433 research outputs found
Possibilistic Boolean games: strategic reasoning under incomplete information
Boolean games offer a compact alternative to normal-form games, by encoding the goal of each agent as a propositional formula. In this paper, we show how this framework can be naturally extended to model situations in which agents are uncertain about other agents' goals. We first use uncertainty measures from possibility theory to semantically define (solution concepts to) Boolean games with incomplete information. Then we present a syntactic characterization of these semantics, which can readily be implemented, and we characterize the computational complexity
Commitment games with conditional information revelation
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents
have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium.
This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's
Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings.
But inefficiencies due to private information have been neglected thus far in
this literature, despite the fact that these problems are pervasive and might
also be addressed by greater mutual transparency. In this work, we introduce a
framework for commitment games with a new kind of conditional commitment
device, which agents can use to conditionally reveal private information. We
prove a folk theorem for this setting that provides sufficient conditions for
ex post efficiency, and thus represents a model of ideal cooperation between
agents without a third-party mediator. Connecting our framework with the
literature on strategic information revelation, we explore cases where
conditional revelation can be used to achieve full cooperation while
unconditional revelation cannot. Finally, extending previous work on program
equilibrium, we develop an implementation of conditional information
revelation. We show that this implementation forms program -Bayesian
Nash equilibria corresponding to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of these
commitment games.Comment: Accepted at the Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop at AAMAS 202
Satisfiability in Strategy Logic can be Easier than Model Checking
In the design of complex systems, model-checking and satisfiability arise as two prominent decision problems. While model-checking requires the designed system to be provided in advance, satisfiability allows to check if such a system even exists. With very few exceptions, the second problem turns out to be harder than the first one from a complexity-theoretic standpoint. In this paper, we investigate the connection between the two problems for a non-trivial fragment of Strategy Logic (SL, for short). SL extends LTL with first-order quantifications over strategies, thus allowing to explicitly reason about the strategic abilities of agents in a multi-agent system. Satisfiability for the full logic is known to be highly undecidable, while model-checking is non-elementary.The SL fragment we consider is obtained by preventing strategic quantifications within the scope of temporal operators. The resulting logic is quite powerful, still allowing to express important game-theoretic properties of multi-agent systems, such as existence of Nash and immune equilibria, as well as to formalize the rational synthesis problem. We show that satisfiability for such a fragment is PSPACE-COMPLETE, while its model-checking complexity is 2EXPTIME-HARD. The result is obtained by means of an elegant encoding of the problem into the satisfiability of conjunctive-binding first-order logic, a recently discovered decidable fragment of first-order logic
Algorithmic Cheap Talk
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential
cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three
decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and
receiver. The sender knows some state of the world which the receiver does not
know, and tries to influence the receiver's action by communicating a cheap
talk message to the receiver.
This paper initiates the algorithmic study of cheap talk in a finite
environment (i.e., a finite number of states and receiver's possible actions).
We first prove that approximating the sender-optimal or the welfare-maximizing
cheap talk equilibrium up to a certain additive constant or multiplicative
factor is NP-hard. Fortunately, we identify three naturally-restricted cases
that admit efficient algorithms for finding a sender-optimal equilibrium. These
include a state-independent sender's utility structure, a constant number of
states or a receiver having only two actions
PPP-Completeness with Connections to Cryptography
Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle (PPP) is an important subclass of TFNP with
profound connections to the complexity of the fundamental cryptographic
primitives: collision-resistant hash functions and one-way permutations. In
contrast to most of the other subclasses of TFNP, no complete problem is known
for PPP. Our work identifies the first PPP-complete problem without any circuit
or Turing Machine given explicitly in the input, and thus we answer a
longstanding open question from [Papadimitriou1994]. Specifically, we show that
constrained-SIS (cSIS), a generalized version of the well-known Short Integer
Solution problem (SIS) from lattice-based cryptography, is PPP-complete.
In order to give intuition behind our reduction for constrained-SIS, we
identify another PPP-complete problem with a circuit in the input but closely
related to lattice problems. We call this problem BLICHFELDT and it is the
computational problem associated with Blichfeldt's fundamental theorem in the
theory of lattices.
Building on the inherent connection of PPP with collision-resistant hash
functions, we use our completeness result to construct the first natural hash
function family that captures the hardness of all collision-resistant hash
functions in a worst-case sense, i.e. it is natural and universal in the
worst-case. The close resemblance of our hash function family with SIS, leads
us to the first candidate collision-resistant hash function that is both
natural and universal in an average-case sense.
Finally, our results enrich our understanding of the connections between PPP,
lattice problems and other concrete cryptographic assumptions, such as the
discrete logarithm problem over general groups
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism ---by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator--- may not be realistic and fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type.We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M: in essence, an extensive-form mechanism exactly preserving all strategic properties of M, WITHOUT relying on a trusted mediator or violating the privacy of the players. We prove that ANY normal-form mechanism can be perfectly implemented by a PUBLIC mediator using envelopes and an envelope-randomizing device (i.e., the same tools used for running fair lotteries or tallying secret votes). Differently from a trusted mediator, a public one only performs prescribed public actions, so that everyone can verify that he is acting properly, and never learns any information that should remain private
Node-Max-Cut and the Complexity of Equilibrium in Linear Weighted Congestion Games
In this work, we seek a more refined understanding of the complexity of local optimum computation for Max-Cut and pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) computation for congestion games with weighted players and linear latency functions. We show that computing a PNE of linear weighted congestion games is PLS-complete either for very restricted strategy spaces, namely when player strategies are paths on a series-parallel network with a single origin and destination, or for very restricted latency functions, namely when the latency on each resource is equal to the congestion. Our results reveal a remarkable gap regarding the complexity of PNE in congestion games with weighted and unweighted players, since in case of unweighted players, a PNE can be easily computed by either a simple greedy algorithm (for series-parallel networks) or any better response dynamics (when the latency is equal to the congestion). For the latter of the results above, we need to show first that computing a local optimum of a natural restriction of Max-Cut, which we call Node-Max-Cut, is PLS-complete. In Node-Max-Cut, the input graph is vertex-weighted and the weight of each edge is equal to the product of the weights of its endpoints. Due to the very restricted nature of Node-Max-Cut, the reduction requires a careful combination of new gadgets with ideas and techniques from previous work. We also show how to compute efficiently a (1+?)-approximate equilibrium for Node-Max-Cut, if the number of different vertex weights is constant
- …