165,589 research outputs found
Hylomorphism and Resurrection
Hylomorphism provides an attractive framework for addressing issues in philosophical anthropology. After describing a hylomorphic theory that dovetails with current work in philosophy of mind and in scientific disciplines such as biology and neuroscience, I discuss how this theory meshes with Christian eschatology, the doctrine of resurrection in particular
Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Cognitive Psychology
There is a prevalent notion among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that computers are merely formal symbol manipulators, performing the actions they do solely on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate. This view of computers has allowed some philosophers to divorce semantics from computational explanations. Semantic content, then, becomes something one adds to computational explanations to get psychological explanations. Other philosophers, such as Stephen Stich, have taken a stronger view, advocating doing away with semantics entirely. This paper argues that a correct account of computation requires us to attribute content to computational processes in order to explain which functions are being computed. This entails that computational psychology must countenance mental representations. Since anti-semantic positions are incompatible with computational psychology thus construed, they ought to be rejected. Lastly, I argue that in an important sense, computers are not formal symbol manipulators
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A methodology for comparing design processes
Engineering Design Centre, University of Cambridge; Design and Innovation, Open UniversityWe gain insights into design processes by recognising similarities to other processes, often in radically different industries. The crucial determinants of what happens are characteristics shared with some other design processes. But there is no way to draw on comparisons beyond one's own experience. We are developing a programme of comparative design research that aims to map the similarities and differences between design processes, and develop a deeper understanding of how and why design is done differently in different industries, and how effective practices can be transferred between industries. In this paper we outline a methodology for creating analyses of design processes that facilitates both cross-process comparisons and the integration of different analytical perspectives on design. The analyst draws on a catalogue of previous design process descriptions for useful concepts, to map processes as a network of participants and activities and the relationships between them, and describe the causal relationships between the properties of the participants, activities and relationships.EPSR
Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem
In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations)
Review of âPhilosophy in a New Centuryâ by John Searle (2008) (review revised 2019)
Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in âOn Certaintyâ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of âcertaintyâ, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the âbattle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by languageâ which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses.
His last chapter âThe Unity of the Propositionâ (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from reading Wâs âOn Certaintyâ or DMSâs two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to Sâs taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it âA proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfactionâŠand a condition of satisfaction⊠is that such and such is the case.â Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case.
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from Sâs half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with Wâs perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Theoretical ecology as etiological from the start
The worldâs leading environmental advisory institutions look to ecological theory and research as an objective guide for policy and resource management decision-making. In addition to various theoretical merits of doing so, it is therefore crucially important to clear up confusions about ecologyâs conceptual foundations and to make plain the basic workings of inferential methods used in the science. Through discussion of key moments in the genesis of the theoretical branch of ecology, this essay elucidates a general heuristic role of teleological metaphor in ecological research and defuses certain enduring confusions and misguided criticisms of current work in ecology
Review of Radicalizing Enactivism by Hutto and Myin (2012) (review revised 2019)
Probably the leading exponent of Wittgensteinâs ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the âTwo Selvesâ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Huttoâs approach is called âRadical Enactivismâ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of Wittgensteinâs 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this).
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Huttoâs lovely dissection of the ârepresentation rats nestâ in his online papers). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein (hereafter W-who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (hereafter S-who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century, which I have also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I wonât dwell on it here.
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as âthe strongest reading of the embodiment thesisâone that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or lessâ (p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you donât. Much clearer is Fodorâs characterization which he quotes as âabilities are prior to theoriesâ, that âcompetence is prior to contentâ and that âknowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing thatâ (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2.
This is classic Hutto high-level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin, so canât say how much of this text is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Huttoâs work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of âinformationâ and ârepresentationâ in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as
philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. âHence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.â Yes, and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with unmatched clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago.
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I donât see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the âmindâ works at Searleâs door, nor how the convoluted prose about âdecoupled contentful activitiesâ etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of culture (S3)? Beginning and end of story.
Their last chapter is about âregaining consciousness,â but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest an even better filter for folly is mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews, and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible. In sum an excellent book with various faults which I try to correct.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Psychophysical Nature
There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as âphysicalâ relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as âpsychologicalâ. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and external world. The chapter goes on to provide grounds for viewing mind and nature as fundamentally psychophysical, and examines similar views as well as differences in previously unpublished writings of Wolfgang Pauli, one of the founders of quantum mechanics
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