the examples, whenever such a ranking exists. We also show that the problem to learn a ranking maximizing the number of correctly decided examples is NP-hard. We obtain similar results for the case of weighted profiles