6,623 research outputs found
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional signals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study
Social Welfare Maximization Auction in Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain
Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in
many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things.
However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and
computing resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of
blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider deploying edge
computing service to support the mobile blockchain. We propose an auction-based
edge computing resource market of the edge computing service provider. Since
there is competition among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and
negative) are taken into account in the model. In our auction mechanism, we
maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the truthfulness, individual
rationality and computational efficiency. Based on blockchain mining experiment
results, we define a hash power function that characterizes the probability of
successfully mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the
performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our edge computing
resources market model can efficiently solve the social welfare maximization
problem for the edge computing service provider
Auction-Based Coopetition between LTE Unlicensed and Wi-Fi
Motivated by the recent efforts in extending LTE to the unlicensed spectrum,
we propose a novel spectrum sharing framework for the coopetition (i.e.,
cooperation and competition) between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band.
Basically, the LTE network can choose to work in one of the two modes: in the
competition mode, it randomly accesses an unlicensed channel, and interferes
with the Wi-Fi access point using the same channel; in the cooperation mode, it
delivers traffic for the Wi-Fi users in exchange for the exclusive access of
the corresponding channel. Because the LTE network works in an
interference-free manner in the cooperation mode, it can achieve a much larger
data rate than that in the competition mode, which allows it to effectively
serve both its own users and the Wi-Fi users. We design a second-price reverse
auction mechanism, which enables the LTE provider and the Wi-Fi access point
owners (APOs) to effectively negotiate the operation mode. Specifically, the
LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer), and the APOs are the bidders (sellers)
who compete to sell their channel access opportunities to the LTE provider. In
Stage I of the auction, the LTE provider announces a reserve rate. In Stage II
of the auction, the APOs submit their bids. We show that the auction involves
allocative externalities, i.e., the cooperation between the LTE provider and
one APO benefits other APOs who are not directly involved in this cooperation.
As a result, a particular APO's willingness to cooperate is affected by its
belief about other APOs' willingness to cooperate. This makes our analysis much
more challenging than that of the conventional second-price auction, where
bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy. We show that the APOs have a
unique form of the equilibrium bidding strategies in Stage II, based on which
we analyze the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate in Stage I.Comment: 32 page
A smart market for passenger road transport (SMPRT) congestion: an application of computational mechanism design
To control and price negative externalities in passenger road transport, we develop an innovative and integrated computational agent based economics (ACE) model to simulate a market oriented "cap" and trade system. (i) First, there is a computational assessment of a digitized road network model of the real world congestion hot spot to determine the "cap" of the system in terms of vehicle volumes at which traffic efficiency deteriorates and the environmental externalities take off exponentially. (ii) Road users submit bids with the market clearing price at the fixed "cap" supply of travel slots in a given time slice (peak hour) being determined by an electronic sealed bid uniform price Dutch auction. (iii) Cross-sectional demand data on car users who traverse the cordon area is used to model and calibrate the heterogeneous bid submission behaviour in order to construct the inverse demand function and demand elasticities. (iv) The willingness to pay approach with heterogeneous value of time is contrasted with the generalized cost approach to pricing congestion with homogeneous value of travel time.
Auctions with Financial Externalities
We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losersâ utilities depend on how much the winner pays. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected revenue. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB) reveals ambiguous effects. We further show that a resale market does not have an effect on the equilibrium bids and that FPSB yields a lower expected revenue than SPSB. With a reserve price, we find an equilibrium for FPSB that involves pooling at the reserve price. For SPSB we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly separating equilibrium, and give an expression for the equilibrium.Auctions, financial externalities, reserve price, resale market
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