Cyber Black Box: Network intrusion forensics system for collecting and preserving evidence of attack

Once the system is compromised, the forensics and investigation are always executed after the attacks and the loss of some useful instant evidence. Since there is no log information necessary for analyzing an attack cause after the cyber incident occurs, it is difficult to analyze the cause of an intrusion even after an intrusion event is recognized. Moreover, in an advanced cyber incident such as advanced persistent threats, several months or more are expended in only analyzing a cause, and it is difficult to find the cause with conventional security equipment. In this paper, we introduce a network intrusion forensics system for collecting and preserving the evidence of an intrusion, it is called Cyber Black Box that is deployed in Local Area Network environment. It quickly analyzes a cause of an intrusion event when the intrusion event occurs, and provides a function of collecting evidence data of the intrusion event. The paper also describes the experimental results of the network throughput performance by deploying our proposed system in an experimental testbed environment

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System Forensics Based on the Modbus Protocol

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) has been at the cored of Operational Technology (OT) used in industries and process plants to monitor and control critical processes, especially in the energy sector. In petroleum sub-sector, it has been used in monitoring transportation, storage and loading of petroleum products. It is linked to instruments that collect and monitor parameters such as temperature, pressure and product densities. It gives commands to actuators by the use of the application programs installed on the programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Earlier SCADA systems were isolated from the internet, hence protected by an airgap from attacks taking place on interconnected systems. The recent trend is that SCADA systems are becoming more integrated with other business systems using Internet technologies such as Ethernet and TCP/IP. However, TCP/IP and web technologies which are predominantly used by IT systems have become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks that are experienced by IT systems such as malwares and other attacks.  It is important to conduct vulnerability assessment of SCADA systems with a view to thwarting attacks that can exploit such vulnerabilities. Where the vulnerabilities have been exploited, forensic analysis is required so as to know what really happened. This paper reviews SCADA systems configuration, vulnerabilities, and attacks scenarios, then presents a prototype SCADA system and forensic tool that can be used on SCADA. The tool reads into the PLC memory and Wireshark has been to capture network communication between the SCADA system and the PLC

Proceedings of the 15th Australian Digital Forensics Conference, 5-6 December 2017, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia

Conference Foreword This is the sixth year that the Australian Digital Forensics Conference has been held under the banner of the Security Research Institute, which is in part due to the success of the security conference program at ECU. As with previous years, the conference continues to see a quality papers with a number from local and international authors. 8 papers were submitted and following a double blind peer review process, 5 were accepted for final presentation and publication. Conferences such as these are simply not possible without willing volunteers who follow through with the commitment they have initially made, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the conference committee for their tireless efforts in this regard. These efforts have included but not been limited to the reviewing and editing of the conference papers, and helping with the planning, organisation and execution of the conference. Particular thanks go to those international reviewers who took the time to review papers for the conference, irrespective of the fact that they are unable to attend this year. To our sponsors and supporters a vote of thanks for both the financial and moral support provided to the conference. Finally, to the student volunteers and staff of the ECU Security Research Institute, your efforts as always are appreciated and invaluable. Yours sincerely, Conference ChairProfessor Craig ValliDirector, Security Research Institute Congress Organising Committee Congress Chair: Professor Craig Valli Committee Members: Professor Gary Kessler – Embry Riddle University, Florida, USA Professor Glenn Dardick – Embry Riddle University, Florida, USA Professor Ali Babar – University of Adelaide, Australia Dr Jason Smith – CERT Australia, Australia Associate Professor Mike Johnstone – Edith Cowan University, Australia Professor Joseph A. Cannataci – University of Malta, Malta Professor Nathan Clarke – University of Plymouth, Plymouth UK Professor Steven Furnell – University of Plymouth, Plymouth UK Professor Bill Hutchinson – Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia Professor Andrew Jones – Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE Professor Iain Sutherland – Glamorgan University, Wales, UK Professor Matthew Warren – Deakin University, Melbourne Australia Congress Coordinator: Ms Emma Burk

Lessons Learned from KYPO – Cyber Exercise & Research Platform Project

Cyber attacks became significant threat for a critical information infrastructure of a state. In order to face them it is necessary to study them, understand them, and train personnel to recognize them. For this purpose we have developed a KYPO - Cyber Exercise & Research Platform for simulation of numerous cyber attacks. In this paper we present the KYPO platform and first experience gained from Capture the Flag game training.Cyber attacks became significant threat for a critical information infrastructure of a state. In order to face them it is necessary to study them, understand them, and train personnel to recognize them. For this purpose we have developed a KYPO - Cyber Exercise & Research Platform for simulation of numerous cyber attacks. In this paper we present the KYPO platform and first experience gained from Capture the Flag game training

HyperLink: Virtual Machine Introspection and Memory Forensic Analysis without Kernel Source Code

Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is an approach to inspecting and analyzing the software running inside a virtual machine from the hypervisor. Similarly, memory forensics analyzes the memory snapshots or dumps to understand the runtime state of a physical or virtual machine. The existing VMI and memory forensic tools rely on up-to-date kernel information of the target operating system (OS) to work properly, which often requires the availability of the kernel source code. This requirement prevents these tools from being widely deployed in real cloud environments. In this paper, we present a VMI tool called HyperLink that partially retrieves running process information from a guest virtual machine without its source code. While current introspection and memory forensic solutions support only one or a limited number of kernel versions of the target OS, HyperLink is a one-for-many introspection and forensic tool, i.e., it supports most, if not all, popular OSes regardless of their versions. We implement both online and offline versions of HyperLink.We validate the efficacy of HyperLink under different versions of Linux, Windows, FreeBSD, and Mac OS X. For all the OSes we tested, HyperLink can successfully retrieve the process information in one minute or several seconds. Through online and offline analyses, we demonstrate that HyperLink can help users detect real-world kernel rootkits and play an important role in intrusion detection. Due to its version-agnostic property, HyperLink could become the first introspection and forensic tool that works well in autonomic cloud computing environments

Web attack risk awareness with lessons learned from high interaction honeypots

Tese de mestrado, Segurança Informática, Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, 2009Com a evolução da web 2.0, a maioria das empresas elabora negócios através da Internet usando aplicações web. Estas aplicações detêm dados importantes com requisitos cruciais como confidencialidade, integridade e disponibilidade. A perda destas propriedades influencia directamente o negócio colocando-o em risco. A percepção de risco providencia o necessário conhecimento de modo a agir para a sua mitigação. Nesta tese foi concretizada uma colecção de honeypots web de alta interacção utilizando diversas aplicações e sistemas operativos para analisar o comportamento do atacante. A utilização de ambientes de virtualização assim como ferramentas de monitorização de honeypots amplamente utilizadas providencia a informação forense necessária para ajudar a comunidade de investigação no estudo do modus operandi do atacante, armazenando os últimos exploits e ferramentas maliciosas, e a desenvolver as necessárias medidas de protecção que lidam com a maioria das técnicas de ataque. Utilizando a informação detalhada de ataque obtida com os honeypots web, o comportamento do atacante é classificado entre diferentes perfis de ataque para poderem ser analisadas as medidas de mitigação de risco que lidam com as perdas de negócio. Diferentes frameworks de segurança são analisadas para avaliar os benefícios que os conceitos básicos de segurança dos honeypots podem trazer na resposta aos requisitos de cada uma e a consequente mitigação de risco.With the evolution of web 2.0, the majority of enterprises deploy their business over the Internet using web applications. These applications carry important data with crucial requirements such as confidentiality, integrity and availability. The loss of those properties influences directly the business putting it at risk. Risk awareness provides the necessary know-how on how to act to achieve its mitigation. In this thesis a collection of high interaction web honeypots is deployed using multiple applications and diverse operating systems in order to analyse the attacker behaviour. The use of virtualization environments along with widely used honeypot monitoring tools provide the necessary forensic information that helps the research community to study the modus operandi of the attacker gathering the latest exploits and malicious tools and to develop adequate safeguards that deal with the majority of attacking techniques. Using the detailed attacking information gathered with the web honeypots, the attacking behaviour will be classified across different attacking profiles to analyse the necessary risk mitigation safeguards to deal with business losses. Different security frameworks commonly used by enterprises are analysed to evaluate the benefits of the honeypots security concepts in responding to each framework’s requirements and consequently mitigating the risk

Assessing the evidential value of artefacts recovered from the cloud

Cloud computing offers users low-cost access to computing resources that are scalable and flexible. However, it is not without its challenges, especially in relation to security. Cloud resources can be leveraged for criminal activities and the architecture of the ecosystem makes digital investigation difficult in terms of evidence identification, acquisition and examination. However, these same resources can be leveraged for the purposes of digital forensics, providing facilities for evidence acquisition, analysis and storage. Alternatively, existing forensic capabilities can be used in the Cloud as a step towards achieving forensic readiness. Tools can be added to the Cloud which can recover artefacts of evidential value. This research investigates whether artefacts that have been recovered from the Xen Cloud Platform (XCP) using existing tools have evidential value. To determine this, it is broken into three distinct areas: adding existing tools to a Cloud ecosystem, recovering artefacts from that system using those tools and then determining the evidential value of the recovered artefacts. From these experiments, three key steps for adding existing tools to the Cloud were determined: the identification of the specific Cloud technology being used, identification of existing tools and the building of a testbed. Stemming from this, three key components of artefact recovery are identified: the user, the audit log and the Virtual Machine (VM), along with two methodologies for artefact recovery in XCP. In terms of evidential value, this research proposes a set of criteria for the evaluation of digital evidence, stating that it should be authentic, accurate, reliable and complete. In conclusion, this research demonstrates the use of these criteria in the context of digital investigations in the Cloud and how each is met. This research shows that it is possible to recover artefacts of evidential value from XCP

The V-network: a testbed for malware analysis

This paper presents a virtualised network environment that serves as a stable and re-usable platform for the analysis of malware propagation. The platform, which has been developed using VMware virtualisation technology, enables the use of either a graphical user interface or scripts to create virtual networks, clone, restart and take snapshots of virtual machines, reset experiments, clean virtual machines and manage the entire infrastructure remotely. The virtualised environment uses open source routing software to support the deployment of intrusion detection systems and other malware attack sensors, and is therefore suitable for evaluating countermeasure systems before deployment on live networks. An empirical analysis of network worm propagation has been conducted using worm outbreak experiments on Class A size networks to demonstrate the capability of the developed platform