Timed Secret Sharing

Secret sharing has been a promising tool in cryptographic schemes for decades. It allows a dealer to split a secret into some pieces of shares that carry no sensitive information on their own when being treated individually but lead to the original secret when having a sufficient number of them together. Existing schemes lack considering a guaranteed delay prior to secret reconstruction and implicitly assume once the dealer shares the secret, a sufficient number of shareholders will get together and recover the secret at their wish. This, however, may lead to security breaches when a timely reconstruction of the secret matters as the early knowledge of a single revealed share is catastrophic assuming a threshold adversary. This paper presents the notion of timed secret sharing (TSS), providing lower and upper time bounds for secret reconstruction with the use of time-based cryptography. The recent advances in the literature including short-lived proofs [Asiacrypt 2022], enable us to realize an upper time bound shown to be useful in breaking public goods game, an inherent issue in secret sharing-based systems. Moreover, we establish an interesting trade-off between time and fault tolerance in a secret sharing scheme by having dealer gradually release additional shares over time, offering another approach with the same goal. We propose several constructions that offer a range of security properties while maintaining practical efficiency. Our constructions leverage a variety of techniques and state-of-the-art primitives

Raziel: Private and Verifiable Smart Contracts on Blockchains

Raziel combines secure multi-party computation and proof-carrying code to provide privacy, correctness and verifiability guarantees for smart contracts on blockchains. Effectively solving DAO and Gyges attacks, this paper describes an implementation and presents examples to demonstrate its practical viability (e.g., private and verifiable crowdfundings and investment funds). Additionally, we show how to use Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Proofs (i.e., Proof-Carrying Code certificates) to prove the validity of smart contracts to third parties before their execution without revealing anything else. Finally, we show how miners could get rewarded for generating pre-processing data for secure multi-party computation.Comment: Support: cothority/ByzCoin/OmniLedge

A Blockchain-based Decentralized Electronic Marketplace for Computing Resources

AbstractWe propose a framework for building a decentralized electronic marketplace for computing resources. The idea is that anyone with spare capacities can offer them on this marketplace, opening up the cloud computing market to smaller players, thus creating a more competitive environment compared to today's market consisting of a few large providers. Trust is a crucial component in making an anonymized decentralized marketplace a reality. We develop protocols that enable participants to interact with each other in a fair way and show how these protocols can be implemented using smart contracts and blockchains. We discuss and evaluate our framework not only from a technical point of view, but also look at the wider context in terms of fair interactions and legal implications

Trustless communication across distributed ledgers: impossibility and practical solutions

Since the advent of Bitcoin as the first decentralized digital currency in 2008, a plethora of distributed ledgers has been created, differing in design and purpose. Considering the heterogeneous nature of these systems, it is safe to say there shall not be ``one coin to rule them all". However, despite the growing and thriving ecosystem, blockchains continue to operate almost exclusively in complete isolation from one another: by design, blockchain protocols provide no means by which to communicate or exchange data with external systems. To this date, centralized providers hence remain the preferred route to exchange assets and information across blockchains~-- undermining the very nature of decentralized currencies. The contribution of this thesis is threefold. First, we critically evaluate the (im)possibilty, requirements, and challenges of cross-chain communication by contributing the first systematization of this field. We formalize the problem of Cross-Chain Communication (CCC) and show it is impossible without a trusted third party by relating CCC to the Fair Exchange problem. With this impossibility result in mind, we develop a framework to design new and evaluate existing CCC protocols, focusing on the inherent trust assumptions thereof, and derive a classification covering the field of cross-chain communication to date. We then present XCLAIM, the first generic framework for transferring assets and information across permissionless distributed ledgers without relying on a centralized third party. XCLAIM leverages so-called cryptocurrency-backed assets, blockchain-based assets one-to-one backed by other cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin-backed tokens on Ethereum. Through the secure issuance, transfer, and redemption of these assets, users can perform cross-chain exchanges in a financially trustless and non-interactive manner, overcoming the limitations of existing solutions. To ensure the security of user funds, XCLAIM relies on collateralization of intermediaries and a proof-or-punishment approach, enforced via smart contracts equipped with cross-chain light clients, so-called chain relays. XCLAIM has been adopted in practice, among others by the Polkadot blockchain, as a bridge to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Finally, we contribute to advancing the state of the art in cross-chain light clients. We develop TxChain, a novel mechanism to significantly reduce storage and bandwidth costs of modern blockchain light clients using contingent transaction aggregation, and apply our scheme to Bitcoin and Ethereum individually, as well as in the cross-chain setting.Open Acces

