5 research outputs found
Devils in the Clouds: An Evolutionary Study of Telnet Bot Loaders
One of the innovations brought by Mirai and its derived malware is the
adoption of self-contained loaders for infecting IoT devices and recruiting
them in botnets. Functionally decoupled from other botnet components and not
embedded in the payload, loaders cannot be analysed using conventional
approaches that rely on honeypots for capturing samples. Different approaches
are necessary for studying the loaders evolution and defining a genealogy. To
address the insufficient knowledge about loaders' lineage in existing studies,
in this paper, we propose a semantic-aware method to measure, categorize, and
compare different loader servers, with the goal of highlighting their
evolution, independent from the payload evolution. Leveraging behavior-based
metrics, we cluster the discovered loaders and define eight families to
determine the genealogy and draw a homology map. Our study shows that the
source code of Mirai is evolving and spawning new botnets with new
capabilities, both on the client side and the server side. In turn, shedding
light on the infection loaders can help the cybersecurity community to improve
detection and prevention tools.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures, ICC 2023. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:2206.0038
Securing emerging IoT systems through systematic analysis and design
The Internet of Things (IoT) is growing very rapidly. A variety of IoT systems have been developed and employed in many domains such as smart home, smart city and industrial control, providing great benefits to our everyday lives. However, as IoT becomes increasingly prevalent and complicated, it is also introducing new attack surfaces and security challenges. We are seeing numerous IoT attacks exploiting the vulnerabilities in IoT systems everyday.
Security vulnerabilities may manifest at different layers of the IoT stack. There is no single security solution that can work for the whole ecosystem. In this dissertation, we explore the limitations of emerging IoT systems at different layers and develop techniques and systems to make them more secure. More specifically, we focus on three of the most important layers: the user rule layer, the application layer and the device layer. First, on the user rule layer, we characterize the potential vulnerabilities introduced by the interaction of user-defined automation rules. We introduce iRuler, a static analysis system that uses model checking to detect inter-rule vulnerabilities that exist within trigger-action platforms such as IFTTT in an IoT deployment. Second, on the application layer, we design and build ProvThings, a system that instruments IoT apps to generate data provenance that provides a holistic explanation of system activities, including malicious behaviors. Lastly, on the device layer, we develop ProvDetector and SplitBrain to detect malicious processes using kernel-level provenance tracking and analysis. ProvDetector is a centralized approach that collects all the audit data from the clients and performs detection on the server. SplitBrain extends ProvDetector with collaborative learning, where the clients collaboratively build the detection model and performs detection on the client device
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Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things
Today's Internet connects billions of physical devices. These devices are often immature and insecure, and share common vulnerabilities. The predominant form of attacks relies on recent advances in Internet-wide scanning and device discovery. The speed at which (vulnerable) devices can be discovered, and the device monoculture, mean that a single exploit, potentially trivial, can affect millions of devices across brands and continents.
In an attempt to detect and profile the growing threat of autonomous and Internet-scale attacks against the Internet of Things, we revisit honeypots, resources that appear to be legitimate systems. We show that this endeavour was previously limited by a fundamentally flawed generation of honeypots and associated misconceptions.
We show with two one-year-long studies that the display of warning messages has no deterrent effect in an attacked computer system. Previous research assumed that they would measure individual behaviour, but we find that the number of human attackers is orders of magnitude lower than previously assumed.
Turning to the current generation of low- and medium-interaction honeypots, we demonstrate that their architecture is fatally flawed. The use of off-the-shelf libraries to provide the transport layer means that the protocols are implemented subtly differently from the systems being impersonated. We developed a generic technique which can find any such honeypot at Internet scale with just one packet for an established TCP connection.
We then applied our technique and conducted several Internet-wide scans over a one-year period. By logging in to two SSH honeypots and sending specific commands, we not only revealed their configuration and patch status, but also found that many of them were not up to date. As we were the first to knowingly authenticate to honeypots, we provide a detailed legal analysis and an extended ethical justification for our research to show why we did not infringe computer-misuse laws.
Lastly, we present honware, a honeypot framework for rapid implementation and deployment of high-interaction honeypots. Honware automatically processes a standard firmware image and can emulate a wide range of devices without any access to the manufacturers' hardware. We believe that honware is a major contribution towards re-balancing the economics of attackers and defenders by reducing the period in which attackers can exploit vulnerabilities at Internet scale in a world of ubiquitous networked `things'.Premium Research Studentship, Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Cambridg
Cyber physical anomaly detection for smart homes: A survey
Twenty-first-century human beings spend more than 90\% of their time in indoor environments. The emergence of cyber systems in the physical world has a plethora of benefits towards optimising resources and improving living standards. However, because of significant vulnerabilities in cyber systems, connected physical spaces are exposed to privacy risks in addition to existing and novel security challenges. To mitigate these risks and challenges, researchers opt for anomaly detection techniques. Particularly in smart home environments, the anomaly detection techniques are either focused on network traffic (cyber phenomena) or environmental (physical phenomena) sensors' data. This paper reviewed anomaly detection techniques presented for smart home environments using cyber data and physical data in the past. We categorise anomalies as known and unknown in smart homes. We also compare publicly available datasets for anomaly detection in smart home environments. In the end, we discuss essential key considerations and provide a decision-making framework towards supporting the implementation of anomaly detection systems for smart homes