Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Software Innovation

This paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation, and reciprocity in driving open source software innovation. Unlike previous literature based on survey data, we exploit the observed pattern of contributions - the .revealed preference. of developers - to infer the underlying incentives driving the decision to contribute source code. Using detailed information on code contributions and project membership, we classify software developers into distinct types and study how contributions from each developer type vary according to the open source license type and other project characteristics. We find that developers strongly sort by license type, project size, and corporate sponsorship, and that reciprocity is important only for a small subset of projects. We also show that contributions have a substantial impact on the performance of open source projects.open source software, innovation, incentives, intrinsic motivation, motivated agents, reputation, reciprocity

The Size Conundrum: Why Online Knowledge Markets Can Fail at Scale

In this paper, we interpret the community question answering websites on the StackExchange platform as knowledge markets, and analyze how and why these markets can fail at scale. A knowledge market framing allows site operators to reason about market failures, and to design policies to prevent them. Our goal is to provide insights on large-scale knowledge market failures through an interpretable model. We explore a set of interpretable economic production models on a large empirical dataset to analyze the dynamics of content generation in knowledge markets. Amongst these, the Cobb-Douglas model best explains empirical data and provides an intuitive explanation for content generation through concepts of elasticity and diminishing returns. Content generation depends on user participation and also on how specific types of content (e.g. answers) depends on other types (e.g. questions). We show that these factors of content generation have constant elasticity---a percentage increase in any of the inputs leads to a constant percentage increase in the output. Furthermore, markets exhibit diminishing returns---the marginal output decreases as the input is incrementally increased. Knowledge markets also vary on their returns to scale---the increase in output resulting from a proportionate increase in all inputs. Importantly, many knowledge markets exhibit diseconomies of scale---measures of market health (e.g., the percentage of questions with an accepted answer) decrease as a function of number of participants. The implications of our work are two-fold: site operators ought to design incentives as a function of system size (number of participants); the market lens should shed insight into complex dependencies amongst different content types and participant actions in general social networks.Comment: The 27th International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW), 201

Overestimating Self_Control: Evidence from the Health Club Industry

Experimental evidence suggests that people make time-inconsistent choices and display overconfidence about positive personal attributes. Do these features affect consumer behavior in the market? To address this question we use a new panel data set from three US health clubs with information on the contract choices and the day-to-day attendance decisions of 7,978 health club members over three years. Members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over $70 attend on average 4.8 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than$17, even though a $10-per-visit fee is also available. On average, these users forgo savings of$700 during their membership. We review many aspects of the consumer behavior, including the interval between last attendance and contract termination, the survival probability, and the correlation between different consumption choices. The empirical results are difficult to reconcile with the standard assumption of time-consistent preferences and rational expectations. A model of time-inconsistent agents with overconfidence about future patience explains the findings. The agents overestimate the future attendance and delay contract cancellation whenever renewal is automatic. Salesman pressure and overstimation of future efficiency are the leading alternative explanations.

Public Innovations in the Future

Taking off the past, the future always starts today. The capacity to harness intellectual and social capital and to convert it into novel and useful things has become the critical organizational requirement of the age. Organizations must frame tools, methods, and approaches that boost creativity and innovation, particularly in the public sector. The agenda for change is great: we need future solutions now

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will regulatory convergence lead to positive outcomes for utility sectors? This paper attempts to provide new answers to these questions. Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple theoretical model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations in the telecommunications sector. We find support for the ideas (1) that once institutional factors are taken into account, one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation, and (2) this process will lead to very different results regarding the impact of regulation.Regulatory convergence, lobbying, utilities

Do Bubbles Lead to Overinvestment?: A Revealed Preference Approach

Many economists believe that the stock market plays an important role in efficiently allocating capital to its most productive uses. This standard story of the stock market was called into question by events in the late 1990s, when some observers believed that stock market overvaluation – or a bubble - led to overinvestment. Both the standard and overinvestment stories involve discount rates and, to differentiate between the two stories, this paper examines the discount rates used by firms in making their investment decisions.We use a revealed preference approach that relies on the pattern of investment spending – combined with investment theory – to estimate the discount rates used by managers. The standard story predicts that firms with high stock prices and good investment opportunities should have discount rates that do not differ systematically from the risk-adjusted market rate. The overinvestment story predicts that firms with high stock prices and poor investment opportunities should have discount rates consistently below the market rate.Based on a panel dataset of over 50,000 firm-year observations, we find support for both stories. The behavior of high stock price firms with good measured investment opportunities is best described by the standard story, while the overinvestment story provides the most appropriate interpretation of the behavior of high stock price firms with poor investment opportunities. Firms in this latter category accumulate between 15.1% and 45.2% too much capital. These estimates suggest that, even before they burst, bubbles adversely affect economic activity by misallocating capital.bubbles, investment, stock markets, real effects of financial markets, capital formation

The value added statement: bastion of social reporting or dinosaur of financial reporting?

South Africa is at present experiencing the highest incidence of publication of the value added statement reported anywhere in the world to date. In addition research investigating the predictive ability of value added information has been conducted in the USA since 1990, even though the value added statement has not been published there. The research reported in this paper sets out to establish whether the value added statement is a disclosure worth considering by companies around the world, by investigating the South African experience with the value added statement. The social accounting theories of organisational legitimacy and political costs were found to be best suited to explain why the value added statement is published. Surveys among the companies publishing the value added statement indicated that management had the employees in mind when they published this information. However, a survey among users has indicated that very little use has been made of the value added statement. The main reason for this seems to be that the unregulated nature of the value added statement allows for inconsistencies in disclosures, which eventually caused users to suspect bias in the reports. The USA evidence that the information has additional predictive power is not confirmed by a South African study, and is complicated by the limited additional information contained in the value added statement. The South African experience with the value added statement does not make a convincing case for publication. Rather, it highlights the need for unbiased and verified social disclosures that will be useful to all the stakeholders of the company. In addition, it has implications for other voluntary social and environmental disclosures