A Comparative Study of Pairwise Learning Methods based on Kernel Ridge Regression

Many machine learning problems can be formulated as predicting labels for a pair of objects. Problems of that kind are often referred to as pairwise learning, dyadic prediction or network inference problems. During the last decade kernel methods have played a dominant role in pairwise learning. They still obtain a state-of-the-art predictive performance, but a theoretical analysis of their behavior has been underexplored in the machine learning literature. In this work we review and unify existing kernel-based algorithms that are commonly used in different pairwise learning settings, ranging from matrix filtering to zero-shot learning. To this end, we focus on closed-form efficient instantiations of Kronecker kernel ridge regression. We show that independent task kernel ridge regression, two-step kernel ridge regression and a linear matrix filter arise naturally as a special case of Kronecker kernel ridge regression, implying that all these methods implicitly minimize a squared loss. In addition, we analyze universality, consistency and spectral filtering properties. Our theoretical results provide valuable insights in assessing the advantages and limitations of existing pairwise learning methods.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1606.0427

Presumptuous aim attribution, conformity, and the ethics of artificial social cognition

Imagine you are casually browsing an online bookstore, looking for an interesting novel. Suppose the store predicts you will want to buy a particular novel: the one most chosen by people of your same age, gender, location, and occupational status. The store recommends the book, it appeals to you, and so you choose it. Central to this scenario is an automated prediction of what you desire. This article raises moral concerns about such predictions. More generally, this article examines the ethics of artificial social cognition—the ethical dimensions of attribution of mental states to humans by artificial systems. The focus is presumptuous aim attributions, which are defined here as aim attributions based crucially on the premise that the person in question will have aims like superficially similar people. Several everyday examples demonstrate that this sort of presumptuousness is already a familiar moral concern. The scope of this moral concern is extended by new technologies. In particular, recommender systems based on collaborative filtering are now commonly used to automatically recommend products and information to humans. Examination of these systems demonstrates that they naturally attribute aims presumptuously. This article presents two reservations about the widespread adoption of such systems. First, the severity of our antecedent moral concern about presumptuousness increases when aim attribution processes are automated and accelerated. Second, a foreseeable consequence of reliance on these systems is an unwarranted inducement of interpersonal conformity