A Survey of Paraphrasing and Textual Entailment Methods

Paraphrasing methods recognize, generate, or extract phrases, sentences, or longer natural language expressions that convey almost the same information. Textual entailment methods, on the other hand, recognize, generate, or extract pairs of natural language expressions, such that a human who reads (and trusts) the first element of a pair would most likely infer that the other element is also true. Paraphrasing can be seen as bidirectional textual entailment and methods from the two areas are often similar. Both kinds of methods are useful, at least in principle, in a wide range of natural language processing applications, including question answering, summarization, text generation, and machine translation. We summarize key ideas from the two areas by considering in turn recognition, generation, and extraction methods, also pointing to prominent articles and resources.Comment: Technical Report, Natural Language Processing Group, Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece, 201

Automated Claim Matching with Large Language Models: Empowering Fact-Checkers in the Fight Against Misinformation

In today's digital era, the rapid spread of misinformation poses threats to public well-being and societal trust. As online misinformation proliferates, manual verification by fact checkers becomes increasingly challenging. We introduce FACT-GPT (Fact-checking Augmentation with Claim matching Task-oriented Generative Pre-trained Transformer), a framework designed to automate the claim matching phase of fact-checking using Large Language Models (LLMs). This framework identifies new social media content that either supports or contradicts claims previously debunked by fact-checkers. Our approach employs GPT-4 to generate a labeled dataset consisting of simulated social media posts. This data set serves as a training ground for fine-tuning more specialized LLMs. We evaluated FACT-GPT on an extensive dataset of social media content related to public health. The results indicate that our fine-tuned LLMs rival the performance of larger pre-trained LLMs in claim matching tasks, aligning closely with human annotations. This study achieves three key milestones: it provides an automated framework for enhanced fact-checking; demonstrates the potential of LLMs to complement human expertise; offers public resources, including datasets and models, to further research and applications in the fact-checking domain

Two Essays on Constructivism: Lessons from Semantic Theory

This thesis consists of two loosely-connected essays about Sharon Street\u27s Humean metanormative constructivism. In the first chapter, I examines a lacuna in Street\u27s account--namely, that she owes us a semantic theory as a necessary condition for getting her metanormative theory off the ground--and argue that Brandom\u27s inferentialist semantic theory is the best option for filling the lacuna. I then show that Michael Ridge\u27s reading of Street as a reductive realist is mistaken. In the second chapter, I examine the vulnerability of Street\u27s account to certain epistemic reliability challenges, including one she herself makes against realist theories of value. I then argue, using Davidson\u27s strategy, that the coherentist impulses in Street\u27s theory are sufficient to answer the challenges in question

Saving Moral Realism: Against Blackburn\u27s Projectivism

In the argumentative dialectic between moral realists and non-cognitivist moral antirealists each side in the debate is typically thought to enjoy a different prima facie advantage over its rival. Moral realism gains plausibility from its truth-conditional semantics because it can explain the meaning of moral judgments on the same basis as ordinary propositions. However, many moral philosophers doubt moral realism because the theory is committed to the existence of moral properties, which are, in J. L. Mackie\u27s term, queer. Moral antirealism denies that these moral properties exist, and this is a principal reason why many moral philosophers endorse the theory. However, if moral terms like good , immoral , or right do not refer to anything, then the meanings of the moral judgments in which they appear cannot be explained with truth-conditional semantics; moral antirealists who wish to preserve moral practice need to develop a semantics that can accommodate it. The general perception of the dialectic is that moral realists have the upper hand in semantics, but a disadvantage in metaphysics, and vice versa for moral antirealists. This essay challenges this assumption. Simon Blackburn\u27s quasi-realism is one of the principal examples of non-cognitivism, a form of moral antirealism that tries to develop an alternative account of moral semantics in which the function of a moral proposition is not to express belief but attitude. Quasi-realism is Blackburn\u27s research program of developing a semantics for moral discourse that is consistent with projectivism, the metaphysics of his metaethical theory. After situating Blackburn\u27s project within the history of twentieth century metaethics, this essay reviews Blackburn\u27s quasi-realist semantics and criticizes it. This essay then aims to extend the metaethical dialectic by developing and critiquing an account of Blackburn\u27s projectivism. This essay interprets projectivism as an explanation of moral awareness that aims to explain the realist phenomenology of that experience when realist explanations of it fail. After developing an account of the mechanism of projectivism, this essay argues that a metaethical theory feature projectivism as its metaphysical element contrasts negatively with moral realism in several ways: e.g., if it postulates new mental states and more events to account for moral awareness, then its ontological economy is less certain; it does not solve a metaphysical problem, supervenience, that moral realism cannot; it is incompatible with desirable features of moral practice; it undermines Blackburn\u27s rejection of error theory. This essay then concludes that when assessing the dialectic between moral realism and non-cognitivist moral antirealism, it is inappropriate to presume a metaphysical advantage for the latter on the basis of the mere denial of the existence of moral properties. This suggests that non-cognitivist moral antirealists need to supplement their theories with more robust metaphysical research programs

Toward a Cognitive Classical Linguistics. The Embodied Basis of Constructions in Greek and Latin

The volume that gathers a series of papers bringing together the study of grammatical and syntactic constructions in Greek and Latin under the perspective of theories of embodied meaning developed in cognitive linguistics

Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive Power

There are consequences to theories in a world questioning the power of the President. For decades, some originalists, including Justice Scalia, maintained that the President enjoys “all” executive power. Of course, this is not the Constitution’s actual text (which refers to “the” executive power, not “all” executive power)—but a highly contestable, and potentially dangerous, addition of meaning to the text. As I demonstrate in this Article, adding to the actual text of the Constitution is common in the originalist literature on executive power, whether the precise question is the President’s removal power, the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law, or the President’s obligations under the Emoluments Clause. Using elementary principles from the philosophy of language—principles that apply to all communication—I explain how originalist interpreters in this area “pragmatically enrich” the text, without articulating or justifying those additions and without seeking to test those meanings against the full text of the Constitution. Before one gets to history, the originalist has assumed a unit of textual analysis—a word, a clause, a paragraph—that may effectively enrich the meaning to reflect the interpreter’s preferred policy position. If this is correct, originalists must theorize the “interpretation zone,” a putatively neutral place from which historical inquiries are launched, and explain why interpreters may add meaning by pragmatic enrichment in this zone—particularly if those meanings are falsified by the rest of the Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, originalism’s opponents need to start talking about how to reclaim the actual text of the Constitution

Cartesian Humility and Pyrrhonian Passivity: The Ethical Significance of Epistemic Agency

While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of sub-personal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian advocacy of a minimal conception of ‘belief’ was motivated by ethical concerns: avoiding any sort of commitment, he attempted to preserve his peace of mind. In this article, I argue for a Cartesian model of rational guidance that, in line with some current versions of an agential virtue epistemology, does involve judgment and risk, and thus which is true both to our rational constitution and to our finite and fallible nature. Insofar as epistemic humility is a virtue of rational agents that recognise the limits of their judgments, Pyrrhonian scepticism, and a fortiori any variety of naturalism, is unable to accommodate this virtue. This means that, in contrast to the Cartesian model, the Pyrrhonist does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of cognitive disintegration. The Pyrrhonist thus becomes a social rebel, one that violates the norm of serious personal assent that enables the flourishing of a collaborative and social species which depends on agents that, however fallible, are accountable for their actions and judgments