Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent

We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium.public good, contribution game, bounded rationality, mechanism

Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent

We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium

Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent

We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium

Democratic Education in an Era of Town Hall Protests

One central aspect of a healthy democracy is the practice of democratic dissent. For the first time in many years, dissent is being widely practiced in town hall meetings and on street corners across the United States. Despite this presence, dissent is often suppressed or omitted in the prescribed, tested, hidden, and external curriculum of US schools. This article calls for a realignment of these aspects of curriculum with both a guiding vision of ideal democracy and a realistic interpretation of democracy as it is currently invoked in order to maximize this historic moment and work toward more robust democracy as a whole. This article will define dissent, show why it matters for healthy democracy, describe its role in the conscious social reproduction of citizens, reveal implications of the current more consensus-oriented forms of democracy portrayed in US schools, and call for new work on consensus and dissent in schools given changes in the present environment

Current Literature: Titles and Abstracts

Material appearing in this column is thought to be of particular interest to the Catholic physician because of its moral, religious, or philosophic content. The medical literature constitutes the primary but not the sole source of such material. In general, abstracts are intended to reflect the substance of the original article. Parenthetical editorial comment may follow the abstract if considered desirable. Books are reviewed rather than summarized. Contributions and comments from readers are invited

Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa

A civil society is a truly international idea. This paper argues that there is prima facie evidence of a nascent civil society in certain African countries. But universal ideas require adaptation to take into account the distinctiveness of different world regions, notably in the level of socioeconomic development, and in the cultural attributes of different nations and sub-nations

Uncovering Hidden Profiles; Managerial Interventions for Discovering Superior Decision Alternatives

A common reason for the use of teams in organizations is the idea that each individual can bring a unique perspective to the decision task; however, research shows that teams often fail to surface and use unique information to evaluate decision alternatives. Under a condition known as the hidden profile, each member uniquely possesses a critical clue needed to uncover the superior solution. Failure to share and adequately evaluate this information will result in poor decision quality. In order to mitigate this team decision-making bias, the present study utilizes experimental research to examine the impact of the devil’s advocacy technique on the decision quality of hidden profile teams. Results show that advocacy groups had higher decision qualities than groups under free discussion; however, advocacy teams also had higher levels of anger and lower levels of individual support for their group’s decision. As a result, while these teams selected the best solution, the presence of a devil’s advocate introduces conditions that may hinder the solution’s implementation. Furthermore, similar experiments with advocacy techniques suggest that the positive effect on decision quality found here is reduced in the presence of stronger hidden profiles