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A framework for proving the correctness of cryptographic protocol properties by linear temporal logic
In this paper, a framework for cryptographic protocol analysis using linear temporal logic is proposed. The framework can be used to specify and analyse security protocols. It aims to investigate and analyse the security protocols properties that are secure or have any flaws. The framework extends the linear temporal logic by including the knowledge of participants in each status that may change over the time. It includes two main parts, the Language of Temporal Logic (LTL) and the domain knowledge. The ability of the framework is demonstrated by analysing the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol and the Andrew Secure RPC protocol as examples
Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications
Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for
the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research
experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts
today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited
abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes,
thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led
to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at
formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism
are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of
clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN)
paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right
kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence
in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and
synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a
self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in
formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial
Efficient First-Order Temporal Logic for Infinite-State Systems
In this paper we consider the specification and verification of
infinite-state systems using temporal logic. In particular, we describe
parameterised systems using a new variety of first-order temporal logic that is
both powerful enough for this form of specification and tractable enough for
practical deductive verification. Importantly, the power of the temporal
language allows us to describe (and verify) asynchronous systems, communication
delays and more complex properties such as liveness and fairness properties.
These aspects appear difficult for many other approaches to infinite-state
verification.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figure
Quantitative Verification: Formal Guarantees for Timeliness, Reliability and Performance
Computerised systems appear in almost all aspects of our daily lives, often in safety-critical scenarios such as embedded control systems in cars and aircraft
or medical devices such as pacemakers and sensors. We are thus increasingly reliant on these systems working correctly, despite often operating in unpredictable or unreliable environments. Designers of such devices need ways to guarantee that they will operate in a reliable and efficient manner.
Quantitative verification is a technique for analysing quantitative aspects of a system's design, such as timeliness, reliability or performance. It applies formal methods, based on a rigorous analysis of a mathematical model of the system, to automatically prove certain precisely specified properties, e.g. ``the airbag will always deploy within 20 milliseconds after a crash'' or ``the probability of both sensors failing simultaneously is less than 0.001''.
The ability to formally guarantee quantitative properties of this kind is beneficial across a wide range of application domains. For example, in safety-critical systems, it may be essential to establish credible bounds on the probability with which certain failures or combinations of failures can occur. In embedded control systems, it is often important to comply with strict constraints on timing or resources. More generally, being able to derive guarantees on precisely specified levels of performance or efficiency is a valuable tool in the design of, for example, wireless networking protocols, robotic systems or power management algorithms, to name but a few.
This report gives a short introduction to quantitative verification, focusing in particular on a widely used technique called model checking, and its generalisation to the analysis of quantitative aspects of a system such as timing, probabilistic behaviour or resource usage.
The intended audience is industrial designers and developers of systems such as those highlighted above who could benefit from the application of quantitative verification,but lack expertise in formal verification or modelling
Flow Logic
Flow networks have attracted a lot of research in computer science. Indeed,
many questions in numerous application areas can be reduced to questions about
flow networks. Many of these applications would benefit from a framework in
which one can formally reason about properties of flow networks that go beyond
their maximal flow. We introduce Flow Logics: modal logics that treat flow
functions as explicit first-order objects and enable the specification of rich
properties of flow networks. The syntax of our logic BFL* (Branching Flow
Logic) is similar to the syntax of the temporal logic CTL*, except that atomic
assertions may be flow propositions, like or , for
, which refer to the value of the flow in a vertex, and
that first-order quantification can be applied both to paths and to flow
functions. We present an exhaustive study of the theoretical and practical
aspects of BFL*, as well as extensions and fragments of it. Our extensions
include flow quantifications that range over non-integral flow functions or
over maximal flow functions, path quantification that ranges over paths along
which non-zero flow travels, past operators, and first-order quantification of
flow values. We focus on the model-checking problem and show that it is
PSPACE-complete, as it is for CTL*. Handling of flow quantifiers, however,
increases the complexity in terms of the network to , even
for the LFL and BFL fragments, which are the flow-counterparts of LTL and CTL.
We are still able to point to a useful fragment of BFL* for which the
model-checking problem can be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we introduce
and study the query-checking problem for BFL*, where under-specified BFL*
formulas are used for network exploration
Towards the Verification of Pervasive Systems
Pervasive systems, that is roughly speaking systems that can interact with their environment, are increasingly common. In such systems, there are many dimensions to assess: security and reliability, safety and liveness, real-time response, etc. So far modelling and formalizing attempts have been very piecemeal approaches. This paper describes our analysis of a pervasive case study (MATCH, a homecare application) and our proposal for formal (particularly verification) approaches. Our goal is to see to what extent current state of the art formal methods are capable of coping with the verification demand introduced by pervasive systems, and to point out their limitations
Verifying Security Properties in Unbounded Multiagent Systems
We study the problem of analysing the security for an unbounded number of concurrent sessions of a cryptographic protocol. Our formal model accounts for an arbitrary number of agents involved in a protocol-exchange which is subverted by a Dolev-Yao attacker. We define the parameterised model checking problem with respect to security requirements expressed in temporal-epistemic logics. We formulate sufficient conditions for solving this problem, by analysing several finite models of the system. We primarily explore authentication and key-establishment as part of a larger class of protocols and security requirements amenable to our methodology. We introduce a tool implementing the technique, and we validate it by verifying the NSPK and ASRPC protocols
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