Value-at-Risk for Country Risk Ratings

The country risk literature argues that country risk ratings have a direct impact on the cost of borrowings as they reflect the probability of debt default by a country. An improvement in country risk ratings, or country creditworthiness, will lower a country’s cost of borrowing and debt servicing obligations, and vice-versa. In this context, it is useful to analyse country risk ratings data, much like financial data, in terms of the time series patterns, as such an analysis would provide policy makers and the industry stakeholders with a more accurate method of forecasting future changes in the risks and returns of country risk ratings. This paper considered an extension of the Value-at-Risk (VaR) framework where both the upper and lower thresholds are considered. The purpose of the paper was to forecast the conditional variance and Country Risk Bounds (CRBs) for the rate of change of risk ratings for ten countries. The conditional variance of composite risk returns for the ten countries were forecasted using the Single Index (SI) and Portfolio Methods (PM) of McAleer and da Veiga [10,11]. The results suggested that the country risk ratings of Switzerland, Japan and Australia are much mode likely to remain close to current levels than the country risk ratings of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. This type of analysis would be useful to lenders/investors evaluating the attractiveness of lending/investing in alternative countries.Country risk; risk ratings; value-at-risk; risk bounds; risk management

Sovereign Credit Ratings, Market Volatility, and Financial Gains

The reaction of EU bond and equity market volatilities to sovereign rating announcements (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) is investigated using a panel of daily stock market and sovereign bond returns. The parametric volatilities are defined using EGARCH specifications. The estimation results show that upgrades do not have significant effects on volatility, but downgrades increase stock and bond market volatility. Contagion is present, and sovereign rating announcements create interdependence among European financial markets with upgrades (downgrades) in one country leading to a decrease (increase) in volatility in other countries. The empirical results show also a financial gain and risk (value-at-risk) reduction for portfolio returns when taking into account sovereign credit ratings’ information for volatility modelling, with financial gains decreasing with higher risk aversion

The new Basel accord and developing countries: problems and alternatives

The new Basel Accord framework relies on markets and supervisors to discipline banks. Yet both markets and supervisors fail, and more so in developing countries than in high-income countries. Therefore, the new Accord is not, as its designers claim, suitable for wide application. Nevertheless, developing country policymakers have little choice but to implement it in part or in whole. Hence there are problems of governance in international regulation. I offer seven general principles for the design of a prudential regime more robust to government and market failure. Four alternative capital regimes are evaluated in the light of these principles. Simpler and harsher regimes are likely to achieve greater safety with a given level of resources

Democratization’s Risk Premium: Partisan and Opportunistic Political Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop a framework for explaining election-period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk-ratings (“ratings”). We test six hypotheses derived from the framework with 482 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987-2000. We find that ratings are linked to the partisan orientation of incumbents facing election and to expectations of incumbent victory. Consistent with the framework, rating effects are sometimes greater for right-wing compared to left-wing incumbents, perhaps, because partisan PBC considerations with right-wing (left-wing) incumbents reinforce (counteract) opportunistic PBC considerations.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39931/3/wp546.pd

Why Do Countries Matter so Much in Corporate Social Performance?

Why do levels of corporate social performance (CSP) differ so much across countries? We answer this question in an examination of CSP ratings of more than 2,600 companies from 36 countries. We find that firm characteristics explain very little of the variations in CSP ratings. In contrast, variations in country factors such as stages of economic development, culture, and institutions account for a significant proportion of variations in CSP ratings across countries. In particular, we find that CSP ratings are high in countries with high income-per-capita, strong civil liberties and political rights, and cultures oriented toward harmony and autonomy. Furthermore, we find that home country factors explain a smaller portion of the overall variations in CSP for multinationals and cross-listed firms than for non-multinationals and pure domestic firms, respectively