On the definition of affordable prices under universal service obligations

In this paper, we investigate the social welfare implications of the European and American definition of affordable prices when a country is divided into independent zones. We find that the European definition is always soc ial welfare superior, because it forces to keep lower prices. We also introduce to new defintions of affordable prices. The first definition advocates for a common price for the unprofitable area. We prove that this definition is social welfare superior to the current definitions. In the second definition denote as "yardstick pricing" , we define the affordable prices for the unprofitable areas as a function that does not depende on their own zone profitable area price. We show that yardstick price is more efficient for social welfare when the differences in demand among zones are not very large

Endogenous financing of the universal service

We address the question of endogenous financing of the Universal Service Obligations and we compare it with the exogenous financing. A fund is created and fed through a tax firms pay. We show that the way these funds are implemented by the current regulatory regimes at work goes against the social welfare. We propose a new way of implementing the fund that improves welfare. Moreover, we challenge the proportionality payment principle as it leads to lower welfare

How Effective is European Merger Control?

This paper applies a novel methodology to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990-2002 to assess merger control’s effectiveness. By using data gathered from several sources and employing different evaluation techniques, we analyze the economic effects of the European Commission’s (EC) merger control decisions and distinguish between blockings, clearances with commitments (either behavioral or structural), and outright clearances. We run an event study on merging and rival firms’ stocks to quantify the profitability effects of mergers and merger control decisions. We back up our results and methodology by using alternative measures for the merger’s profitability effects based on balance sheet data and obtain consistent results. Our findings suggest that outright blockings solve the competitive problems generated by the merger. Remedies are not always effective in solving the market power concerns, at least not on average. Nevertheless, both structural (divestitures) and behavioral remedies do help restore effective competition when correctly applied to anticompetitive mergers during the first investigation phase. Yet, they are on the whole ineffective or even detrimental when applied after the second investigation phase. Finally, remedies - especially behavioral ones - seem to constitute a rent transfer from merging firms to rivals when mistakenly applied to pro-competitive mergers

How adverse selection affects the health insurance market

Adverse selection can be defined as strategic behavior by the more informed partner in a contract against the interest of the less informed partner(s). In the health insurance field, this manifests itself through healthy people choosing managed care and less healthy people choosing more generous plans. Drawing on theoretical literature on the problem of adverse selection in the health insurance market, the author synthesizes concepts developed piecemeal over more than 20 years, using two examples and revisiting the classical contribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz. He highlights key insights, especially from the literature on"equilibrium refinements"and on the theory of"second best."The government can correct spontaneous market dynamics in the health insurance market by directly subsidizing insurance or through regulation; the two forms of intervention provide different results. Providing partial public insurance, even supplemented by the possibility of opting out, can lead to second-best equilibria. The same result holds as long as the government can subsidize contracts with higher-than-average premium-benefit ratios and can tax contracts with lower-than-average premium-benefit ratios. The author analyzes the following policy options relating to the public provision of insurance: a) Full public insurance. b) Partial public insurance with or without the possibility of acquiring supplementary insurance and with or without the possibility of opting out. In recent plans implemented in Germany and the Netherlands, where competition among several health funds and insurance companies was promoted, a public fund was created to discourage risk screening practices by providing the necessary compensation across riks groups. But only"objective"risk adjusters (such as age, gender, and region) were used to decide which contracts to subsidize. Those criteria alone cannot correct the effects of adverse selection. Regulation can exacerbate the problem of adverse selection and lead to chronic market instability, so certain steps must be taken to prevent risk screening and preserve competition for the market. The author considers the following three policy options for regulating the private insurance market: 1) A standard contract with full coverage. 2) Imposition of a minimum insurance requirement. 3) Imposition of premium rate restrictions.Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,Financial Intermediation

Rail Privatisation: The Practice – An Analysis of Seven Case Studies

After a brief description of the proposals for rail privatisation in Great Britain, this paper contrasts these with the proposals and experience in other countries around the world. The proposals and experience in other countries contain some elements of the British proposals, however, the 'open access' element that features strongly in the British proposals has never been experienced on any significant scale elsewhere. In conclusion, experience elsewhere may shed light on the likely outcome of some aspects of the British proposals, but other aspects such as 'open access' and vertical separation are still unknowns

Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion

We argue that management sells assets when doing so provides the cheapest funds to pursue its objectives rather than for operating efficiency reasons alone. This hypothesis suggests that (1) firms selling assets have high leverage and/or poor performance, (2) a successful asset sale is good news and (3) the stock market discounts asset sale proceeds retained by the selling firm. In support of this hypothesis, we find that the typical firm in our sample performs poorly before the sale and that the average stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive only when the proceeds are paid out.

Soft commodity funds, food price volatility, speculation and public Perception. Why soft commodities are a special asset class.

This paper reviews evidence on food price volatility, soft commodity speculation and the public perception of these practices, at least from a Belgian perspective. Soft commodity speculation expanded greatly during the 2007-2008 food crisis and since then has become an asset class of its own in which many banks and investment institutions engage in. This is fueled by food price volatility, especially for the soft primary commodities wich teh food industry uses as ingredients: cereals, oilseeds, vegetable oil, sugar, coffee, cocao, etc ... Of course, speculation is not new and extends to all primary commodities, to stocks and bonds, currencies, and in fact all asset classes. What is special about soft commodity(comprising all agricultural products and raw materials for the food, fiber and bio-fuel industry)speculation is that it impacts our dialy food, and that there are nearly one billion people in the world that are chronically food insecure, i.e. don't have enough to eat every day for a normal and healthy life. The recent food crisis added more than 100 million people, according to FAO, to that group. The 50 poorest countries in the world ) basically all agriculturally based economies-are nearly all net importers of food, particularly cereals, and thus depend on the world market for their food supply. Many poor families spend over half their income on food. And this is why food price speculation raises many ethical questions and why soft commodities - the basis of food - are a special asset class.

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF IT INNOVATION ON BANK STRATEGY, 1985-1995

Through case study research this paper illustrates opportunities presented by IT-based technological change in British retail bank markets (1985-1995). For the managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland IT appeared to lower entry barriers, exit barriers and deliver high sustainability of competitive advantage. The strategic intent behind diversification patterns of the Royal Bank of Scotland suggested competitive considerations were at a premium because unsolicited take-over bids in the early 1980s put pressure on managers to create growth opportunities. Direct Line Insurance was a subsidiary from the Royal Bank of Scotland. Direct Line was also the first retail finance institution to establish a clear competitive advantage based on information technology. The success of Direct Line enabled an increase in the market share of British retail financial services of The Royal Bank of Scotland. Direct Line is a case of planned success that questions the extent to which banks’ competencies must change to master alternative delivery channels. The success of Direct Line also suggested more effective execution than other activities explored by managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland.Financial institutions; technological change; corporate strategy