Global Risks 2015, 10th Edition.

The 2015 edition of the Global Risks report completes a decade of highlighting the most significant long-term risks worldwide, drawing on the perspectives of experts and global decision-makers. Over that time, analysis has moved from risk identification to thinking through risk interconnections and the potentially cascading effects that result. Taking this effort one step further, this year's report underscores potential causes as well as solutions to global risks. Not only do we set out a view on 28 global risks in the report's traditional categories (economic, environmental, societal, geopolitical and technological) but also we consider the drivers of those risks in the form of 13 trends. In addition, we have selected initiatives for addressing significant challenges, which we hope will inspire collaboration among business, government and civil society communitie

Synopsis of global scenario and forecasting surveys scenarios in risk habitat megacity (RHM)

The main objective of the paper is to provide a synopsis of global scenario and forecasting surveys. First, the paper will give an overview on existing global scenario and forecasting surveys and their specific scenario philosophies and storylines. Second, the major driving forces that shape and characterise the different scenarios will be identified. The scenario analysis has been provided for the research project Risk Habitat Megacity (HRM) that aims at developing strategies for sustainable development in megacities and urban agglomerations. The analysis of international scenario surveys is an essential component within RHM. The scenario analysis will be the basis and source for the development of own RHM-framework scenarios and for defining specific driving forces of change.scenarios, megacities, risk habitat

The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th Edition

Now in its 11th edition, The Global Risks Report 2016 draws attention to ways that global risks could evolve and interact in the next decade. The year 2016 marks a forceful departure from past findings, as the risks about which the Report has been warning over the past decade are starting to manifest themselves in new, sometimes unexpected ways and harm people, institutions and economies. Warming climate is likely to raise this year's temperature to 1° Celsius above the pre-industrial era, 60 million people, equivalent to the world's 24th largest country and largest number in recent history, are forcibly displaced, and crimes in cyberspace cost the global economy an estimated US$445 billion, higher than many economies' national incomes. In this context, the Reportcalls for action to build resilience – the "resilience imperative" – and identifies practical examples of how it could be done.The Report also steps back and explores how emerging global risks and major trends, such as climate change, the rise of cyber dependence and income and wealth disparity are impacting already-strained societies by highlighting three clusters of risks as Risks in Focus. As resilience building is helped by the ability to analyse global risks from the perspective of specific stakeholders, the Report also analyses the significance of global risks to the business community at a regional and country-level

Decisive but Forgotten: Germany's Missing Technological Zeitenwende

The digital technology transformation is a largely overlooked dimension of Zeitenwende. However, preserving national security, safeguarding core values enshrined in technology, ensuring access to critical technologies, and maintaining competitiveness need to be a policy priorities for Germany and Europe. All of these are integral elements of autonomy and sovereignty in a world increasingly characterized by great power rivalry. The looming policy decisions, however, will have divergent outcomes depending on the prevailing political paradigms: Europe needs to start with a proper analysis of the ­geopolitical context. At its heart is the question of whether Germany and Europe prepare for a zero polar, bipolar or multipolar world. Europe's ambition will largely depend on its assessment of the future international order. The general assessment needs to be followed by a technology-­specific understanding of interdependent ecosystems. Germany and Europe need to acknowledge that the challenges largely diverge. This requires identifying criticality, risks, and conditions of market success or failure in concrete technology ecosystems. Only from such an assessment can a proper policy toolbox be developed. Regardless of analysis, Germany and Europe need to sort out public and private interaction to fully capitalize on the private sector's innovation power, as these players could support overarching security priorities with innovative ­technology in the digital sphere

Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory

The ongoing Schmitt revival has extended Carl Schmitt's reach over the fields of international legal and political theory. Neo-Schmittians suggest that his international thought provides a new reading of the history of international law and order, which validates the explanatory power of his theoretical premises – the concept of the political, political decisionism, and concrete-order-thinking. Against this background, this article mounts a systematic reappraisal of Schmitt's international thought in a historical perspective. The argument is that his work requires re-contextualization as the intellectual product of an ultra-intense moment in Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction. It inscribed Hitler's ‘spatial revolution’ into a full-scale reinterpretation of Europe's geopolitical history, grounded in land appropriations, which legitimized Nazi Germany's wars of conquest. Consequently, Schmitt's elevation of the early modern nomos as the model for civilized warfare – the ‘golden age’ of international law – against which American legal universalism can be portrayed as degenerated, is conceptually and empirically flawed. Schmitt devised a politically motivated set of theoretical premises to provide a historical counter-narrative against liberal normativism, which generated defective history. The reconstruction of this history reveals the explanatory limits of his theoretical vocabulary – friend/enemy binary, sovereignty-as-exception, nomos/universalism – for past and present analytical purposes. Schmitt's defective analytics and problematic history compromise the standing of his work for purposes of international theory

DUAL-USE MATERIAL SCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES TRANSFER IN UKRAINE: PREMISES AND PRESENT CATCH-22

