2,267 research outputs found

    Quantitative combinatorial geometry for continuous parameters

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    We prove variations of Carath\'eodory's, Helly's and Tverberg's theorems where the sets involved are measured according to continuous functions such as the volume or diameter. Among our results, we present continuous quantitative versions of Lov\'asz's colorful Helly theorem, B\'ar\'any's colorful Carath\'eodory's theorem, and the colorful Tverberg theorem.Comment: 22 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1503.0611

    Quantitative Tverberg, Helly, & Carath\'eodory theorems

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    This paper presents sixteen quantitative versions of the classic Tverberg, Helly, & Caratheodory theorems in combinatorial convexity. Our results include measurable or enumerable information in the hypothesis and the conclusion. Typical measurements include the volume, the diameter, or the number of points in a lattice.Comment: 33 page

    Quantitative Tverberg theorems over lattices and other discrete sets

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    This paper presents a new variation of Tverberg's theorem. Given a discrete set SS of RdR^d, we study the number of points of SS needed to guarantee the existence of an mm-partition of the points such that the intersection of the mm convex hulls of the parts contains at least kk points of SS. The proofs of the main results require new quantitative versions of Helly's and Carath\'eodory's theorems.Comment: 16 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1503.0611

    Helly numbers of Algebraic Subsets of Rd\mathbb R^d

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    We study SS-convex sets, which are the geometric objects obtained as the intersection of the usual convex sets in Rd\mathbb R^d with a proper subset SRdS\subset \mathbb R^d. We contribute new results about their SS-Helly numbers. We extend prior work for S=RdS=\mathbb R^d, Zd\mathbb Z^d, and Zdk×Rk\mathbb Z^{d-k}\times\mathbb R^k; we give sharp bounds on the SS-Helly numbers in several new cases. We considered the situation for low-dimensional SS and for sets SS that have some algebraic structure, in particular when SS is an arbitrary subgroup of Rd\mathbb R^d or when SS is the difference between a lattice and some of its sublattices. By abstracting the ingredients of Lov\'asz method we obtain colorful versions of many monochromatic Helly-type results, including several colorful versions of our own results.Comment: 13 pages, 3 figures. This paper is a revised version of what was originally the first half of arXiv:1504.00076v

    On Colorful Bin Packing Games

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    We consider colorful bin packing games in which selfish players control a set of items which are to be packed into a minimum number of unit capacity bins. Each item has one of m2m\geq 2 colors and cannot be packed next to an item of the same color. All bins have the same unitary cost which is shared among the items it contains, so that players are interested in selecting a bin of minimum shared cost. We adopt two standard cost sharing functions: the egalitarian cost function which equally shares the cost of a bin among the items it contains, and the proportional cost function which shares the cost of a bin among the items it contains proportionally to their sizes. Although, under both cost functions, colorful bin packing games do not converge in general to a (pure) Nash equilibrium, we show that Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist and we design an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium whose running time is polynomial under the egalitarian cost function and pseudo-polynomial for a constant number of colors under the proportional one. We also provide a complete characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria under both cost functions for general games, by showing that the prices of anarchy and stability are unbounded when m3m\geq 3 while they are equal to 3 for black and white games, where m=2m=2. We finally focus on games with uniform sizes (i.e., all items have the same size) for which the two cost functions coincide. We show again a tight characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria and design an algorithm which returns Nash equilibria with best achievable performance
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