Theory of Mind Impairments in Women With Cocaine Addiction

OBJECTIVE This study investigates the Theory of Mind performance of female cocaine-dependent users (CDUs) and possible associations between theory of mind performance and features of cocaine use. METHOD Sixty women controlled for age, education, individual income, and IQ participated in this study: 30 in the CDU group and 30 in the healthy control group. Participants were assessed for theory of mind with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), a test of understanding of first-order and second-order false beliefs, and the Hinting task. Drug use parameters, clinical symptoms, and neuropsychological functioning were also assessed. RESULTS Analyses of covariance indicated Theory of Mind impairments in negative mental states within the RMET and second-order false-belief understanding of Theory of Mind stories. In addition, Theory of Mind impairment was associated with drug use characteristics, including craving and number of hospitalizations. CONCLUSIONS High-demand Theory of Mind is suggested to be impaired in CDU women, and the deficits appear to be related to drug addiction severity. We found associations between Theory of Mind deficits and worse clinical and social outcomes

Theory of mind development and executive functioning in elementary school children

The following study explored the role of verbal ability and executive functioning in theory of mind understanding in elementary school children. Scores on measures of language comprehension, verbal ability (sentence memory, and forward digit span), matrix completion, executive functioning (backward digit span), and second-order theory of mind tasks were obtained. Partial correlations of the measures controlling for age revealed verbal ability to be significantly correlated with theory of mind comprehension. A regression analysis demonstrated that auditory language comprehension was the only variable, in addition to age, that explained unique variance in performance on a recursive thinking task. Possible explanations are explored and future directions are recommended

Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind

I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary function of a theory of mind. I further argue that in order to be motivated to offer explanations of behavior, one must have at least an implicit understanding of appropriate behavior, which implies at least an implicit understanding of norms. The second argument looks at three cases of nonhuman animal societies that appear to operate within a system of norms. While there is no evidence that any species other than humans have a theory of mind, there is evidence that other species have sensitivity to the normative. Finally, I propose an explanation for the priority of norms over a theory of mind: given an understanding of norms in a society, and the ability to recognize and sanction violations, there developed a need to understand actions that violated the norms, and such explanations could only be given in terms of a person’s reasons. There is a significant benefit to being able to explain behavior that violates norms, because explanations of the right sort can also serve to justify behavior

Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind

I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary function of a theory of mind. I further argue that in order to be motivated to offer explanations of behavior, one must have at least an implicit understanding of appropriate behavior, which implies at least an implicit understanding of norms. The second argument looks at three cases of nonhuman animal societies that appear to operate within a system of norms. While there is no evidence that any species other than humans have a theory of mind, there is evidence that other species have sensitivity to the normative. Finally, I propose an explanation for the priority of norms over a theory of mind: given an understanding of norms in a society, and the ability to recognize and sanction violations, there developed a need to understand actions that violated the norms, and such explanations could only be given in terms of a person’s reasons. There is a significant benefit to being able to explain behavior that violates norms, because explanations of the right sort can also serve to justify behavior

Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind

I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary function of a theory of mind. I further argue that in order to be motivated to offer explanations of behavior, one must have at least an implicit understanding of appropriate behavior, which implies at least an implicit understanding of norms. The second argument looks at three cases of nonhuman animal societies that appear to operate within a system of norms. While there is no evidence that any species other than humans have a theory of mind, there is evidence that other species have sensitivity to the normative. Finally, I propose an explanation for the priority of norms over a theory of mind: given an understanding of norms in a society, and the ability to recognize and sanction violations, there developed a need to understand actions that violated the norms, and such explanations could only be given in terms of a person’s reasons. There is a significant benefit to being able to explain behavior that violates norms, because explanations of the right sort can also serve to justify behavior

HI-TOM: A Benchmark for Evaluating Higher-Order Theory of Mind Reasoning in Large Language Models

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to reason about one's own and others' mental states. ToM plays a critical role in the development of intelligence, language understanding, and cognitive processes. While previous work has primarily focused on first and second-order ToM, we explore higher-order ToM, which involves recursive reasoning on others' beliefs. We introduce HI-TOM, a Higher Order Theory of Mind benchmark. Our experimental evaluation using various Large Language Models (LLMs) indicates a decline in performance on higher-order ToM tasks, demonstrating the limitations of current LLMs. We conduct a thorough analysis of different failure cases of LLMs, and share our thoughts on the implications of our findings on the future of NLP.Comment: Accepted at Findings of EMNLP 202

Predicting the theory of mind precursors based on parenting styles and language skills in preschool children