The object of effort is to assess the underpin premises of transfer of dual use materials science technologies appeared in Ukraine after the Independence and those developed until nowadays. It is also to shed a light on this issue and evaluate historical, technical, political, and mental barriers between technology supplier / recipient and future prospects and successful steps to be made to overcome those. The work puts a problem to scrutinize today’s and future materials science dual use technology transfer control regulations and all premises associated and leaving an imprint on the realities existing in Ukraine. First of all, it is important to study technology transfer issues and a vital role of those premises appeared in Ukraine otherwise one may chase a ghost while trying to understand how to put it correct in a right legal and political way to successfully resolve this matter since in this case none turnkey solutions ever exist. For example, central to a control regime debate is to discuss an evolution, or lack of the existing transparent legislation covering dual-use technologies, and a discussion on its orientation and scope. Does this really work and sound in practice, and if “yes” then to what extent? Second, at a time of fundamental change in nature and order of international relations, the wisdom of ad hoc control regimes must not escape scrutiny. Although experts are very much aware of these problems, future of control regulations remains still blurred and uncertain, so what are their potential implications for international state’s security? The research revealed that a reassessment of the problems surrounding dual use materials science technologies and today’s control regulations should be made – both in terms of their potential improvement and/or possible new universal multilateral agreements and transparency among states involved in technology transfer. This further argues a need for new international mechanisms to ensure the transfer of dual-use materials science technologies, while not powering proliferation opportunities for weapon systems. The results of this endeavor make a ground floor for further debates in terms of politics and export control in the field of transfer of intangible technologies

Internationalization and Financial Federalism: The United States and Germany at the Crossroads?

In this article, the authors examine some effects of economic internationalization on state structures, especially in regard to the distribution of power and authority within federalist systems. Using an institutional rational choice model, they analyze changes in financial regulation and market structures in Germany and the United States. The focus is on the financial realm because of its high degree of internationalization and because, in both countries, financial markets and regulation have historically exhibited federalist traits. The findings indicate that internationalization has led to significant convergence in financial market structures and regulation across the two countries and that in each case this convergence has been accompanied by centralization of financial regulatory authority. Although both the German type of cooperative federalism and the U.S. model of competitive federalism proved to be vulnerable to the growing international pressures, the two countries took different paths of change that reflected differences in domestic institutions. Thus, the authors conclude that convergence is, and will likely remain, of a limited nature

Sovereignty by Subtraction: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment

The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) represents a major step in the evolution of sovereignty, which includes the power of a nation-state to govern without external controls. A panelist at the 1998 Cornell International Law journal Symposium introduced the MAl as an example of multilateral sovereignty to achieve commonly held goals of global economic integration. This perspective posits that the MAl is an exercise in sovereignty by subtraction, aiming to limit governing power rather than promote its joint exercise. Its critics call the MAl a slow motion coup d\u27etat, a bill of rights for investors, a threat to sovereignty, and a corporate rule treaty, because it (1) empowers foreign investors to challenge the law-making authority of nation states and subnational governments, (2) is composed of a fifty-page text of fourteen investor-protection standards that exceed the scope of any existing agreement/ (3) and acts through an international forum with the power to award monetary damages against the offending government. U.S. negotiators counter that the MAl protects foreign investors from discrimination by giving them rights analogous to those they already enjoy under the U.S. Constitution. In addition, U.S. negotiators maintain that an agreement that poses significant limits on U.S. sovereignty is unacceptable. This article suggests a more modest analogy than a virtual coup d\u27etat. It simply seeks to explain that the MAl would have a greater impact on U.S. law making power than acknowledged by MAl supporters, who claim that it merely repeats domestic principles of non-discrimination. For example, the MAl aims to limit U.S. States\u27 traditional powers to discriminate. The first objective of this article is truth in advertising: the MAl would disrupt state and local lawmaking capacity. The capacity of cities, counties, and states to serve as our laboratories of democracy hangs in the balance. States act as successful laboratories for testing future national policy in virtually every sector of governance, including banking regulation, economic development, government purchasing, consumer protection, working conditions, health and medical insurance, and environmental law. The second objective is to bring some order to the MAl sovereignty debate. Previous writers have brought conceptual order to the comparison of state sovereignty and international law under NAFTA and the WTO agreements. This article extends the analysis to the MAl to (1) inform the bottom-up view of the MAl from the perspective of those who would lose power if it is implemented, and (2) shape positive policy options to maintain the constitutional balance between federalism and private investor protection

THE SEMANTICS OF GOVERNANCE. (The common thread running through corporate, public, and global governance.)

This paper argues that the semantics of governance illustrates connections and provides a unifying view from which to understand much better its natural branches: corporate, public and global governance. In this regard, governance is presented from the point of view of a distinctive field of learning and practice. Further, three levels of analysis are carried out to drive the subject home. Firstly, it highlights the extent of corporate governance within an institutional framework, and also gives heed to some performance measurement devices: the governance index, the comparativeeconomics approach, and the governance slack model. Secondly, it frames the notion of public governance while due regard is given to the World Bank’s methodology and the public governance wave of reforms in the 80s and 90s. Afterwards, the development goes further to handle the linkage among constituents, charters and representation, so as to later cope with the problems raised by accountability and reputational intermediaries. Thirdly, it addresses the semantics of global governance, country assessments and corporate governance in global settings.Corporate Governance, Public Governance, Global Governance