Buyback and return policies for a book publishing firm = Egy könyvkiadó vállalat visszavásárlási stratégiája

A dolgozat célja egy vállalati gyakorlatból származó eset elemzése. Egy könyvkiadót tekintünk. A kiadó kapcsolatban van kis- és nagykereskedőkkel, valamint a fogyasztók egy csoportjával is vannak kapcsolatai. A könyvkiadók projekt rendszerben működnek. A kiadó azzal a problémával szembesül, hogy hogyan ossza el egy frissen kiadott és nyomtatott könyv példányszámait a kis- és nagykereskedők között, valamint mekkora példányszámot tároljon maga a fogyasztók közvetlen kielégítésére. A kiadóról feltételezzük, hogy visszavásárlási szerződése van a kereskedőkkel. A könyv iránti kereslet nem ismert, de becsülhető. A kis- és nagykereskedők maximalizálják a nyereségüket. = The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project industry. The publisher faces with the problem how to allocate the stocks of a given, newly published book to the wholesaler and retailer, and to hold some copies to satisfy the customers direct from the publisher. The publisher has a buyback option. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be estimated. The wholesaler / retailer maximize the profits. The problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not identical demand distribution. The model can be transformed in a game theory problem. It is assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution

On how the acquisition of recoverable parts influences the profitability of spare parts management for durables

In the management of spare parts for durables OEMs often face a sharp decline in sales of spare parts when the warranty period of their products ends. One reason for this effect is given by the high profitability of the after sales market which attracts competitors. If the competitors’ main sourcing option consists of repairing used or broken parts, an acquisition of those parts by the OEM might lower competition and increase sales. The purpose of this paper is to provide a case-based framework to offer insights on the opportunity of recovering parts. We consider a two-stage supply chain, where independent repair shops are responsible for handling the repair process. There are two options to meet spare parts demand: repair shops may replace the part with a new one (ordered from the OEM) or they may use a part that they repaired before. While repair shops achieve a larger profit by repairing parts, the OEM would prefer the use of new parts. However, he has no control on demand which might be obtained through buyback of broken parts. Furthermore, the OEM could recover these parts on a higher level, thus reducing production/procurement of new parts. The main contribution of this paper is to elaborate the important effects of recoverable items acquisition on spare parts demand by using a simple deterministic framework thus outlining the impact of different parameters on the profitability of spare parts management.Closed-Loop Supply Chains, Spare Parts, Competition in Product Recovery, Case Study

Evaluating debt repurchases: what are the alternative to investment?

In this paper a general model of debt repurchases is built which reconciles most of the points raised in the literature on debt buybacks. It is shown that results previously found in the literature can be obtained from this general model and are strongly dependant on assumptions made on its parameters. The condition that determines whether or not buybacks are an attractive solution from the point of the debtor nations is derived. Additionally it is shown that if there are other assets safer than investment, a debt buyback will always lead to an increase in investment and a reduction in the holdings of such other assets. This result holds independently of the source of the resources used for the buyback, unlike previous suggestions. With a buyback out of current resources, optimal reserves levels fall by more than what is used for the buyback, releasing extra resources for investment purposes, while current consumption does not fall. (JEL F34

Supply Chain Coordination Model with Retailerfs Risk Attitudes

One of the major concerns in supply chain management is the coordination among various members of a supply chain comprising suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers and retailers. We consider a newsvendor model in a two level supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. In this model, the retailer must order the item from the supplier prior to the selling season. Due to the short selling season and long replenishment lead time, the retailer is unable to reorder the item by using actual sales data generated from the early part of the season. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the eect of the attitudes toward risk of the members on the coordination in a supply chain. Using the risk averse utility functions, we show that, the risk averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than or equal to that of a risk neutral one, when the goodwill penalty cost is ignored. We also explore the relationship between the retailer's order quantity and the risk aversion function in a special case.Supply chain management, Newsvendor model, Risk aversion.

