1,029 research outputs found
E-voting discourses in the UK and the Netherlands
A qualitative case study of the e-voting discourses in the UK and the Netherlands was performed based on the theory of strategic niche management. In both countries, eight e-voting experts were interviewed on their expectations, risk estimations, cooperation and learning experiences. The results show that differences in these variables can partly explain the variations in the embedding of e-voting in the two countries, from a qualitative point of view
What proof do we prefer? Variants of verifiability in voting
In this paper, we discuss one particular feature of Internet
voting, verifiability, against the background of scientific
literature and experiments in the Netherlands. In order
to conceptually clarify what verifiability is about, we distinguish
classical verifiability from constructive veriability in
both individual and universal verification. In classical individual
verifiability, a proof that a vote has been counted can
be given without revealing the vote. In constructive individual
verifiability, a proof is only accepted if the witness (i.e.
the vote) can be reconstructed. Analogous concepts are de-
fined for universal veriability of the tally. The RIES system
used in the Netherlands establishes constructive individual
verifiability and constructive universal verifiability,
whereas many advanced cryptographic systems described
in the scientific literature establish classical individual
verifiability and classical universal verifiability.
If systems with a particular kind of verifiability continue
to be used successfully in practice, this may influence the
way in which people are involved in elections, and their image
of democracy. Thus, the choice for a particular kind
of verifiability in an experiment may have political consequences.
We recommend making a well-informed democratic
choice for the way in which both individual and universal
verifiability should be realised in Internet voting, in
order to avoid these unconscious political side-effects of the
technology used. The safest choice in this respect, which
maintains most properties of current elections, is classical
individual verifiability combined with constructive universal
verifiability. We would like to encourage discussion
about the feasibility of this direction in scientific research
Comparing "challenge-based" and "code-based" internet voting verification implementations
Internet-enabled voting introduces an element of invisibility and unfamiliarity into the voting process, which makes it very different from traditional voting. Voters might be concerned about their vote being recorded correctly and included in the final tally. To mitigate mistrust, many Internet-enabled voting systems build verifiability into their systems. This allows voters to verify that their votes have been cast as intended, stored as cast and tallied as stored at the conclusion of the voting period. Verification implementations have not been universally successful, mostly due to voter difficulties using them. Here, we evaluate two cast as intended verification approaches in a lab study: (1) "Challenge-Based" and (2) "Code-Based". We assessed cast-as-intended vote verification efficacy, and identified usability issues related to verifying and/or vote casting. We also explored acceptance issues post-verification, to see whether our participants were willing to engage with Internet voting in a real election. Our study revealed the superiority of the code-based approach, in terms of ability to verify effectively. In terms of real-life Internet voting acceptance, convenience encourages acceptance, while security concerns and complexity might lead to rejection
Ethics of e-voting: an essay on requirements and values in Internet elections
In this paper, we investigate ethical issues involved in the development and implementation of
Internet voting technology. From a phenomenological perspective, we describe how voting via the
Internet mediates the relation between people and democracy. In this relation, trust plays a major
role. The dynamics of trust in the relation between people and their world forms the basis for our
analysis of the ethical issues involved. First, we consider established principles of voting,
confirming the identity of our democracy, which function as expectations in current experiments
with online voting in the Netherlands. We investigate whether and how Internet voting can meet
these expectations and thereby earn trust, based on the experiments in the Netherlands. We identify
major challenges, and provide a basis for ethical and political discussion on these issues, especially
the changed relation between public and private. If we decide that we want to vote via the Internet,
more practical matters come into play in the implementation of the technology. The choices
involved here are discussed in relation to the mediating role of concrete voting technologies in the
relation between citizen and state
What did I really vote for? On the usability of verifiable e-voting schemes
E-voting has been embraced by a number of countries, delivering benefits in terms of efficiency and accessibility. End-to-end verifiable e-voting schemes facilitate verification of the integrity of individual votes during the election process. In particular, methods for cast-as-intended verification enable voters to confirm that their cast votes have not been manipulated by the voting client. A well-known technique for effecting cast-as-intended verification is the Benaloh Challenge. The usability of this challenge is crucial because voters have to be actively engaged in the verification process. In this paper, we report on a usability evaluation of three different approaches of the Benaloh Challenge in the remote e-voting context. We performed a comparative user study with 95 participants. We conclude with a recommendation for which approaches should be provided to afford verification in real-world elections and suggest usability improvements
Secret texts and cipherballots: secret suffrage and remote electronic voting
Una de les principals preocupacions sobre el vot telemàtic és com preservar el sufragi secret. La llista d’estudis que
afirmen que el vot per Internet és incompatible amb el secret del vot és força extensa. Si bé estudis posteriors sobre
experiències reals han tingut resultats més matisats, les preocupacions sobre el sufragi secret i el vot telemàtic es
