On the relative proof complexity of deep inference via atomic flows

We consider the proof complexity of the minimal complete fragment, KS, of standard deep inference systems for propositional logic. To examine the size of proofs we employ atomic flows, diagrams that trace structural changes through a proof but ignore logical information. As results we obtain a polynomial simulation of versions of Resolution, along with some extensions. We also show that these systems, as well as bounded-depth Frege systems, cannot polynomially simulate KS, by giving polynomial-size proofs of certain variants of the propositional pigeonhole principle in KS.Comment: 27 pages, 2 figures, full version of conference pape

An Abstract Approach to Consequence Relations

We generalise the Blok-J\'onsson account of structural consequence relations, later developed by Galatos, Tsinakis and other authors, in such a way as to naturally accommodate multiset consequence. While Blok and J\'onsson admit, in place of sheer formulas, a wider range of syntactic units to be manipulated in deductions (including sequents or equations), these objects are invariably aggregated via set-theoretical union. Our approach is more general in that non-idempotent forms of premiss and conclusion aggregation, including multiset sum and fuzzy set union, are considered. In their abstract form, thus, deductive relations are defined as additional compatible preorderings over certain partially ordered monoids. We investigate these relations using categorical methods, and provide analogues of the main results obtained in the general theory of consequence relations. Then we focus on the driving example of multiset deductive relations, providing variations of the methods of matrix semantics and Hilbert systems in Abstract Algebraic Logic

Double-Negation Elimination in Some Propositional Logics

This article answers two questions (posed in the literature), each concerning the guaranteed existence of proofs free of double negation. A proof is free of double negation if none of its deduced steps contains a term of the form n(n(t)) for some term t, where n denotes negation. The first question asks for conditions on the hypotheses that, if satisfied, guarantee the existence of a double-negation-free proof when the conclusion is free of double negation. The second question asks about the existence of an axiom system for classical propositional calculus whose use, for theorems with a conclusion free of double negation, guarantees the existence of a double-negation-free proof. After giving conditions that answer the first question, we answer the second question by focusing on the Lukasiewicz three-axiom system. We then extend our studies to infinite-valued sentential calculus and to intuitionistic logic and generalize the notion of being double-negation free. The double-negation proofs of interest rely exclusively on the inference rule condensed detachment, a rule that combines modus ponens with an appropriately general rule of substitution. The automated reasoning program OTTER played an indispensable role in this study.Comment: 32 pages, no figure

A simple sequent calculus for nominal logic

Nominal logic is a variant of first-order logic that provides support for reasoning about bound names in abstract syntax. A key feature of nominal logic is the new-quantifier, which quantifies over fresh names (names not appearing in any values considered so far). Previous attempts have been made to develop convenient rules for reasoning with the new-quantifier, but we argue that none of these attempts is completely satisfactory. In this article we develop a new sequent calculus for nominal logic in which the rules for the new- quantifier are much simpler than in previous attempts. We also prove several structural and metatheoretic properties, including cut-elimination, consistency, and equivalence to Pitts' axiomatization of nominal logic

Proof search in constructive logics

We present an overview of some sequent calculi organised not for "theorem-proving" but for proof search, where the proofs themselves (and the avoidance of known proofs on backtracking) are objects of interest. The main calculus discussed is that of Herbelin [1994] for intuitionistic logic, which extends methods used in hereditary Harrop logic programming; we give a brief discussion of similar calculi for other logics. We also point out to some related work on permutations in intuitionistic Gentzen sequent calculi that clarifies the relationship between such calculi and natural deduction.Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Minho (CMAT).União Europeia (UE) - Programa ESPRIT - BRA 7232 Gentzen

Dual-Context Calculi for Modal Logic

We present natural deduction systems and associated modal lambda calculi for the necessity fragments of the normal modal logics K, T, K4, GL and S4. These systems are in the dual-context style: they feature two distinct zones of assumptions, one of which can be thought as modal, and the other as intuitionistic. We show that these calculi have their roots in in sequent calculi. We then investigate their metatheory, equip them with a confluent and strongly normalizing notion of reduction, and show that they coincide with the usual Hilbert systems up to provability. Finally, we investigate a categorical semantics which interprets the modality as a product-preserving functor.Comment: Full version of article previously presented at LICS 2017 (see arXiv:1602.04860v4 or doi: 10.1109/LICS.2017.8005089

EARLY STRUCTURAL REASONING. GENTZEN 1932

Abstract. This paper is a study of the opening section of Gentzen’s first publication of 1932, Über die Existenz unabhängiger Axiomensysteme zu unendlichen Satzsystemen, a text which shows the relevance of Hertz’s work of the 1920’s for the young Gentzen. In fact, Gentzen borrowed from Hertz the analysis of the notion of consequence, which was given in terms of the rules of thinning (Verdünnung) and cut (Schnitt) on sequents (there called “sentences”(Sätze)). Moreover, following Hertz again, he also judged it necessary to justify the forms of inference of the system by providing a semantics for them, so that it became possible to make precise the informal notion of consequence, and to show that the inference rules adopted are correct and sufficient