Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

CENTURION: Incentivizing Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing

The recent proliferation of increasingly capable mobile devices has given rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that outsource the collection of sensory data to a crowd of participating workers that carry various mobile devices. Aware of the paramount importance of effectively incentivizing participation in such systems, the research community has proposed a wide variety of incentive mechanisms. However, different from most of these existing mechanisms which assume the existence of only one data requester, we consider MCS systems with multiple data requesters, which are actually more common in practice. Specifically, our incentive mechanism is based on double auction, and is able to stimulate the participation of both data requesters and workers. In real practice, the incentive mechanism is typically not an isolated module, but interacts with the data aggregation mechanism that aggregates workers' data. For this reason, we propose CENTURION, a novel integrated framework for multi-requester MCS systems, consisting of the aforementioned incentive and data aggregation mechanism. CENTURION's incentive mechanism satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency, as well as guaranteeing non-negative social welfare, and its data aggregation mechanism generates highly accurate aggregated results. The desirable properties of CENTURION are validated through both theoretical analysis and extensive simulations

Location Privacy in Spatial Crowdsourcing

Spatial crowdsourcing (SC) is a new platform that engages individuals in collecting and analyzing environmental, social and other spatiotemporal information. With SC, requesters outsource their spatiotemporal tasks to a set of workers, who will perform the tasks by physically traveling to the tasks' locations. This chapter identifies privacy threats toward both workers and requesters during the two main phases of spatial crowdsourcing, tasking and reporting. Tasking is the process of identifying which tasks should be assigned to which workers. This process is handled by a spatial crowdsourcing server (SC-server). The latter phase is reporting, in which workers travel to the tasks' locations, complete the tasks and upload their reports to the SC-server. The challenge is to enable effective and efficient tasking as well as reporting in SC without disclosing the actual locations of workers (at least until they agree to perform a task) and the tasks themselves (at least to workers who are not assigned to those tasks). This chapter aims to provide an overview of the state-of-the-art in protecting users' location privacy in spatial crowdsourcing. We provide a comparative study of a diverse set of solutions in terms of task publishing modes (push vs. pull), problem focuses (tasking and reporting), threats (server, requester and worker), and underlying technical approaches (from pseudonymity, cloaking, and perturbation to exchange-based and encryption-based techniques). The strengths and drawbacks of the techniques are highlighted, leading to a discussion of open problems and future work