Local and Global Trust Based on the Concept of Promises

We use the notion of a promise to define local trust between agents possessing autonomous decision-making. An agent is trustworthy if it is expected that it will keep a promise. This definition satisfies most commonplace meanings of trust. Reputation is then an estimation of this expectation value that is passed on from agent to agent. Our definition distinguishes types of trust, for different behaviours, and decouples the concept of agent reliability from the behaviour on which the judgement is based. We show, however, that trust is fundamentally heuristic, as it provides insufficient information for agents to make a rational judgement. A global trustworthiness, or community trust can be defined by a proportional, self-consistent voting process, as a weighted eigenvector-centrality function of the promise theoretical graph

PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions

Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively studied in recent years. Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true valuations, simplifying greatly the analysis of auctions. However, revealing one's true valuation causes severe privacy disclosure to the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse, previous work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate security. In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions. Besides maintaining the properties of truthfulness and special spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable security against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography. Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone in the auction, except the auction result. To the best of our knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first provably secure solution for spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental results show that the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is modest, and its practical applications are feasible.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, submitted to Infocom 201

Backing the horse or the jockey? Due diligence, agency costs, information and the evaluation of risk by business angel investors

This paper explores the argument that business angel investors are more concerned with managing and minimising agency risk than market risk. Based on data on the due diligence process from a survey of business angels in the UK, the paper concludes that business angels do view entrepreneur characteristics and experience as having the greatest impact on the perceived riskiness of an investment opportunity. Further, they emphasise personal and informal over formal sources of information in the due diligence process, and seek information on both the entrepreneur and the venture in determining valuation. Indeed, the reliance of business angels on short-term and subjective information to value investment opportunities leads to the conclusion that their approach to valuation is not a function of the conventional protocols of financial analysis, but of personal relations and assessment