2,822 research outputs found
Complete Insecurity of Quantum Protocols for Classical Two-Party Computation
A fundamental task in modern cryptography is the joint computation of a
function which has two inputs, one from Alice and one from Bob, such that
neither of the two can learn more about the other's input than what is implied
by the value of the function. In this Letter, we show that any quantum protocol
for the computation of a classical deterministic function that outputs the
result to both parties (two-sided computation) and that is secure against a
cheating Bob can be completely broken by a cheating Alice. Whereas it is known
that quantum protocols for this task cannot be completely secure, our result
implies that security for one party implies complete insecurity for the other.
Our findings stand in stark contrast to recent protocols for weak coin tossing,
and highlight the limits of cryptography within quantum mechanics. We remark
that our conclusions remain valid, even if security is only required to be
approximate and if the function that is computed for Bob is different from that
of Alice.Comment: v2: 6 pages, 1 figure, text identical to PRL-version (but reasonably
formatted
SoK: Secure E-voting with Everlasting Privacy
In this work, we systematically analyze all e-voting protocols
designed to provide everlasting privacy. Our main focus is to illustrate
their relations and to identify the research problems which have or have
not been solved in this area
SoK: Secure E-Voting with Everlasting Privacy
Vote privacy is a fundamental right, which needs to be protected not only during an election, or for a limited time afterwards, but for the foreseeable future. Numerous electronic voting (e-voting) protocols have been proposed to address this challenge, striving for everlasting privacy. This property guarantees that even computationally unbounded adversaries cannot break privacy of past elections.
The broad interest in secure e-voting with everlasting privacy has spawned a large variety of protocols over the last three decades. These protocols differ in many aspects, in particular the precise security properties they aim for, the threat scenarios they consider, and the privacy-preserving techniques they employ. Unfortunately, these differences are often opaque, making analysis and comparison cumbersome.
In order to overcome this non-transparent state of affairs, we systematically analyze all e-voting protocols designed to provide everlasting privacy. First, we illustrate the relations and dependencies between all these different protocols. Next, we analyze in depth which protocols do provide secure and efficient approaches to e-voting with everlasting privacy under realistic assumptions, and which ones do not. Eventually, based on our extensive and detailed treatment, we identify which research problems in this field have already been solved, and which ones are still open.
Altogether, our work offers a well-founded reference point for conducting research on secure e-voting with everlasting privacy as well as for future-proofing privacy in real-world electronic elections
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