Asymmetry and Discrimination in Internet Peering Evidence from the LINX

Is the quality of interconnection between Internet operators affected by their asymmetry? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset based on Internet routing policies, and study the interconnection decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) members of the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our results show that interconnection quality degradation can be significantly explained by asymmetry between providers. We also show that Competition Authorities should focus more on the role played by the “centrality of an operatorâ€, rather than on its market share.Internet Peering, Two-sided Markets, Network Industries, Antitrust, Net Neutrality

OutFlank Routing: Increasing Throughput in Toroidal Interconnection Networks

We present a new, deadlock-free, routing scheme for toroidal interconnection networks, called OutFlank Routing (OFR). OFR is an adaptive strategy which exploits non-minimal links, both in the source and in the destination nodes. When minimal links are congested, OFR deroutes packets to carefully chosen intermediate destinations, in order to obtain travel paths which are only an additive constant longer than the shortest ones. Since routing performance is very sensitive to changes in the traffic model or in the router parameters, an accurate discrete-event simulator of the toroidal network has been developed to empirically validate OFR, by comparing it against other relevant routing strategies, over a range of typical real-world traffic patterns. On the 16x16x16 (4096 nodes) simulated network OFR exhibits improvements of the maximum sustained throughput between 14% and 114%, with respect to Adaptive Bubble Routing.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figures, to be presented at ICPADS 201

‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX

‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX Abstract: Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size” enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality” induces quality degradation, hence “unfairer” interconnection conditions

The State of Network Neutrality Regulation

The Network Neutrality (NN) debate refers to the battle over the design of a regulatory framework for preserving the Internet as a public network and open innovation platform. Fueled by concerns that broadband access service providers might abuse network management to discriminate against third party providers (e.g., content or application providers), policymakers have struggled with designing rules that would protect the Internet from unreasonable network management practices. In this article, we provide an overview of the history of the debate in the U.S. and the EU and highlight the challenges that will confront network engineers designing and operating networks as the debate continues to evolve.BMBF, 16DII111, Verbundprojekt: Weizenbaum-Institut für die vernetzte Gesellschaft - Das Deutsche Internet-Institut; Teilvorhaben: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)EC/H2020/679158/EU/Resolving the Tussle in the Internet: Mapping, Architecture, and Policy Making/ResolutioNe

On the Area of Hypercube Layouts

This paper precisely analyzes the wire density and required area in standard layout styles for the hypercube. The most natural, regular layout of a hypercube of N^2 nodes in the plane, in a N x N grid arrangement, uses floor(2N/3)+1 horizontal wiring tracks for each row of nodes. (The number of tracks per row can be reduced by 1 with a less regular design.) This paper also gives a simple formula for the wire density at any cut position and a full characterization of all places where the wire density is maximized (which does not occur at the bisection).Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures, LaTe