Interdependent policy instrument preferences: a two-mode network approach

In policymaking, actors are likely to take the preferences of others into account when strategically positioning themselves. However, there is a lack of research that conceives of policy preferences as an interdependent system. In order to analyse interdependencies, we link actors to their policy preferences in water protection, which results in an actor-instrument network. As actors exhibit multiple preferences, a complex two-mode network between actors and policies emerges. We analyse whether actors exhibit interdependent preference profiles given shared policy objectives or social interactions among them. By fitting an exponential random graph model to the actor-instrument network, we find considerable clustering, meaning that actors tend to exhibit preferences for multiple policy instruments in common. Actors tend to exhibit interdependent policy preferences when they are interconnected, that is, they collaborate with each other. By contrast, actors are less likely to share policy preferences when a conflict line divides them

Integrative Use of Information Extraction, Semantic Matchmaking and Adaptive Coupling Techniques in Support of Distributed Information Processing and Decision-Making

In order to press maximal cognitive benefit from their social, technological and informational environments, military coalitions need to understand how best to exploit available information assets as well as how best to organize their socially-distributed information processing activities. The International Technology Alliance (ITA) program is beginning to address the challenges associated with enhanced cognition in military coalition environments by integrating a variety of research and development efforts. In particular, research in one component of the ITA ('Project 4: Shared Understanding and Information Exploitation') is seeking to develop capabilities that enable military coalitions to better exploit and distribute networked information assets in the service of collective cognitive outcomes (e.g. improved decision-making). In this paper, we provide an overview of the various research activities in Project 4. We also show how these research activities complement one another in terms of supporting coalition-based collective cognition

An optimal feedback model to prevent manipulation behaviours in consensus under social network group decision making

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.A novel framework to prevent manipulation behaviour in consensus reaching process under social network group decision making is proposed, which is based on a theoretically sound optimal feedback model. The manipulation behaviour classification is twofold: (1) ‘individual manipulation’ where each expert manipulates his/her own behaviour to achieve higher importance degree (weight); and (2) ‘group manipulation’ where a group of experts force inconsistent experts to adopt specific recommendation advices obtained via the use of fixed feedback parameter. To counteract ‘individual manipulation’, a behavioural weights assignment method modelling sequential attitude ranging from ‘dictatorship’ to ‘democracy’ is developed, and then a reasonable policy for group minimum adjustment cost is established to assign appropriate weights to experts. To prevent ‘group manipulation’, an optimal feedback model with objective function the individual adjustments cost and constraints related to the threshold of group consensus is investigated. This approach allows the inconsistent experts to balance group consensus and adjustment cost, which enhances their willingness to adopt the recommendation advices and consequently the group reaching consensus on the decision making problem at hand. A numerical example is presented to illustrate and verify the proposed optimal feedback model

Political Economy : Variability and Consistency in the Development of Worker Owned Cooperatives

The relationship between worker cooperatives and their social and economic environment has sparked interest among the sociological community for the contradictions and harmony typical of these interactions. However, these studies do not examine how firm behavior varies and/or remains constant in different social conditions. With insights from economic sociology, neo-institutionalism, and social movements theory, the paper pursues this issue by answering the following question: how do worker cooperatives respond to different social conditions over time? Using interviews with members of eight worker cooperatives in a Midwestern metropolitan area, the author compares behavior in older and younger cooperatives to observe similarities and differences in their practices under different social conditions. The analysis demonstrates that differences in social support and market competition created variation among older and newer cooperatives. For instance, the decision to start worker-owned cooperatives reflected different political motivations that emerged from distinct socio-economic conditions. However, all firms eventually behaved like businesses because they framed economic activities as political activism, exposing them to fluctuations in the city’s political scene. As a result, these businesses created market niches, attract customers and competent workers, and copy other successful democratic enterprises to survive demographic fluctuations in the market