Modular Formal Verification of Rust Programs with Unsafe Blocks

Rust is a modern systems programming language whose type system guarantees memory safety. For the sake of expressivity and performance it allows programmers to relax typing rules temporarily, using unsafe code blocks. However, in unsafe blocks, the burden of making sure that the code does not end up having undefined behaviour is on the programmer. Even most expert programmers make mistakes and a memory safety bug in an unsafe block renders all the type system guarantees void. To address this problem we are trying to verify soundness of Rust unsafe code applying our Modular Symbolic Execution algorithm. This text outlines our approach and the progress that has been made so far.Comment: 22 pages, 13 listings, 3 figures, Technical report, Appendix by Bart Jacob

Checking-in on Network Functions

When programming network functions, changes within a packet tend to have consequences---side effects which must be accounted for by network programmers or administrators via arbitrary logic and an innate understanding of dependencies. Examples of this include updating checksums when a packet's contents has been modified or adjusting a payload length field of a IPv6 header if another header is added or updated within a packet. While static-typing captures interface specifications and how packet contents should behave, it does not enforce precise invariants around runtime dependencies like the examples above. Instead, during the design phase of network functions, programmers should be given an easier way to specify checks up front, all without having to account for and keep track of these consequences at each and every step during the development cycle. In keeping with this view, we present a unique approach for adding and generating both static checks and dynamic contracts for specifying and checking packet processing operations. We develop our technique within an existing framework called NetBricks and demonstrate how our approach simplifies and checks common dependent packet and header processing logic that other systems take for granted, all without adding much overhead during development.Comment: ANRW 2019 ~ https://irtf.org/anrw/2019/program.htm

Automated and foundational verification of low-level programs

Formal verification is a promising technique to ensure the reliability of low-level programs like operating systems and hypervisors, since it can show the absence of whole classes of bugs and prevent critical vulnerabilities. However, to realize the full potential of formal verification for real-world low-level programs one has to overcome several challenges, including: (1) dealing with the complexities of realistic models of real-world programming languages; (2) ensuring the trustworthiness of the verification, ideally by providing foundational proofs (i.e., proofs that can be checked by a general-purpose proof assistant); and (3) minimizing the manual effort required for verification by providing a high degree of automation. This dissertation presents multiple projects that advance formal verification along these three axes: RefinedC provides the first approach for verifying C code that combines foundational proofs with a high degree of automation via a novel refinement and ownership type system. Islaris shows how to scale verification of assembly code to realistic models of modern instruction set architectures-in particular, Armv8-A and RISC-V. DimSum develops a decentralized approach for reasoning about programs that consist of components written in multiple different languages (e.g., assembly and C), as is common for low-level programs. RefinedC and Islaris rest on Lithium, a novel proof engine for separation logic that combines automation with foundational proofs.Formale Verifikation ist eine vielversprechende Technik, um die Verlässlichkeit von grundlegenden Programmen wie Betriebssystemen sicherzustellen. Um das volle Potenzial formaler Verifikation zu realisieren, müssen jedoch mehrere Herausforderungen gemeistert werden: Erstens muss die Komplexität von realistischen Modellen von Programmiersprachen wie C oder Assembler gehandhabt werden. Zweitens muss die Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Verifikation sichergestellt werden, idealerweise durch maschinenüberprüfbare Beweise. Drittens muss die Verifikation automatisiert werden, um den manuellen Aufwand zu minimieren. Diese Dissertation präsentiert mehrere Projekte, die formale Verifikation entlang dieser Achsen weiterentwickeln: RefinedC ist der erste Ansatz für die Verifikation von C Code, der maschinenüberprüfbare Beweise mit einem hohen Grad an Automatisierung vereint. Islaris zeigt, wie die Verifikation von Assembler zu realistischen Modellen von modernen Befehlssatzarchitekturen wie Armv8-A oder RISC-V skaliert werden kann. DimSum entwickelt einen neuen Ansatz für die Verifizierung von Programmen, die aus Komponenten in mehreren Programmiersprachen bestehen (z.B., C und Assembler), wie es oft bei grundlegenden Programmen wie Betriebssystemen der Fall ist. RefinedC und Islaris basieren auf Lithium, eine neue Automatisierungstechnik für Separationslogik, die maschinenüberprüfbare Beweise und Automatisierung verbindet.This research was supported in part by a Google PhD Fellowship, in part by awards from Android Security's ASPIRE program and from Google Research, and in part by a European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant for the project "RustBelt", funded under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (grant agreement no. 683289)

RustHorn: CHC-based Verification for Rust Programs (full version)

Reduction to the satisfiability problem for constrained Horn clauses (CHCs) is a widely studied approach to automated program verification. The current CHC-based methods for pointer-manipulating programs, however, are not very scalable. This paper proposes a novel translation of pointer-manipulating Rust programs into CHCs, which clears away pointers and memories by leveraging ownership. We formalize the translation for a simplified core of Rust and prove its correctness. We have implemented a prototype verifier for a subset of Rust and confirmed the effectiveness of our method.Comment: Full version of the same-titled paper in ESOP202

Bounded Model Checking of Industrial Code

Abstract: Bounded Model Checking(BMC) is an effective and precise static analysis technique that reduces program verification to satisfiability (SAT) solving. However, with a few exceptions, BMC is not actively used in software industry, especially, when compared to dynamic analysis techniques such as fuzzing, or light-weight formal static analysis. This thesis describes our experience of applying BMC to industrial code using a novel BMC tool SEABMC. We present three contributions: First, a case study of (re)verifying the aws-c-common library from AWS using SEABMC and KLEE. This study explores the methodology from the perspective of three research questions: (a) can proof artifacts be used across verification tools; (b) are there bugs in verified code; and (c) can specifications be improved. To study these questions, we port the verification tasks for aws-c-common library to SEAHORN and KLEE. We show the benefits of using compiler semantics and cross-checking specifications with different verification techniques, and call for standardizing proof library extensions to increase specification reuse. Second, a description of SEABMC - a novel BMC engine for SEAHORN. We start with a custom IR (called SEA-IR) that explicitly purifies all memory operations by explicating dependencies between them. We then run program transformations and allow for generating many different styles of verification conditions. To support memory safety checking, we extend our base approach with fat pointers and shadow bits of memory to keep track of metadata, such as the size of a pointed-to object. To evaluate SEABMC, we use the aws-c-common library from AWS as a benchmark and compare with CBMC, SMACK, and KLEE. We show that SEABMC is capable of providing an order of magnitude improvement compared with state-of-the-art. Third, a case study of extending SEABMC to work with Rust - a young systems programming language. We ask three research questions: (a) can SEABMC be used to verify Rust programs easily; (b) can the specification style of aws-c-common be applied successfully to Rust programs; and (c) can verification become more efficient when using higher level language information. We answer these questions by verifying aspects of the Rust standard library using SEAURCHIN, an extension of SEABMC for Rust