64 research outputs found
Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We
prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies
Three essays on game theory
The main text of this thesis is divided into three chapters. The three
papers are contributions to the literature on equilibrium refinements in noncooperative
game theory. Each chapter can be read independently of the
rest.
Chapter 2 characterizes the class of finite extensive forms for which the
sets of Subgame Perfect and Sequential equilibrium strategy profiles coincide
for any possible payoff function. In addition, it identifies the class of
finite extensive forms for which the outcomes induced by these two solution
concepts coincide, and study the implications of our results for perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Chapter 3 shows that in games with population uncertainty some perfect
equilibria are in dominated strategies. It is proved that every Poisson game
has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.
Chapter 4 shows that the set of probability distributions over networks
induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game proposed by
Myerson (1991) is finite for a generic assignment of payoffs to networks.
The same result can be extended to several variations of the game found in
the literature.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________El texto de esta tesis estĂĄ dividido en tres capĂtulos. Cada uno de ellos es
una contribuciĂłn a la literatura de los refinamientos de equilibrio en juegos
no cooperativos. Cada capĂtulo se puede leer de manera independiente.
El capĂtulo 2 caracteriza la clase de formas extensivas finitas para las
que los conjuntos de estrategias de equilibrio para el equilibrio perfecto
en subjuegos y el equilibrio secuencial coinciden para cualquier funciĂłn
de pagos. AdemĂĄs, identifica la clase de formas extensivas finitas para las
que los conjuntos de resultados derivados de ambos conceptos de equilibrio
coinciden, y estudia las implicaciones que estos resultados tienen en cuanto
al equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos.
El capĂtulo 3 muestra que en juegos con incertidumbre acerca del nĂșmero
de jugadores algunos equilibrios perfectos pueden estar dominados y
demostramos que todo juego de Poisson tiene al menos un equilibrio perfecto
en estrategias no dominadas.
El capĂtulo 4 se demuestra que el conjunto de distribuciones de probabilidad
sobre redes inducidas por equilibrios de Nash del juego de formaciĂłn
de redes propuesto por Myerson (1991) es finito para toda asignación genérica
de pagos a redes. Este mismo resultado se puede extender a varias
versiones del juego que se pueden encontrar en la literatura
Maximum Sustainable Government Debt in the Overlapping Generations Model.
The theoretical determinants of maximum sustainable government debt are investigated using Diamond's overlapping-generations model. A level of debt is defined to be 'sustainable' f a steady state with non-degenerate values of economic variables exists. We show that a maximum sustainable level of debt almost always exists. Most interestingly, it normally occurs at a 'catastrophe' ather than a 'degeneracy' , i.e. where variables such as capital and consumption are in the interiors, rather than at the limits, of their economically meaningful ranges. This means that if debt is increased step by step, the economy may suddenly collapse without obvious warning.GOVERNMENT DEBT ; OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
Sincere Scoring Rules
Approval Voting is shown to be the unique scoring rule that leads strategic voters to sincere behavior of three candidates elections in Poisson Games. However, Approval Voting can lead to insincere behavior in elections with more than three candidates.Sincerity, Approval Voting, Scoring rules, Poisson Games
When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives. When n is large, âalmost allâ games can be classified as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n > 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is sufficiently replicate
Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections
International audienceIf voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates
Collective Sampling: An Ex Ante Perspective
I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players determine when to
end sequential sampling via a collective choice rule. My analysis focuses on
the case of two players, but extends to many players. With two players,
collective stopping is determined either unilaterally or unanimously. I develop
a methodology to characterize equilibrium outcomes using an ex ante perspective
on posterior distributions. Under unilateral stopping, each player chooses a
mean-preserving contraction of the other's posterior distribution; under
unanimous stopping, they choose meanpreserving spreads. Equilibrium outcomes
can be determined via concavification. Players learn Pareto inefficiently: too
little under unilateral stopping, while too much under unanimous stopping;
these learning inefficiencies are amplified when players' preferences become
less aligned. I demonstrate the value of my methodological approach in three
applications: committee search, dynamic persuasion, and competition in
persuasion
Spectrum Leasing as an Incentive towards Uplink Macrocell and Femtocell Cooperation
The concept of femtocell access points underlaying existing communication
infrastructure has recently emerged as a key technology that can significantly
improve the coverage and performance of next-generation wireless networks. In
this paper, we propose a framework for macrocell-femtocell cooperation under a
closed access policy, in which a femtocell user may act as a relay for
macrocell users. In return, each cooperative macrocell user grants the
femtocell user a fraction of its superframe. We formulate a coalitional game
with macrocell and femtocell users being the players, which can take individual
and distributed decisions on whether to cooperate or not, while maximizing a
utility function that captures the cooperative gains, in terms of throughput
and delay.We show that the network can selforganize into a partition composed
of disjoint coalitions which constitutes the recursive core of the game
representing a key solution concept for coalition formation games in partition
form. Simulation results show that the proposed coalition formation algorithm
yields significant gains in terms of average rate per macrocell user, reaching
up to 239%, relative to the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the proposed
approach shows an improvement in terms of femtocell users' rate of up to 21%
when compared to the traditional closed access policy.Comment: 29 pages, 11 figures, accepted at the IEEE JSAC on Femtocell Network
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