mantenen. Abordar aquestes preocupacions esdevé una obligació ineludible. En aquest context, la nostra recerca és
novadora. En primer lloc, el nostre punt de partida no es basa en definicions legals preexistents que s'accepten com a
donades. Partint de l'enfocament universalista del dret constitucional comparat, hem entès que el principi del sufragi
secret transcendeix les opinions i convencions lligades a comunitats polítiques concretes. Aquesta concepció comú i
bàsica s'ha traduït en tres estàndards: individualitat, confidencialitat i anonimat. Aquests estàndards s’han de satisfer
en qualsevol canal de votació. En segon lloc, hem adoptat un enfocament més ampli en l’aplicació d’aquest principi al
vot telemàtic. Hem demostrat que el sufragi secret es pot garantir mitjançant la llei, el codi informàtic, les normes i fins i
tot el mercat. La normativa actual tendeix a ser limitada perquè recorre a analogies amb els canals de votació en paper
i no reconeix les especificitats del vot telemàtic. Per contra, aquí hem examinat el paper que exerceixen (i les
limitacions pròpies) del xifrat asimètric, l'anonimització basada en mix-nets o el recompte homomòrfic, i el vot múltiple.Una de las principales preocupaciones sobre el voto telemático es cómo garantizar el secreto del voto. La lista de
autores que afirman que el voto por Internet es incompatible con el sufragio secreto es considerable. Aunque las
conclusiones de estudios posteriores sobre experiencias reales hayan sido más matizadas, las preocupaciones sobre
el sufragio secreto y el voto telemático se mantienen. Abordar estas preocupaciones constituye en una obligación
ineludible. En este contexto, nuestra investigación es novedosa. En primer lugar, nuestro punto de partida no se basa
en definiciones legales preexistentes que se aceptan como dadas. Partiendo del enfoque universalista del derecho
constitucional comparado, hemos entendido que el principio del sufragio secreto trasciende las opiniones y
convenciones ligadas a la cultura de comunidades políticas concretas. Esta concepción se ha traducido en tres
normas: individualidad, confidencialidad y anonimato. Estas normas deberían aplicarse a cualquier canal de votación.
En segundo lugar, hemos adoptado un enfoque más amplio sobre la aplicación de este principio. Hemos demostrado
que el sufragio secreto puede garantizarse mediante la ley, el código, las normas e incluso el mercado. La normativa
actual tiende a ser limitada porque recurre a analogías con los canales de votación en papel y no reconoce las
especificidades del voto telemático.One of the key concerns about remote electronic voting is how to preserve secret suffrage. The list of authors who
claim that Internet voting is incompatible with the secrecy of the vote is actually quite long. Even if later studies that
analysed the actual implementation of remote electronic voting in public political elections had more nuanced findings,
concerns about secret suffrage and remote electronic voting remain. Addressing these concerns becomes an
inescapable obligation. In this context, our research is quite novel. First and foremost, our starting point is not based on
pre-existing legal definitions that are accepted as given. Drawing from the universalist approach to comparative
constitutional law, we have understood that the principle of secret suffrage exists in such a way that it transcends the
culture bound opinions and conventions of particular political communities. This core understanding has been
translated into three standards: individuality, confidentiality, and anonymity. These standards should apply to any voting
channel. Second, we have taken a wider approach at the enforcement of this principle. We have showed that secret
suffrage may be enforced through law, code, norms, and even the market. Current regulations tend to be constrained
because they resort to analogies with paper-based voting channels and fail to acknowledge the specificities of remote
electronic voting. In contrast, we have examined the role played by (and the limitations of) asymmetric encryption,
anonymization based on mix-nets or homomorphic tallying, and of multiple voting to enforce secret suffrage
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Gaining assurance in a voter-verifiable voting system
The literature on e-voting systems has many examples of discussion of the correctness of the computer and communication algorithms of such systems, as well as discussions of their vulnerabilities. However, a gap in the literature concerns the practical need (before adoption of a specific e-voting system) for a complete case demonstrating that the system as a whole has sufficiently high probability of exhibiting the desired properties when in use in an actual election. This paper discusses the problem of producing such a case, with reference to a specific system: a version of the Prêt à Voter scheme for voter-verifiable e-voting. We show a possible organisation of a case in terms of four main requirements – accuracy, privacy, termination and ‘trustedness’– and show some of the detailed organisation that such a case should have, the diverse kinds of evidence that needs to be gathered and some of the interesting difficulties that arise
La volonté machinale: understanding the electronic voting controversy
Contains fulltext :
32048_voloma.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 21 januari 2008Promotor : Jacobs, B.P.F. Co-promotores : Poll, E., Becker, M.226 p
The Prospects of M-Voting Implementation in Nigeria
Since independence, an average of 50% of registered voters participates in voting [1].
Similarly, an increasing rate of apathy was observed between the electorate and the elect,
which was not unconnected with lack of transparency, accountability, and probity on the
part of government [2]. Thus the electorate did not see the need to subject itself to any
stress. Consequently, government is very committed to implementing the forth coming
elections through e-voting. This paper proposes the prospects of m-voting implementation
in Nigeria through the use of mobile phones, PDAs, etc. with guaranteed security, secrecy,
and convenience in a democratization process. It also reviews the level of adoption of GSM
in Nigeria, the implication of voting through the GSM, and finally introducing m-voting
innovation in the voting process to increase voters’ access and participation rate in
election
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