1,179 research outputs found
Prospective Overruling and the Revival of ‘Unconstitutional\u27 Statutes
The Supreme Court\u27s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey reshaped the law of abortion in this country. The Court overturned two of its previous decisions invalidating state restrictions on abortions, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and it abandoned the trimester analytic framework established in Roe v. Wade. At the time Casey was handed down, twenty states had restrictive abortion statutes on the books that were in conflict with Akron or Thornburgh and which were unenforced. In six of these states, courts had held the statutes unconstitutional. Almost as soon as the Casey ruling was announced, the campaign to secure enforcement of these restrictions began.
Are these statutes good law, despite the fact that they were once in conflict with governing Supreme Court precedent (and in some cases had been judicially determined to violate women\u27s constitutional rights)? Alternatively, will they have to be re-enacted by the legislature to be enforceable? These questions highlight the revival issue. The revival issue arises when a court overrules a prior decision in which it had held a statute unconstitutional. (We will throughout this article refer to the first decision as the invalidating decision, and to the second decision as the overruling decision. ) Should the enforceability of a statute passed prior to the overruling decision be determined by reference to the invalidating decision--in which case the statute would have to be repassed to be in effect--or by reference to the overruling decision--in which case the statute would not have to be repassed? In other words, does the overruling decision automatically revive a previously unenforceable statute?
The way in which the revival issue is resolved will thus determine whether, in light of Casey, previously unenforced statutes became enforceable without the need for any post-Casey legislative action. In addition to affecting what kind of abortion regulations are in effect in twenty states in the immediate wake of Casey, this determination has profound consequences for the kind of abortion regulations that will be in effect in these states in the future. Such long-term consequences reflect the fact that our governmental system is not one of pure majoritarianism and that the burden of inertia in our legislative process is heavy: as we will discuss, statutes on the books can stay on the books even if a current majority no longer desires them; in contrast, proposed statutes need supermajoritarian support to secure passage. Therefore, the starting point for future legislative action--such as whether pre-Casey abortion regulations are enforceable--influences the legislative action that in fact develops
When No Law is Better than a Good Law
This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no securities law may be better than a good securities law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific securities law - the law prohibiting insider trading - may satisfy these conditions. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when some countries enact an insider trading law, but do not enforce it.insider trading, cost of capital, emerging markets, securities law, enforcement, International Development, G15, G18, K22, K42,
When No Law is Better than a Good Law
This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no security law may be better than a good security law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific security law - the law prohibiting insider trading - may satisfy these conditions, which implies that our theory predicts that it is sometimes better not to have an insider trading law than to have an insider trading law but not enforce it. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We revisit the panel data set assembled by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who showed that enforcement, not the mere existence, of insider trading laws reduced the cost of equity in a country. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when a country introduces an insider trading law, but does not enforce it.
Imperfect Contract Enforcement
We model imperfect contract enforcement when repudiators and their victims default to spot trading. The interaction between the contract and spot markets under improved enforcement can exacerbate repudiation and reduce contract execution, harming all traders. Improved contract execution benefits traders on the excess side of the spot market by attracting potential counter-parties, but harms them by impeding their exit from contracts found to be unfavorable. Multiple equilibria and multiple optima are possible, with anarchy a local optimum, perfect enforcement a local minimum and imperfect enforcement a global optimum. LDCs exhibit parameter combinations such that imperfect enforcement is optimal from their side of international markets. The model thus rationalizes the internationally varying patterns of imperfect enforceability observable in survey data.
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees
Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One would prefer a
coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but
often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive
search for the optimal one. But then, can the coalition structure found via a
partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum? We show that
none of the previous coalition structure generation algorithms can establish
any bound because they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show
necessary for establishing a bound. We present an algorithm that establishes a
tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show that any other
algorithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to
be searched approaches zero as the number of agents grows. If additional time
remains, our anytime algorithm searches further, and establishes a
progressively lower tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node
drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm lowers the bound rapidly
early on, and exhibits diminishing returns to computation. It also drastically
outperforms its obvious contenders. Finally, we show how to distribute the
desired search across self-interested manipulative agents
The Business Case for Complying With Bribery Laws
This article addresses a gap in the common understanding of corruption. The rules regarding corruption at both the macro- and the micro-level are well known, as are the consequences at the macro-level. The consequences at the micro-level, however, particularly for business firms, are not well understood. With respect to rules, at both the macro-and micro-levels the rules are very clear: do not pay bribes. At the macro-level the consequences are well known: corruption has devastating effects on societies and economies. Although not often referred to in most corruption literature, the consequences at the micro-level can be discussed. This article begins with the direct and indirect costs imposed on firms that pay bribes. Firms that pay bribes spend more time and money dealing with governments, and bear the costs of distortions of internal resources. The article then examines the negative effects of corruption on existing relationships within the firm and potential relationships with parties outside of the firm. Finally, the article examines potential criminal and civil liability that a firm exposes itself to when it pays bribes. The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit the firm
Exploring Customers\u27 Reactions to Enforcement of Fine Print
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of enforcement and/or unenforcement of “Fine Print” on consumers’ reactions. “Fine Print” is defined as both the explicit and implicit conditions under which the product/service contract waives firm responsibility and accountability toward unsuccessful product/service experience, and outcome or lack of customer satisfaction with the same. Study 1 examined the interaction effects between “Fine Print” and “Company Size” on trust, satisfaction, repurchase intention, switching intentions, and word-of-mouth in a retailer context. The results revealed significant interaction effects between “Fine Print” and “Company Size” for satisfaction and repurchase intention, where satisfaction and repurchase intention are higher in case of the large and national company when “Fine Print” is unenforced, compared to when “Fine Print” is enforced. Conversely, satisfaction and repurchase intention are higher in case of small and local company when “Fine Print” is enforced, compared to when “Fine Print” is unenforced.
Study 2 replicated the experimental design of Study 1 to examine the effect of delight as a mediator in a retailer context and found significant indirect effects of delight when fine print is enforced/unenforced.
Study 3 examined the interaction effects between “Fine Print” and “Company Size” in an airline context. Significant two-way interaction effects between “Fine Print” and “Frontline Employee Explanation” were observed for negative word-of-mouth, where negative word-of-mouth was higher when fine print was enforced, and also when frontline employee did not explain the terms and conditions to consumers. Whereas, negative word-of-mouth was higher when fine print was unenforced, and also when frontline employee explained the terms and conditions to consumers.
Study 4 examined the interaction effects between “Fine Print” and “Company Size” on trust, satisfaction, repurchase intention, switching intentions, and word-of-mouth, as well as examined the role of delight as a mediator in a banking context. Significant two-way interaction effects between “Fine Print” and “Frontline Employee Competency” and between “Frontline Employee Sympathy” and “Frontline Employee Competency” were observed for switching intentions and word-of-mouth respectively. The mediating effects of delight were also significant for “Fine Print” and “Frontline Employee Sympathy”
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