A New Rational Algorithm for View Updating in Relational Databases

The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. In order to apply the rationality result of belief dynamics theory to various practical problems, it should be generalized in two respects: first it should allow a certain part of belief to be declared as immutable; and second, the belief state need not be deductively closed. Such a generalization of belief dynamics, referred to as base dynamics, is presented in this paper, along with the concept of a generalized revision algorithm for knowledge bases (Horn or Horn logic with stratified negation). We show that knowledge base dynamics has an interesting connection with kernel change via hitting set and abduction. In this paper, we show how techniques from disjunctive logic programming can be used for efficient (deductive) database updates. The key idea is to transform the given database together with the update request into a disjunctive (datalog) logic program and apply disjunctive techniques (such as minimal model reasoning) to solve the original update problem. The approach extends and integrates standard techniques for efficient query answering and integrity checking. The generation of a hitting set is carried out through a hyper tableaux calculus and magic set that is focused on the goal of minimality.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1301.515

Reasoning of non- and pre-linguistic creatures: How much do the experiments tell us?

If a conclusion was reached that creatures without a language capability exhibit some form of a capability for logic, this would shed a new light on the relationship between logic, language, and thought. Recent experimental attempts to test whether some animals, as well as pre-linguistic human infants, are capable of exclusionary reasoning are taken to support exactly that conclusion. The paper discusses the analyses and conclusions of two such studies: Call’s (2004) two cups task, and Mody and Carey’s (2016) four cups task. My paper exposes hidden assumptions within these analyses, which enable the authors to settle on the explanation which assigns logical capabilities to the participants of the studies, as opposed to the explanations which do not. The paper then demonstrates that the competing explanations of the experimental results are theoretically underdeveloped, rendering them unclear in their predictions concerning the behavior of cognitive subjects, and thus difficult to distinguish by use of experiments. Additionally, it is questioned whether the explanations are rivals at all, i.e. whether they compete to explain the cognitive processes of the same level. The contribution of the paper is conceptual. Its aim is to clear up the concepts involved in these analyses, in order to avoid oversimplified or premature conclusions about the cognitive abilities of pre- and non-linguistic creatures. It is also meant to show that the theoretical space surrounding the issues involved might be much more diverse and unknown than many of these studies imply