Antisocial rewarding in structured populations

Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its invasion, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas

Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations

Prosocial punishment has been proved to be a powerful mean to promote cooperation. Recent studies have found that social exclusion, which indeed can be regarded as a kind of punishment, can also support cooperation. However, if prosocial punishment and exclusion are both present, it is still unclear which strategy is more advantageous to curb free-riders. Here we first study the direct competition between different types of punishment and exclusion. We find that pool (peer) exclusion can always outperform pool (peer) punishment both in the optional and in the compulsory public goods game, no matter whether second-order sanctioning is considered or not. Furthermore, peer exclusion does better than pool exclusion both in the optional and in the compulsory game, but the situation is reversed in the presence of second-order exclusion. Finally, we extend the competition among all possible sanctioning strategies and find that peer exclusion can outperform all other strategies in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, while pool exclusion prevails when second-order sanctioning is possible. Our results demonstrate that exclusion is a more powerful strategy than punishment for the resolution of social dilemmas

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

A multidisciplinary investigation into socioeconomic variation in behaviour

PhD ThesisSocioeconomic differences in behaviour are widely documented, but are not yet well understood. I propose that they can be better understood by using concepts from evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory predicts that mortality risk should be important in determining life history traits such as the scheduling of growth and reproduction. An extension of this concept is that mortality risk should influence the degree to which people value benefits and costs in the present versus those in the future. Thus, many socioeconomic differences in behaviour may represent differences in time perspective, generated by inequalities in mortality risk. This raises the question of what cues evolved psychological mechanisms rely on when forming their estimates of personal mortality risk. I first report a test of the hypothesis that the deaths of others are used as a cue to mortality risk. The results showed that experiences of close bereavement are associated with steeper future discounting and earlier ideal, and actual, reproductive timing (Chapter 2). I then report the results of two experimental tests of whether the ages of others might be used as an indicator of local mortality rates. Manipulating the age profiles of sets of faces viewed in laboratory experiments did not have a clear effect on future discounting or reported ideal reproductive timing (Chapter 3). I move on to testing the hypothesis that the controllability of mortality risks should be most important for behaviour. The results of a correlational study showed that perceived extrinsic mortality risk mediated the association between socioeconomic status and effort spent looking after health (Chapter 4). I then report three experiments that demonstrate that priming participants to feel that prevailing sources of mortality risk are, or are not, controllable alters a simple health behaviour – the choice of a healthy food reward (Chapter 5). Finally, I review the bigger picture of socioeconomic differences in behaviour. I explain how the lack of control associated with lower socioeconomic status may lead to present-oriented behaviour in a range of domains – a phenomenon that I have called the Behavioural Constellation of Deprivation. I highlight some principles from evolutionary theoretical models that can deepen our understanding of how socioeconomic inequalities can become amplified and embedded. I discuss mechanisms by which extrinsic mortality risk may influence behaviour. I then review the evidence in support of my position, highlighting the fact that many researchers working from different perspectives have converged on control and time perspective as explanations for socioeconomic differences in behaviour. I finish by discussing the wider implications of my thesis and some of the related questions which could be answered in future research (Chapter 6 & 7)

The Relationship Between Participation, Social Networks and Cooperation: How Social Networks Influence Voter Turnout through Mobilization and how both Networks and Turnout are Related to Cooperation.

This dissertation is organized around three papers that illustrate the codependence of cooperation, political participation and social networks. It takes advantage of a unique project, the 2010 Rural Social Network Study that comprehensively mapped the social relationships of residents in 32 small Honduran communities. These data are paired with survey questions and behavioral observations of subsamples in incentivized settings. The first paper, ``Cooperation and Popularity,'' reinforces the claim that cooperation and friendship share a strong positive relationship. Friendship and social networks may have evolutionary roots in cooperation, but this work is the first to demonstrate a relationship between the number of friends one has and the propensity to cooperate. Number of friendships predicts cooperation in a public goods game. Specifically, I find that individuals with more friends are more likely to cooperate in earlier rounds, and that a group's total amount of money earned increases with the aggregate number of friends of its members. The second paper, ``Habituated Cooperation and Voter Turnout,'' provides empirical support for the claim that voting is a cooperative act. Prior theoretical work argues for a link between cooperation and voter turnout. I demonstrate that there is a robust empirical relationship been those who cooperate in public goods games and self-reported voting. The final paper, ``Social Networks and Mobilization,'' demonstrates that mobilization occurs more commonly when strong affective relationships are present. This study is the first to demonstrate how one’s position within a social network can affect the ability to mobilize others for participation in a community meeting. Specifically, the greater the number of connections a person is away from a mobilizer, the less likely she is to attend a community meeting. I also show that as mobilizers are more central to the network, the percentage of those who attend the community meeting grows. Together these papers illustrate that cooperation, social networks, and participation are linked to one another thereby contributing to the understanding of the interrelationship between social, political, and economic dynamics in the political process. These findings could be used to augment political participation and community cooperation through social networks.PhDPolitical ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/133345/1/dstaff_1.pd

The equity and efficiency of incentives to manage ecosystem services for natural resource conservation and rural development Case studies from Lombok, Indonesia and Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso, Brazil