The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief—over 50 percent of 2012 GDP—with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents—particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors—that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult

Default Costs, Willingness to Pay and Sovereign Debt Buybacks

The arguments put forward by Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991) against sovereign debt buybacks are re-examined in a willingness-to-pay framework. This paper argues that the Bulow-Rogoff framework treats default by a debtor as an event with no dead-weight loss, and, as such, underestimates the potential gains from a buyback. The willingness-to- pay framework allows dead-weight costs of default to be introduced in a consistent and simple fashion into the buybacks calculus. Two versions of this framework are considered. First, a model in which the default costs induce an all-or-nothing default decision is analysed. In this case, an ambiguous result is derived in which the variability of the debtor’s income determines whether (small) buybacks are beneficial to the debtor, even though expected total transfers to the creditor increase, consistent with Bulow-Rogoff. In a second version, default costs are modelled so as to induce at most a partial default. This model corresponds most closely, in terms of the repayment behaviour of the sovereign debtor, to the models used by Bulow and Rogoff. It is shown that small buybacks are always beneficial to the debtor in this case. The second version is extended to include an investment opportunity. Only if the country has sufficiently scarce resources when the investment can be made, will a buyback be harmful to the interests of the debtor.Sovereign Debt Buybacks Sanctions Willingness to Pay

Changes in the value of the Southeast Alaska salmon purse seine limited entry permits following two permit buy back programs

Master's Project (M.S.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2014The Southeast Alaska salmon purse seine fishery (S01A) is an Alaska state waters limited entry fishery. When initially limited by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission in 1975, 419 permanent permits were issued. As salmon prices dropped in the late 1990s, current and expected future revenues also dropped leading to a decline in the market value of permit. This led permitees to look at different ways to improve their economic position. Reduction of permit numbers through the buyback and permanent retirement of some permits emerged as a preferred option for the S01A fishery; it was motivated as the best means to improve economic conditions in the fishery. After a very long road of regulatory changes at the state and federal level, 35 permits were bought and retired in 2008 using funds provided under a federal grant. A second buyback in 2012, based on a federally backed fishery reduction loan led to the retirement of 65 additional permits. Basic economic principles suggest that resulting decrease in supply of limited entry permits would lead to an increase in the market value of remaining permits. An important policy question is: whether the increased value to permitees is sufficient to offset the cost to taxpayers of financing the buyback. However, conducting that cost-benefit assessment is made difficult because of unrelated but concomitant changes in exvessel prices and catch volumes. During the same time that permits were being removed through the buyback, the exvessel value of salmon increased as did the volume of Southeast Alaska salmon harvests, per-vessel average exvessel gross earnings, and the market value of S01A permits. Econometric analyses based on Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) time series data on S01A permit values, estimated gross earnings, and salmon prices indicate that the buybacks led to statistically significant increases in the asset value of S01A LEPs. In light of the program's stated goals, the buyback was a qualified success in increasing the asset value of S01A permits and removing latent fishing capacity from returning to the fishery as exvessel prices increased. The buyback did not change the fundamental conditions that precondition the Alaska salmon LEP program to systematic vulnerabilities inherent in a management system that does not counter the pernicious race for fish motivations of participants

Voluntary choices in concerted deals : mechanics and attributes of the menu approach

When sovereign debt trades at a discount on secondary markets, a market buyback increases the secondary market price. The wealth of private creditors increases because part of the funds used in the repurchase is a transfer payment to them. This transfer of resources can be mitigated by imposing a capital gains tax on the remaining debt. The authors show how this can be achieved by including exit and new money options in a menu of options from which creditors can freely choose. The menu approach imposes an implicit tax on the capital gains on the remaining debt by requiring lenders that do not exit to extend new loans in proportion to the debt they retain. The menu approach does not require that particular choices from the menu be assigned to each lender. Instead, it implements debt reduction through a price system, allowing different creditors to select different portfolios in equilibrium from a common set of options. The authors illustrate some of their results by analyzing the recent Mexican debt agreement. They show how to read through the complex financial acrobatics to estimate the net debt reduction. Funds provided by international financial institutions benefited both Mexico and its creditors. Mexico directly retained 62 percent of these resources and the banks 34 percent.Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Strategic Debt Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation