Medication decision-making for patients with renal insufficiency in inpatient and outpatient care at a US Veterans Affairs Medical Centre: a qualitative, cognitive task analysis.

BackgroundMany studies identify factors that contribute to renal prescribing errors, but few examine how healthcare professionals (HCPs) detect and recover from an error or potential patient safety concern. Knowledge of this information could inform advanced error detection systems and decision support tools that help prevent prescribing errors.ObjectiveTo examine the cognitive strategies that HCPs used to recognise and manage medication-related problems for patients with renal insufficiency.DesignHCPs submitted documentation about medication-related incidents. We then conducted cognitive task analysis interviews. Qualitative data were analysed inductively.SettingInpatient and outpatient facilities at a major US Veterans Affairs Medical Centre.ParticipantsPhysicians, nurses and pharmacists who took action to prevent or resolve a renal-drug problem in patients with renal insufficiency.OutcomesEmergent themes from interviews, as related to recognition of renal-drug problems and decision-making processes.ResultsWe interviewed 20 HCPs. Results yielded a descriptive model of the decision-making process, comprised of three main stages: detect, gather information and act. These stages often followed a cyclical path due largely to the gradual decline of patients' renal function. Most HCPs relied on being vigilant to detect patients' renal-drug problems rather than relying on systems to detect unanticipated cues. At each stage, HCPs relied on different cognitive cues depending on medication type: for renally eliminated medications, HCPs focused on gathering renal dosing guidelines, while for nephrotoxic medications, HCPs investigated the need for particular medication therapy, and if warranted, safer alternatives.ConclusionsOur model is useful for trainees so they can gain familiarity with managing renal-drug problems. Based on findings, improvements are warranted for three aspects of healthcare systems: (1) supporting the cyclical nature of renal-drug problem management via longitudinal tracking mechanisms, (2) providing tools to alleviate HCPs' heavy reliance on vigilance and (3) supporting HCPs' different decision-making needs for renally eliminated versus nephrotoxic medications

Can the Heinrich ratio be used to predict harm from medication errors?

The purpose of this study was to establish whether, for medication errors, there exists a fixed Heinrich ratio between the number of incidents which did not result in harm, the number that caused minor harm, and the number that caused serious harm. If this were the case then it would be very useful in estimating any changes in harm following an intervention. Serious harm resulting from medication errors is relatively rare, so it can take a great deal of time and resource to detect a significant change. If the Heinrich ratio exists for medication errors, then it would be possible, and far easier, to measure the much more frequent number of incidents that did not result in harm and the extent to which they changed following an intervention; any reduction in harm could be extrapolated from this

Committed to Safety: Ten Case Studies on Reducing Harm to Patients

Presents case studies of healthcare organizations, clinical teams, and learning collaborations to illustrate successful innovations for improving patient safety nationwide. Includes actions taken, results achieved, lessons learned, and recommendations

Information technology for detecting medication errors and adverse drug events

It is estimated that over three-quarters of a million people are injured or die in hospitals ‎each year from adverse drug events (ADE’s). The majority of medical errors result form ‎poorly designed healthcare systems rather than from negligence on the part of healthcare ‎providers. In general, healthcare systems rely on voluntary reporting, which seriously ‎underestimates the number of medication errors and ADE’s by as much as 90%. This ‎paper reviews the causes and impact of medication errors and ADE\u27s. It also reports ‎studies that have used information technology (IT) to detect and prevent medication ‎errors and ADE’s. Significant reduction of medication errors and ADE’s requires ‎systemic implementation of IT, improvements in the reporting of errors, and integration ‎of the components of the healthcare systems’ information systems. At the present time, ‎most healthcare systems should be able to use IT to detect and prevent ADE’s.

Supporting Treatment Adherence Readiness through Training (START) for patients with HIV on antiretroviral therapy: study protocol for a randomized controlled trial.

BackgroundFew HIV antiretroviral adherence interventions target patients before they start treatment, assess adherence readiness to determine the timing of treatment initiation, or tailor the amount of adherence support. The Supporting Treatment Adherence Readiness through Training (START) intervention, based on the information-motivation-behavioral skills model of behavior change, is designed to address these gaps with the inclusion of (1) brief pill-taking practice trials for enhancing pretreatment adherence counseling and providing a behavioral criterion for determining adherence readiness and the timing of treatment initiation and (2) a performance-driven dose regulation mechanism to tailor the amount of counseling to the individual needs of the patient and conserve resources. The primary aim of this randomized controlled trial is to examine the effects of START on antiretroviral adherence and HIV virologic suppression.Methods/designA sample of 240 patients will be randomized to receive START or usual care at one of two HIV clinics. Primary outcomes will be optimal dose-taking adherence (>85 % prescribed doses taken), as measured with electronic monitoring caps, and undetectable HIV viral load. Secondary outcomes will include dose-timing adherence (>85 % prescribed doses taken on time) and CD4 count. Primary endpoints will be month 6 (short-term effect) and month 24 (to test durability of effect), though electronic monitoring will be continuous and a fully battery of assessments will be administered every 6 months for 24 months.DiscussionIf efficacious and cost-effective, START will provide clinicians with a model for assessing patient adherence readiness and helping patients to achieve and sustain readiness and optimal treatment benefits.Trial registrationClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT02329782 . Registered on 22 December 2014

Adverse Drug Reactions, Nursing and Policy: A Narrative Review

Medicines' management is a priority in healthcare delivery, but weaknesses in the monitoring and management of Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs) cause unplanned hospital admissions, financial burdens on healthcare systems, patient discomfort, morbidity, and mortality. This paper suggests policies and strategies that would help nurses minimise and manage ADRs to prescription medicines. The literature was searched for strategies to promote nurses' engagement with monitoring patients for potential ADRs. This narrative review opens the discussion by exploring the potential for nurse policy makers to address this hiatus in care. Recognition, amelioration and reporting of ADRs are important components of safe care, areas where nurses could make important contributions through collaboration in policy development, healthcare reform and enhanced nursing practice. Minimising ADRs necessitates paying sufficient attention to their recognition and prevention. Healthcare providers, particularly nurse leaders, need to commit to strategies to identify and address any adverse consequences of treatments, including ADRs: the axiom primum non nocere (first, do no harm) should be applied to all healthcare delivery. The application of structured nurse-led medicines' monitoring in practice depends on the collaboration of all healthcare professionals, co-ordinated by nurses. Incorporation of strategies to identify and ameliorate preventable ADRs into routine work will require the support of policy makers

A safer place for patients: learning to improve patient safety

1 Every day over one million people are treated successfully by National Health Service (NHS) acute, ambulance and mental health trusts. However, healthcare relies on a range of complex interactions of people, skills, technologies and drugs, and sometimes things do go wrong. For most countries, patient safety is now the key issue in healthcare quality and risk management. The Department of Health (the Department) estimates that one in ten patients admitted to NHS hospitals will be unintentionally harmed, a rate similar to other developed countries. Around 50 per cent of these patient safety incidentsa could have been avoided, if only lessons from previous incidents had been learned. 2 There are numerous stakeholders with a role in keeping patients safe in the NHS, many of whom require trusts to report details of patient safety incidents and near misses to them (Figure 2). However, a number of previous National Audit Office reports have highlighted concerns that the NHS has limited information on the extent and impact of clinical and non-clinical incidents and trusts need to learn from these incidents and share good practice across the NHS more effectively (Appendix 1). 3 In 2000, the Chief Medical Officer’s report An organisation with a memory 1 , identified that the key barriers to reducing the number of patient safety incidents were an organisational culture that inhibited reporting and the lack of a cohesive national system for identifying and sharing lessons learnt. 4 In response, the Department published Building a safer NHS for patients3 detailing plans and a timetable for promoting patient safety. The goal was to encourage improvements in reporting and learning through the development of a new mandatory national reporting scheme for patient safety incidents and near misses. Central to the plan was establishing the National Patient Safety Agency to improve patient safety by reducing the risk of harm through error. The National Patient Safety Agency was expected to: collect and analyse information; assimilate other safety-related information from a variety of existing reporting systems; learn lessons and produce solutions. 5 We therefore examined whether the NHS has been successful in improving the patient safety culture, encouraging reporting and learning from patient safety incidents. Key parts of our approach were a census of 267 NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts in Autumn 2004, followed by a re-survey in August 2005 and an omnibus survey of patients (Appendix 2). We also reviewed practices in other industries (Appendix 3) and international healthcare systems (Appendix 4), and the National Patient Safety Agency’s progress in developing its National Reporting and Learning System (Appendix 5) and other related activities (Appendix 6). 6 An organisation with a memory1 was an important milestone in the NHS’s patient safety agenda and marked the drive to improve reporting and learning. At the local level the vast majority of trusts have developed a predominantly open and fair reporting culture but with pockets of blame and scope to improve their strategies for sharing good practice. Indeed in our re-survey we found that local performance had continued to improve with more trusts reporting having an open and fair reporting culture, more trusts with open reporting systems and improvements in perceptions of the levels of under-reporting. At the national level, progress on developing the national reporting system for learning has been slower than set out in the Department’s strategy of 2001 3 and there is a need to improve evaluation and sharing of lessons and solutions by all organisations with a stake in patient safety. There is also no clear system for monitoring that lessons are learned at the local level. Specifically: a The safety culture within trusts is improving, driven largely by the Department’s clinical governance initiative 4 and the development of more effective risk management systems in response to incentives under initiatives such as the NHS Litigation Authority’s Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (Appendix 7). However, trusts are still predominantly reactive in their response to patient safety issues and parts of some organisations still operate a blame culture. b All trusts have established effective reporting systems at the local level, although under-reporting remains a problem within some groups of staff, types of incidents and near misses. The National Patient Safety Agency did not develop and roll out the National Reporting and Learning System by December 2002 as originally envisaged. All trusts were linked to the system by 31 December 2004. By August 2005, at least 35 trusts still had not submitted any data to the National Reporting and Learning System. c Most trusts pointed to specific improvements derived from lessons learnt from their local incident reporting systems, but these are still not widely promulgated, either within or between trusts. The National Patient Safety Agency has provided only limited feedback to trusts of evidence-based solutions or actions derived from the national reporting system. It published its first feedback report from the Patient Safety Observatory in July 2005