Incentives to manage ecosystem services have been heralded as important mechanisms to increase efficiency in biodiversity conservation and to facilitate greater equity in the distribution of natural resources. These interventions aim to control the use of natural resources by altering resource users’ land-use decisions and environmental behaviours. There is relatively little evidence, however, about the perceived benefits and societal values of incentives, and the institutional effectiveness of incentives to alter land-use behaviours to increase compliance. It is also unclear how incentive-based management institutions align with the local biophysical, social, economic, and political dimensions of the social-ecological systems (SES) in which they are implemented. The thesis examines the ways in which incentives are used to manage ecosystem services and their institutional effectiveness to alter landowner environmental behaviours in the complex reality of the world It is important to understand the drivers of land-use decisions and environmental behaviours to implement institutions that can address natural resource issues within specific contexts. This thesis contributes to the discourse surrounding the use of incentive-based management that aim to provide motivation for compliant land-use decisions. The research highlights the need to understand the contextual nature of societal values and institutional processes that drive behaviours and determine the ‘fit’ of natural resource governance mechanisms. The recognition of these values and processes enables sufficient ‘incentive effects’ to be provided that can motivate pro-environmental behaviours. The thesis also illustrates the reality of how incentive-based institutions can function on the ground makes it difficult to clearly attribute outcomes to theoretical assumptions on which incentive-based institutions are designed. Case studies from Lombok, Indonesia and Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso, Brazil were used to illustrate the significance of local participation in decision-making, incentive design, and landowner perception of the benefits of behaviours on compliance outcomes, equity in benefit distribution, and efficient conservation management. A mixed methods approach was used to compare different incentives, which included legal sanctions, religious beliefs, social norms, and economic rewards. The thesis examines institutional function, ‘fit’, and landowner perceptions that can influence compliant pro-environmental behaviours. Spatial analysis, semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interviews, and focus groups were conducted to determine the impact of religious, economic, and customary law incentives on land-use decisions in communities on Lombok. Spatial analysis was used to examine the impact of sanctions in the legal reforms of the Forest Code, Brazil’s forest conservation legislation, on farmer land-use decisions in Alta Floresta. Abstract -ii- This thesis finds that ‘incentive effects’ are strongly determined by landowner perceptions of the social and economic cost-effectiveness of compliant behaviour, and the ‘fit’ of incentive-based management to SES’s contexts and dynamics. Institutional ‘fit’ was greater when procedural justice was perceived to be higher. That was driven by stakeholder participation in decision-making, closer links to existing institutions and social norms, and higher community autonomy over incentives. Positive incentives, like religious values and customary laws, were used to generate collective action for pro-environmental behaviours at local levels on Lombok, Indonesia. This generated greater community cooperation when collective action was built on existing social norms, socio-cultural institutions, and ecological dimensions. Incentives for collective action had less impact when they were imposed by external organisations, did not align to the local SES dimensions, and were only focused on increasing efficiency to control natural resource use. When negative incentives, such as legal sanctions and economic fines, were used to increase compliance with pro-environmental behaviours to protect riparian forests in Alta Floresta, they were found to, in fact, reduce overall compliance. The cost of sanctions and the option to offset illegal deforestation were perceived to be lower than the benefit of non-compliant behaviours like continued deforestation. The ‘incentive effects’ of these sanctions had limited impact to alter environmental behaviours of landowners. The findings of this study have implications for policies that use incentives as mechanisms to alter land-use behaviour. These findings also have clear relevance for PES and incentive-based design. They move PES beyond its theoretical application to meet the realities of the ‘messy’ world in which they are applied. The application of incentives is highly context specific to the SES in which incentives aim to function. This approach includes a need for the understanding of local perceptions of equity and cost-efficiency, and the impact of SES subsystem dynamics. A more integrated SES approach to understand the required incentives of land-use behaviours can enable a greater ‘fit’ of incentive-based institutions to local contexts, which may address environmental issues that can lead to a more sustainable use and equitable distribution of natural resources

Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law

Recently, commentators have applied insights from complexity theory to legal analysis generally and to administrative law in particular. This Article focuses on one of the central problems that complexity. theory addresses, the importance and mechanisms of adaptation within complex systems. In Part I, the Article uses three features of complex adaptive systems-emergence from self-assembly, nonlinearity, and sensitivity to initial conditions-and explores the extent to which they may add value as a matter of positive analysis to the understanding of change within legal systems. In Part H, the Article focuses on three normative claims in public law scholarship that depend explicitly or implicitly on notions of adaptation: that states offer advantages over the federal government because experimentation can make them more adaptive, that federal agencies should themselves become more experimentalist using the tool of adaptive management, and that administrative agencies shou Id adopt collaborative mechanisms in policymaking. Using two analytic tools found in the complexity literature, the genetic algorithm and evolutionary game theory, the Article tests the extent to which these three normative claims are borne out

Group conflict and intergroup contact

This dissertation contains three papers. The first paper studies the effects of a peacebuilding intervention randomly assigned to conflicting farming and pastoral communities in Nigeria, where thousands die each year in farmer-pastoralist violence. Members of conflicting farming and pastoral groups worked together to build infrastructure projects beneficial to both communities, and that collaboration increased voluntary intergroup contact, intergroup trust, and feelings of security for the participants and for nonparticipants living in the same villages as the participants. The second paper uses a lab experiment to test a specific mechanism through which contact might work. Subjects vicariously experienced intergroup contact that either achieved or failed to achieve a joint goal. It finds that contact only improves attitudes towards the outgroup when it achieves a goal and that contact only improves attitudes of the majority group towards the minority group, not of the minority towards the majority group. The third paper bridges perspectives on group conflict in political economy and political psychology. The political economy literature focuses on bargaining; the political psychology literature focuses on group identities. This paper demonstrates that these two perspectives can work together by applying the group identity perspective to the bargaining perspective, showing how group identities and related psychological and cognitive biases complicate bargaining