Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market

This paper studies the switching of trading strategies and its effect on the market volatility in a continuous double auction market. We describe the behavior when some uninformed agents, who we call switchers, decide whether or not to pay for information before they trade. By paying for the information they behave as informed traders. First we verify that our model is able to reproduce some of the stylized facts in real financial markets. Next we consider the relationship between switching and the market volatility under different structures of investors. We find that there exists a positive relationship between the market volatility and the percentage of switchers. We therefore conclude that the switchers are a destabilizing factor in the market. However, for a given fixed percentage of switchers, the proportion of switchers that decide to buy information at a given moment of time is negatively related to the current market volatility. In other words, if more agents pay for information to know the fundamental value at some time, the market volatility will be lower. This is because the market price is closer to the fundamental value due to information diffusion between switchers.Comment: 15 pages, 9 figures, Physica A, 201

Scalar and vector games in the evaluation of social and environmental disclosure and their relationship with market value

This study evaluated the association of social, environmental and socio-environmental disclosure with the market value of Brazilian companies with high environmental impact based on the Game Theory. To perform the analysis, rankings were developed by using scalar and vector gaming techniques. After the construction of the rankings, the association between them was verified through Kendall’s correlation analysis. The findings indicate a positive association of social, environmental and socio-environmental disclosure with the market value of Brazilian companies with high environmental impact. In addition, there was an increase in the degree of association during the investigated periods. This result suggests that the market is increasingly demanding regarding the disclosure of this information, which indicates that the disclosure of these information can bring competitive advantages in relation to the market value

"Looking behind the veil": invisible corporate intangibles, stories, structure and the contextual information content of disclosure

Purpose – This paper aims to use a grounded theory approach to reveal that corporate private disclosure content has structure and this is critical in making "invisible" intangibles in corporate value creation visible to capital market participants. Design/methodology/approach – A grounded theory approach is used to develop novel empirical patterns concerning the nature of corporate disclosure content in the form of narrative. This is further developed using literature of value creation and of narrative. Findings – Structure to content is based on common underlying value creation and narrative structures, and the use of similar categories of corporate intangibles in corporate disclosure cases. It is also based on common change or response qualities of the value creation story as well as persistence in telling the core value creation story. The disclosure is a source of information per se and also creates an informed context for capital market participants to interpret the meaning of new events in a more informed way. Research limitations/implications – These insights into the structure of private disclosure content are different to the views of relevant information content implied in public disclosure means such as in financial reports or in the demands of stock exchanges for "material" or price sensitive information. They are also different to conventional academic concepts of (capital market) value relevance. Practical implications – This analysis further develops the grounded theory insights into disclosure content and could help improve new disclosure guidance by regulators. Originality/value – The insights create many new opportunities for developing theory and enhancing public disclosure content. The paper illustrates this potential by exploring new ways of measuring the value relevance of this novel form of contextual information and associated benchmarks. This connects value creation narrative to a conventional value relevance view and could stimulate new types of market event studies

Value Relevance of Financial and Non-Financial Information: Evidence from the Gaming Industry

Using financial and non-financial data from casino gaming firms listed in the United States from 1999–2017, we explore two research questions: (1) Is financial information value relevant to financial markets in the casino gaming industry? (2) Does non-financial information have incremental explanatory power over financial information? In general, we find that accounting numbers can explain a firm’s market value and stock returns in the casino gaming industry, except for accounting accruals, which may behave differently compared to other industries. We also find that non-financial information, such as the number of table games, number of slot machines, and their relative proportion, have significant value relevance in explaining market valuation. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the value relevance of financial and non-financial information in the casino gaming industry. We also provide analysis of firms characterized by these non-financial attributes. Keywords: hospitality, casino, gaming, value relevance, table games, slot machines JEL Code: L83, M19, M4

The Value Spread as a Predictor of Returns

Recent studies have used the value spread to predict aggregate stock returns to construct cash-flow betas that appear to explain the size and value anomalies. We show that two related variables, the book-to-market spread (the book-to-market of value stocks minus that of growth stocks) and the market-to-book spread (the market-to-book of growth stocks minus that of value stocks) predict returns in different directions and exhibit opposite cyclical variations. Most important, the value spread mixes information on the book-to-market and market-to-book spreads, and appears much less useful in predicting returns.

Credit Risk, Market Sentiment and Randomly-Timed Default

We propose a model for the credit markets in which the random default times of bonds are assumed to be given as functions of one or more independent "market factors". Market participants are assumed to have partial information about each of the market factors, represented by the values of a set of market factor information processes. The market filtration is taken to be generated jointly by the various information processes and by the default indicator processes of the various bonds. The value of a discount bond is obtained by taking the discounted expectation of the value of the default indicator function at the maturity of the bond, conditional on the information provided by the market filtration. Explicit expressions are derived for the bond price processes and the associated default hazard rates. The latter are not given a priori as part of the model but rather are deduced and shown to be functions of the values of the information processes. Thus the "perceived" hazard rates, based on the available information, determine bond prices, and as perceptions change so do the prices. In conclusion, explicit expressions are derived for options on discount bonds, the values of which also fluctuate in line with the vicissitudes of market sentiment.Comment: To appear in: Stochastic Analysis in 2010, Edited by D. Crisan, Springer Verla

Introducing Genetically Modified Plants: Now or Later - An Option Value Approach

Using market data, we have estimated the quasi option value of delaying to grow genetically modified corn and soybeans in Europe. We find that the current quasi option value of growing genetically modified soybeans and corn in Europe is high. This makes it likely that for the time being the information value of waiting exceeds the market gains of growing genetically modified plants in Europe.quasi option value, value of information, genetically modified plants, Crop Production/Industries, Q29, G13, Q18,

The valuation of market information from livestock selling complexes

The efficient operation of livestock markets is contingent upon producers accessing relevant market information which assists adjustment to production and distribution. This article provides an analysis of the value of market information gleaned by producers attending public livestock auctions. The article uses the Travel Cost Method to quantify the value of this information and notes the limitations of applying the Travel Cost Method in this context.Agribusiness, Livestock Production/Industries,

Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources

Both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and priority lists) are used to allocate a large amount of scarce public resources that produce large private benefits and small consumption externalities. I study a model in which the use of both market and non-market mechanisms can be rationalized. Agents are risk neutral and heterogeneous in terms of their monetary value for a good and their opportunity cost of money, which are both private information. The designer wants to allocate a set of identical goods to the agents with the highest values. To achieve her goal, she can screen agents on the basis of their observable characteristics, and on the basis of information on their willingness to pay that she can extract using market mechanisms. In contrast to models where willingness to pay and value coincide, a first best cannot be achieved. My main result is that both market and non-market mechanisms, or hybrid mechanisms, can be optimal depending on the prior information available to the designer. In particular, non-market mechanisms may be optimal if the value is positively correlated with the opportunity cost of money.

Market efficiency and Price Formation when Dealers are Asymmetrically Informed

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a quote-driven market where one market maker receives a private signal on the security's fundamental. A model is presented where market makers repeatedly compete in prices: at each stage a bid-ask auction occurs and the winner trades the security against liquidity traders. We show that at equilibrium the market is not strong-form efficient until the last stage. We characterize a reputational equilibrium in which the informed market maker will aspect market beliefs, possibly misleading them, in the sense that he will push the uninformed participants to think the value of the risky asset is different from the realized one. At this equilibrium a price leadership effect arises, quotes are never equal to the expected value of the asset given the public information, the informed market maker expected payoff is positive and the information revelation speed is slower than in an analogous order-driven market.bid-ask prices; asymmetric information; repeated auction; insider trading