Against Molinism: A Refutation of William Lane Craig\u27s Molinism

The debate concerning human free will, human moral culpability, and God’s sovereignty has raged for millennia within the Christian church. The recent rediscovery of the medieval philosophical theory known as Molinism brought Molinism to the fore of this debate. One major contemporary proponent of Molinism is William Lane Craig, the famous philosopher, theologian, and apologist. The purpose of this essay is to present a refutation of Craig\u27s brand of Molinism by arguing that Craig’s Molinism relies on a flawed view of human freedom and further fails to reconcile this flawed view of human freedom with God’s sovereignty

Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox

After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on the semantic information theory, a measure b* similar to F is derived from the medical test. Like the likelihood ratio, measures b* and F can only indicate the quality of channels or the testing means instead of the quality of probability predictions. Furthermore, it is still not easy to use b*, F, or another measure to clarify the Raven Paradox. For this reason, measure c* similar to the correct rate is derived. Measure c* supports the Nicod Criterion and undermines the Equivalence Condition, and hence, can be used to eliminate the Raven Paradox. An example indicates that measures F and b* are helpful for diagnosing the infection of Novel Coronavirus, whereas most popular confirmation measures are not. Another example reveals that all popular confirmation measures cannot be used to explain that a black raven can confirm “Ravens are black” more strongly than a piece of chalk. Measures F, b*, and c* indicate that the existence of fewer counterexamples is more important than more positive examples’ existence, and hence, are compatible with Popper’s falsification thought

Preferences for Exposure Control of Power-Frequency Fields among Lay Opinion Leaders

The authors report on surveys, differing according to focus on remedial costs, of Pittsburgh-area adults indicating beliefs about possible health effects of electromagnetic fields and the acceptability of options for reducing or eliminating the potential impact

Interview with Charles Bryan, President, District 100, I.A.M.

[Excerpt] The long-term success of any corporation is fundamental and necessary for the success of the union. So to put your head in the sand and say, \u27I just want to pull my head out when I can, slam my fist on the table and make my demands,\u27 that, I think, is Dark Ages thinking. I want that responsibility. I want to be a part of the decision-making, so that I can be sure that wages be given priority in the distribution of revenue, for example. That was probably one of the most important discoveries that we made

Motivated Reasoning and Response Bias: A Signal Detection Approach

The aim of this dissertation was to address a theoretical debate on belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency for people to be influenced by their prior beliefs when engaged in deductive reasoning. Deduction is the act of drawing necessary conclusions from premises which are meant to be assumed as true. Given that the logical validity of an argument is independent of its content, being influenced by your prior beliefs in such content is considered a bias. Traditional theories posit there are two belief bias components. Motivated reasoning is the tendency to reason better for arguments with unbelievable conclusions relative to arguments with believable conclusions. Response bias is the tendency to accept believable arguments and to reject unbelievable arguments. Dube et al. (2010) pointed out critical methodological problems that undermine evidence for traditional theories. Using signal detection theory (SDT), they found evidence for response bias only. We adopted the SDT method to compare the viability of the traditional and the response bias accounts. In Chapter 1 the relevant literature is reviewed. In Chapter 2 four experiments which employed a novel SDT-based forced choice reasoning method are presented, showing evidence compatible with motivated reasoning. In Chapter 3 four experiments which used the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) method are presented. Crucially, cognitive ability turned out to be linked to motivated reasoning. In Chapter 4 three experiments are presented in which we investigated the impact of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style on belief bias, concluding that cognitive style mediated the effects of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. In Chapter 5 we discuss our findings in light of a novel individual differences account of belief bias. We conclude that using the appropriate measurement method and taking individual differences into account are two key elements to furthering our understanding of belief bias, human reasoning, and cognitive psychology in general.School of Psycholog