Seventh International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting

This volume contains papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2022, the Seventh International JointConference on Electronic Voting, held during October 4–7, 2022. This was the first in-personconference following the COVID-19 pandemic, and, as such, it was a very special event forthe community since we returned to the traditional venue in Bregenz, Austria. The E-Vote-IDconference resulted from merging EVOTE and Vote-ID, and 18 years have now elapsed sincethe first EVOTE conference in Austria.Since that conference in 2004, over 1500 experts have attended the venue, including scholars,practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors, and PhD students. E-Vote-ID collectsthe most relevant debates on the development of electronic voting, from aspects relating tosecurity and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, alsoincluding legal, social, or political aspects, amongst others, turning out to be an importantglobal referent on these issues

Crowdsourcing atop blockchains

Traditional crowdsourcing systems, such as Amazon\u27s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), though once acquiring great economic successes, have to fully rely on third-party platforms to serve between the requesters and the workers for basic utilities. These third-parties have to be fully trusted to assist payments, resolve disputes, protect data privacy, manage user authentications, maintain service online, etc. Nevertheless, tremendous real-world incidents indicate how elusive it is to completely trust these platforms in reality, and the reduction of such over-reliance becomes desirable. In contrast to the arguably vulnerable centralized approaches, a public blockchain is a distributed and transparent global consensus computer that is highly robust. The blockchain is usually managed and replicated by a large-scale peer-to-peer network collectively, thus being much more robust to be fully trusted for correctness and availability. It, therefore, becomes enticing to build novel crowdsourcing applications atop blockchains to reduce the over-trust on third-party platforms. However, this new fascinating technology also brings about new challenges, which were never that severe in the conventional centralized setting. The most serious issue is that the blockchain is usually maintained in the public Internet environment with a broader attack surface open to anyone. This not only causes serious privacy and security issues, but also allows the adversaries to exploit the attack surface to hamper more basic utilities. Worse still, most existing blockchains support only light on-chain computations, and the smart contract executed atop the decentralized consensus computer must be simple, which incurs serious feasibility problems. In reality, the privacy/security issue and the feasibility problem even restrain each other and create serious tensions to hinder the broader adoption of blockchain. The dissertation goes through the non-trivial challenges to realize secure yet still practical decentralization (for urgent crowdsourcing use-cases), and lay down the foundation for this line of research. In sum, it makes the next major contributions. First, it identifies the needed security requirements in decentralized knowledge crowdsourcing (e.g., data privacy), and initiates the research of private decentralized crowdsourcing. In particular, the confidentiality of solicited data is indispensable to prevent free-riders from pirating the others\u27 submissions, thus ensuring the quality of solicited knowledge. To this end, a generic private decentralized crowdsourcing framework is dedicatedly designed, analyzed, and implemented. Furthermore, this dissertation leverages concretely efficient cryptographic design to reduce the cost of the above generic framework. It focuses on decentralizing the special use-case of Amazon MTurk, and conducts multiple specific-purpose optimizations to remove needless generality to squeeze performance. The implementation atop Ethereum demonstrates a handling cost even lower than MTurk. In addition, it focuses on decentralized crowdsourcing of computing power for specific machine learning tasks. It lets a requester place deposits in the blockchain to recruit some workers for a designated (randomized) programs. If and only if these workers contribute their resources to compute correctly, they would earn well-deserved payments. For these goals, a simple yet still useful incentive mechanism is developed atop the blockchain to deter rational workers from cheating. Finally, the research initiates the first systematic study on crowdsourcing blockchains\u27 full nodes to assist superlight clients (e.g., mobile phones and IoT devices) to read the blockchain\u27s records. This dissertation presents a novel generic solution through the powerful lens of game-theoretic treatments, which solves the long-standing open problem of designing generic superlight clients for all blockchains