Objective The aim of this study was to examine the association between language skills and parenting styles and three levels of theory of mind in Iranian preschool children. Materials & Methods The sample consisted of 98 preschool Iranian children (aged 5-6) from Karaj province, Iran. While theory of mind test and test of language development (Told-p: 4) were administrated with children, their mothers were asked to answer a parenting style questionnaire. Results Multivariate regression analysis showed a differential relationship between three levels of theory of mind, language skills and parenting styles. The results indicated that the theory of mind were predicted by most of the language skills and permissiveness parenting styles (P < 0. 01). False belief understanding was predicted only by morphological completion (p < 0.01). In addition, word articulation and authoritative parenting style were observed to predict ability to understand second order theory of mind (R2 = 28%). Conclusion The pattern of relationships between language and theory of mind in Persian language seems similar to previous studies in other languages. Language may play a dual role in theory of mind, such that; whereas for the first (basic) and the third (advanced) levels of theory of mind, language skills (such as relational vocabulary, morphological completion and word articulation) are among of those important prerequisites, for the medium level (false belief), syntactical skills are mostly important. In addition, it seems that authoritative parenting styles could facilitate the development of higher-order abilities related to theory of mind. &nbsp

THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: IS THERE A NEED FOR BETTER TESTS OF WHAT THEY KNOW?

This research looked at the ability of children with autism to understand theory of mind. This is the ability to attribute mental states (e.g. believing, thinking, knowing etc.) to oneself and to others. The main aim of the study was to provide evidence, contrary to a large body of previous research, that individuals with autism can exhibit a theory of mind, when the standard tests used in the past are simplified for this population. A further aim of the study was to show that language ability is significant in terms of theory of mind task performance. It was hypothesised, because of the nature of the theory of mind tasks, that matching participants in terms of their understanding of grammar, rather than single word understanding (as in past research), would be more appropriate. Three groups took part in the study; autistic, learning disabled and normally developing children. The learning disabled and normally developing participants were selected to match the subjects with autism, in terms of receptive verbal age, on either the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) or the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG) or both. All the participants were given two first order theory of mind tasks; the standard 'Sally-Anne' task, which has been used in past research, and a simplified cartoon version of this task designed by the author. These first order tasks test the ability to consider another person's thoughts about an objective event. Those participants who passed one of the first order tasks were then given three second order theory of mind tasks. These test the ability to consider another person's thoughts about a third person's thoughts regarding an objective event. The second order tasks consisted of the standard 'Ice-Cream Man task' (used in past research), Sullivan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusberg's (1994) simplified 'Puppy task' and a simplified cartoon version of the task designed by the author. A significant difference in performance was found between the three participant groups (matched on the BPVS) on the standard first order task, but not on the simplified first order task. A significant difference in performance was found between the participant groups on the standard Ice-Cream Man task and the Puppy task, when matched on the BPVS, but not when matched on the TROG. In addition no significant difference in performance was found between the autistic and learning disabled participants on any of the theory of mind tasks. These findings are discussed in relation to other explanations of autism such as the salient object hypothesis and executive function

Theory of mind and communication in autism

Recent work investigating the biological and cognitive nature of autism is reviewed. The hypothesis that autistic individuals suffer from a specific impairment in theory of mind, and the relevance of this notion to the diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome, is discussed. Theory of mind explanations of autism must account for the minority of autistic subjects who pass false belief tasks. Two possible accounts are considered; delay versus 'hacking'. A battery of theory of mind tasks was given to able autistic subjects, and to mentally handicapped and young normal controls. The results suggested the existence of subgroups: while some autistic subjects performed inconsistently (perhaps using task-specific strategies), others performed consistently well at first-order theory of mind tasks, and some passed an array of second-order tasks. Relevance theory suggests that understanding mental states is vital in communication. Communication tasks were therefore given, to explore the theory of mind abilities of the autistic subjects. Relevance theory predicted that subjects unable to attribute mental states would show literal understanding, subjects with first-order theory of mind would comprehend metaphor, but second-order theory of mind would be necessary to understand irony. These predictions were tested and confirmed with autistic subjects and normal children. The theory of mind hypothesis cannot explain the persistent real-life handicaps of autistics who understand mental states, nor account for the nonsocial peculiarities seen in autism. A deficit in central coherence is suggested as the source of these features. Results from a preliminary test of this hypothesis suggested that even autistic subjects who develop theory of mind ability are impaired at extracting context-dependent meaning. The implications of these findings for the diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome, the relations between the social and nonsocial impairments, and suggestions for further research are discussed

Expressing Motivations By Facilitating Other’s Inverse Reinforcement Learning

It is often necessary to understand each other’s motivations in order to cooperate. Reaching such a mutual understanding requires two abilities: to build models of other’s motivations in order to understand them, and to build a model of “my” motivations perceived by others in order to be understood. Having a self-image seen by others requires two recursive orders of modeling, known in psychology as the first and second orders of theory of mind. In this paper, we present a second-order theory of mind cognitive architecture that aims to facilitate mutual understanding in multi-agent scenarios. We study different conditions of empathy and gratitude leading to irrational cooperation in iterated prisoner’s dilemma